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SOME REVOLUTIONS AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC EXPERIENCES





THE RT. HON. SIR HENRY ELLIOT, G.C.B.
From a photograph by Mrs. Robert Benson. *Circa* 1884

SOME REVOLUTIONS
AND OTHER
DIPLOMATIC EXPERIENCES

BY THE LATE RIGHT HON.
SIR HENRY G. ELLIOT, G.C.B.

EDITED BY HIS DAUGHTER

WITH A PORTRAIT

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INTRODUCTION

THESE Recollections were commenced soon after Sir Henry Elliot's retirement from the Diplomatic Service, and were printed, for private circulation only, in the year 1900. Most of his correspondence previous to 1870 was destroyed in that year by the fire which laid in ashes the British Embassy at Constantinople, together with a great part of the city. Fortunately, however, a diary kept during the time of his missions to Naples and Athens was saved, and his brother the Hon. George Elliot, who was private secretary to Lord John Russell, and to whom he wrote regularly during the Neapolitan troubles, preserved his letters. Part of the account of the second mission to Greece is derived from letters to his wife. The style of the book is therefore intimate and colloquial, no thought of publication having entered the writer's mind.

The very frank expressions of disapproval called forth by the conduct and measures of some of the Italian "Liberators" may possibly come as a shock to those whose ardour for the cause of Italian Unity is such as to incline them to overlook the questionable means which were occasionally resorted to on its behalf. It is not the first great cause that has suffered in repute from the zeal of supporters who in their enthusiasm adopt the creed that the end justifies the

means; religion, liberty, patriotism have all alike suffered from this perverted view of duty, and it is right that the truth should always be impartially recorded, even at the cost of the loss of some cherished illusions. Englishmen are apt to misjudge Continental nations whose standards are different from our own. An example of this difference may be cited: when the doors of the Neapolitan gaols were opened Mrs. Elliot remonstrated with the Italian butler for allowing the escaped prisoners to loiter round the house; his answer was typical: "Ma perchè no? Sono brava gente; non sono ladri, sono assassini!" Comment is needless.

With regard to Sir Henry's career in Turkey a few words respecting the part he played there may not be out of place. In the year 1876 there occurred the terrible excesses commonly known as the "Bulgarian Atrocities," which led to an agitation in England imperilling the existence of the Conservative Government. A full account of what took place will be found in the chapter entitled "The Bulgarian Atrocities," but further elucidation is required of a paragraph in which Sir Henry writes: "A despatch from the Vice-Consul at Adrianople, which in the ordinary routine of the service ought at once to have been communicated to me, was improperly withheld from me and given to the correspondent of the *Daily News*; the public thus got from a newspaper much that the Government should have learnt from me if it had not been for this unjustifiable proceeding, of which I remained in ignorance for two years, when the officer who had so

misconduct himself was already dead." In this short sentence is contained the key to the subsequent agitation. The Consul-General at Constantinople was then Sir Philip Francis, a very able man and a fanatical Liberal; the personal relations between the Consulate-General and the Embassy were excellent, but Sir Philip's jealousy of the higher status of the Embassy, and his dislike of the Conservative Government and policy, were well known to all. According to the general rule, Vice-Consuls do not correspond directly with an Embassy, but only through their superintending Consul or Consul-General—a rule the inconvenience of which in the case of despatches on political subjects has caused it to be frequently disregarded, but on the observance of which Sir Philip Francis insisted. Early in 1876 Vice-Consul Dupuis reported from Adrianople serious excesses committed by Turkish irregular troops; his despatch was retained by Sir Philip and shown to Sir Edwin (then Mr.) Pears, the correspondent of the *Daily News*. Sir Edwin, himself the soul of honour, never knew that this document did not reach the Embassy. Two years later it was discovered by Sir Philip's successor and sent home, Sir Philip having died within a few months of the suppression of the despatch.

Thus Lord Beaconsfield was kept inadequately informed and made the speech which gave such offence, and the match was applied to the gunpowder which nearly blew the Administration out of office. In his letters he frequently alludes to "Sir Henry's lamentable want of energy and deficiency of information

throughout";* "Elliot's stupidity has nearly brought us to great peril. If he had acted with promptitude, or even kept himself informed, these 'atrocities' might have been checked. As it is he has brought us into a position, most unjustly, of being thought to connive at them."† There is no doubt that Lord Beaconsfield had real cause for complaint of lack of information, and the burking of the news contained in Mr. Dupuis' despatch put both him and Sir Henry in the wrong in the eyes of the public; but the staff of Consuls in the Near East was numerically far too small to admit of an adequate supply of trustworthy information: this defect was later on fully realised by Lord Beaconsfield, who then appointed numerous Consuls throughout the Turkish Empire. Their number was subsequently reduced as a measure of economy by the next Liberal Administration, a course much to be regretted, as the presence of an accredited British agent is undoubtedly a great protection to the subject races.

Sir Henry would never allow the story of the withheld despatch to be told in Lady Francis's lifetime, as he said that the mischief was done, and Lady Francis would suffer acutely from the exposure of her husband's conduct.

With regard to the Constantinople Conference the facts are too clearly set out in the "Recollections" to need much comment, but it may be remarked that the initial mistake was made when Constantinople was

* *Life of Lord Beaconsfield*, vol. vi., p. 46.

† *Ibid.*, vol. vi., p. 51.

chosen as the place of meeting. Few people who have not resided there for some years can in the least realize the atmosphere of intrigue which pervades the city, or the difficulty of sifting truth from untruth. Deceitfulness is not the attribute of one race only, and the newcomer generally becomes the partisan of the side which at the moment is provided with the most plausible advocate.

The failure of the Conference and the subsequent war brought about the defeat of the Reforming party in Turkey; it was crushed, and its heads placed at the mercy of Sultan Abdul Hamid. Sir Henry deplored this to the end of his life, and it was especially bitter to him as having resulted from the action of the Liberal party in England, who might have been expected to support any movement for Reform. The belief that every man's hand was against them, and the fact that reforms were only demanded on behalf of the Christians, have largely contributed to foster the intensely Nationalist feeling exhibited by the "Young Turk" party, a feeling adroitly exploited by German diplomacy, which, while perfectly indifferent to the sufferings of the Christians, saw in the Nationalist movement a ready instrument for furthering German interests in the Near East: that this influence was founded on tyranny and cemented with tears mattered nothing.

At Vienna Sir Henry's position was exceptionally good; a fine horseman, he greatly enjoyed the opportunity of hunting, and this sport brought him into intimate contact with the Emperor Francis Joseph and the leading Hungarian statesmen. At that time

the success of the Austro-Hungarian Agreement (1867) was often cited by advocates of Home Rule for Ireland as an inducement for applying some such arrangement in the Sister Isle, though in reality the conditions were not analogous. Sir Henry, however, remained a staunch Unionist and, though a convinced Liberal, always preferred to vote for a Conservative Parliamentary Candidate than for any Liberal Home Ruler.

He never lost his interest in Russia, where the first six years of his diplomatic career were spent, and he read every book that was published about that country, frequently remarking that “A revolution would come there, though not in his lifetime, and that when it came the horrors would surpass anything previously known in history: the French Revolution would be a joke compared to it.”

Sir Henry’s last years were spent between London and Ardington House, Wantage, a charming place lent to him and Lady Elliot by Lord and Lady Wantage, with whom they were on terms of the most affectionate friendship. From Ardington he attended assiduously to his duties on the Bench, and hunted regularly till his 83rd year, when he gave it up after the death of Lady Elliot, to whom he was devotedly attached and with whom he had enjoyed over fifty years of an ideally happy life. A man of singularly humane and sensitive nature, it had fallen to his lot to be held up to obloquy as a monster dead to all human feelings, but although he felt the injustice acutely he never allowed it to embitter him. As a

public servant his one aim was to serve his country to the utmost of his ability and strength, regardless as to whether his views were popular or the reverse: what affected himself only was a secondary consideration. His faculties remained unclouded to the end of his long life; but in his 88th year his sight began to fail; he could no longer read, and became dependent on others for what had been his principal delight, the study of books; a severe trial, but borne without a murmur, his only remark being that he was fortunate to be able to see his way about. He had no fear of death; to him it meant reunion with all he loved most; but when at length he passed away, on March 30, 1907, he was sorely missed by many who had never claimed his sympathy or wise counsel in vain.

GERTRUDE ELLIOT.

January 1922.

[NOTE.—The short Introductions to the Chapters, which are printed in smaller type, have been written by the Editor to enable the reader to follow the narrative without any effort of memory, and do not pretend to throw any new light on the subject.]



PREFACE

THESE recollections, with very trifling subsequent correction, were written while the events mentioned in them were still fresh in my mind.

From the journals and letters of which the extracts are given much has been omitted, but the rest is precisely as it was hurriedly jotted down, and describes things as they appeared to me at the moment, together with the impressions they conveyed to me, whether these happened afterwards to be confirmed or not.

H. E.

July 1900.



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Some Revolutions and Other Diplomatic Experiences

CHAPTER I

AUSTRALIA—NAPLES, 1841–1860

[In May 1859, when Mr. Elliot was appointed to Naples, the disturbances and excitement which had prevailed in Italy ever since the revolutionary risings of 1848-9 had reached their climax. Italy's first general effort for freedom had failed, the Austrian Archdukes had returned to their Duchies, Pope Pius IX. had renounced all Liberal principles, and a Bourbon Prince married to an Austrian Archduchess had ruled at Naples without regard to justice or humanity. All hope of a federation of Italian States was abandoned, but only to be replaced by the more practical scheme of a United Italy under the sceptre of the House of Savoy.

In 1853 Count Cavour had become Prime Minister at Turin, and that far-seeing statesman secured a voice in the councils of Europe by sending a contingent of Sardinian troops to the support of France and England in the Crimea; in especial he gained the ear of the Emperor Louis Napoleon, and obtained from him in 1858 a secret promise of support should war again break out against Austria. The tortuous policy pursued by the French Foreign Office with regard to Neapolitan Affairs is explained by the difficult position in which the Emperor found himself at home. On the one side he posed as the champion of liberty and hoped to bind Italy to himself by the bonds of gratitude, on the other he was checked by the strong Catholic feeling of many of his subjects, a feeling most prevalent in the Empress's *entourage*; and although he probably sincerely wished for a certain measure of liberty and good government in Italy, he by no means intended to set up a State sufficiently powerful to act as a counterpoise to France. Such was the condition of affairs in 1859 when Mr. Elliot arrived in Naples after the death of King Ferdinand II., the hated "Bomba"; he was charged with the British Government's congratulations to the young King Francis on his

accession, coupled with serious warnings and advice, destined to be disregarded, as such advice generally is when not backed by force. Many years afterwards King Francis regretfully observed to an Austrian friend: “If I had followed Elliot’s advice I should still be on my throne !”]

IT falls to the lot of few of my cloth to be present at so many stirring events as passed before me in the different countries where I served after becoming Minister. The dethronement of four Sovereigns—accompanied in one case by the extinction of an ancient dynasty and kingdom, and followed in another by the tragical death of the deposed monarch; the election of a new King in a third case; the assassination of two Cabinet Ministers while sitting in Council, and the murder of two Consuls by a fanatical mob—make up such a goodly list of sensational occurrences, of all of which I had better opportunities than almost anyone of knowing the details, that I am tempted to leave some of my reminiscences of them behind me.

It was by the merest chance that I came to enter the diplomatic profession, as it was about the last that would have been deliberately chosen for me, for I well remember that, while I was growing up and asked my father what he proposed that I should do, he used to evade the question and only answered that the army was a wretched profession and diplomacy a worse.

So I went to Cambridge without a notion of what line I was to follow, and, to say the truth, troubling myself little with thoughts of the future, quite content to live “*au jour le jour*,” thoroughly idle, but in no respect dissipated, not reading but making neither debts nor bad friends.

I had been about eighteen months at the University when, in the middle of the Long Vacation of 1836, my father suddenly proposed to me that I should go to Australia, to which Sir John Franklin, the great Arctic explorer, was about to sail as Governor of Van Diemen’s Land, as Tasmania was then called.

With what precise object I was sent I never quite made out, for before I sailed my father never explained his views to me, and a letter which he put into my hands on the last morning did not say much more than that if I was steady I "could not fail to do well," and hinted at money to be sent out to me later for investment; and my belief is that he in no small degree shared the vague impression, so general at that time, that anyone going to Australia could, if he liked, find the means of making his fortune in some way or other.

However, be this as it may, his decision was the best possible thing for me, for, if I did not make my fortune, I changed an idle life for one of active occupation and interest, and acquired experience and useful habits. He recommended me to Sir John Franklin, one of the finest characters that ever lived, who on the passage appointed me his civil A.D.C., and about a year later his private secretary, thus bringing me into real work, keeping me in his house all the time, and treating me in every respect as if I had been his own son.

I did not hesitate a moment in agreeing to my father's proposal, for I was nineteen, eager to be doing something for myself, and the chance of seeing a new world had an irresistible attraction—and a new world in every sense of the word it really was at that time.

When I landed at Hobart Town at the end of 1836, Van Diemen's Land had existed as a colony for barely twenty-five years, and the entire population of the island was still under 40,000, of which the half either were or had been convicts. The city of Melbourne, with its present half-million of inhabitants, consisted when I saw it of some dozen or so of brick or stone houses, the rest being mere "wattle and daub" shanties; but I gave some of my Australian recollections in an article in the November number of the *Nineteenth Century* of 1889, and I do not propose to repeat them.

When I got home after four years' absence my future

was as uncertain as ever, but on going to see one of my best Cambridge friends, who was Précis Writer at the Foreign Office, he told me that he was just going to resign, whereupon I got my father to go to Lord Palmerston, who gave me the place right off, and the next year, before leaving office in 1841, he appointed me a paid attaché at St. Petersburg, and I was fairly launched in the diplomatic service. I remained there six years, and was then made Secretary of Legation, first at The Hague and then at Vienna, where I received my promotion as Minister at a moment when I least expected it. In those days party politics entered a good deal into diplomatic appointments, and when in the spring of 1858 Lord Palmerston's Government were defeated on his Conspiracy Bill, and had to make way for the Tories, my prospects did not appear brilliant, and it was a complete surprise to me when Lord Malmesbury, on becoming Foreign Secretary, at once appointed me Minister to Denmark, where, however, I was not destined to remain long; for in little more than a twelvemonth a succession of fortunate accidents landed me in the Legation of Naples—at that time the most enviable post in the whole diplomatic service, and which, thanks to Garibaldi, was also soon to become the one most full of interest and excitement.

I had been home on a short leave, and the day before I was to return to Copenhagen, when I called at the Foreign Office to say good-bye to Lord Malmesbury, he told me that he had just heard of the death of Ferdinand, the King of the Two Sicilies, and that he wanted me first to go at once to Naples to congratulate Francis II. on his accession, and to re-establish the diplomatic relations which we and the French had broken off three years before, when Bomba had snapped his fingers at our remonstrances against his misgovernment.

My mission was to be a special and complimentary

one, not intended to last more than a few weeks, and Lord Malmesbury quickly appointed Sir Arthur Magenis as permanent Minister; but my lucky star was in the ascendant, and a change of Government in England put an end to that arrangement: Lord Palmerston became Prime Minister and Lord John Russell Foreign Secretary, and their views on Italian politics were so diametrically opposed to those of their predecessors, which Magenis—a *codino* of the *codini*—was known to share, that the appointment was cancelled, and after being offered to Lord Napier, who fortunately refused it, it was given to me.

When I left England on this special mission in May 1859, the war of France and Sardinia against Austria had just begun, and Lord Malmesbury's feelings were so strongly on the side of the latter that he was afraid lest the young Sovereign of the Two Sicilies might be induced to throw in his lot with the Liberal party, which was calling for an alliance with Victor Emmanuel, and his very last words to me were an injunction to use every endeavour to dissuade the Neapolitan Government from joining the allies. If there had ever been a chance of their doing so it was past before I reached Naples, so that I was not called upon to act upon instructions which it would have been very repugnant to me to execute, though there is little doubt that if King Francis had then frankly and fairly adopted the course so much dreaded by Lord Malmesbury he would have averted the fall of his dynasty. Lord Palmerston and Lord John, with a much truer appreciation of the movement for constitutional reform that was going on throughout Italy, and of the discontent prevailing in the south, clearly perceived that a persistence in his father's system of government must before long lead to the loss of his throne, and I was not backward in following their instructions to do all in my power to impress upon the King and his Ministers that a refusal to satisfy the

just expectations of the people would be followed by their ruin.

Naples and Sicily were at that time entirely governed by an irresponsible police, uncontrolled by any form of law, and regardless of the most elementary considerations of justice. Men by hundreds were arrested, exiled, or imprisoned for years, not only without going through any kind of trial, but often without being even informed of what or by whom they were accused, or being allowed the opportunity of saying a word to explain or refute the accusation; but the strong-willed Ferdinand, backed by a powerful body of Swiss or Bavarian mercenaries, and assured of the support of Austria in resisting the demands of his people for reform, had been able to prevent the general discontent from breaking into open insurrection.

It was evident, from the outset, that this system could not be maintained by his feeble successor, Francis II. His intelligence, naturally of a low order, had not been improved by an education intentionally neglected by his step-mother, the second wife of Ferdinand, an Austrian Archduchess, who shortly before the death of her husband had been more than suspected of a design of getting Francis set aside in order to secure the succession for her own son, Count Trani.

She was, however, a strong-minded, masterful woman, who, in spite of her notorious want of affection for her step-son, had succeeded in establishing her authority over him, and in convincing him that his father had been the incarnation of wisdom, and that dissimulation was the first quality of king-craft.

He had none of that generosity of nature which might have prompted him to appeal to his people, asking them for their support and promising to redress their grievances, at a moment when an impressionable population like the Neapolitans would have been quite ready to look kindly on their young Sovereign if they had seen a symptom of his looking kindly upon them.

An entire want of sympathy or feeling for others was visible in a cold manner, unlike everything you would wish to see in a young man of twenty-three, and it was painfully exhibited before his whole Court on the day on which he received the homage of all the great people of his kingdom. He stood on a carpet in front of the throne, and as the lieges passed before him they kissed his hand, which he did not take the trouble to raise, allowing it, when they had kissed it, to fall back by his side as if it had been the hand of a doll, while he did not even look at the person who was doing homage, but peered about examining those who were coming next. One very infirm old man caught his foot in the carpet and fell flat on his face close to the feet of the King, who neither stirred to help him nor allowed a muscle of his face to move while the poor old fellow, awkwardly and with difficulty, scrambled up and passed him without a word from the King of condolence for his mishap or of enquiry whether he was hurt. It afforded an insight into the King's disposition, and it must have impressed many of his subjects who witnessed the scene much as it did me, when I remarked to my neighbour that "that young man will finish badly."

We got to Naples in the very height of the war in Lombardy, the battle of Magenta being fought on June 4, the day I believe of our arrival, and three weeks later Solferino brought the war to a close, and was followed before the middle of July by the Peace of Villafranca, which, incomplete and unsatisfactory as it was, put an end to the preponderance of Austria in Italy, where it had been disastrously exercised in opposing all attempts to bring about the much-needed constitutional reforms.

The clauses of the treaty under which Tuscany, Parma and Modena were to revert to their respective Grand Dukes were defeated by the prompt action of the Sardinian Government in provoking a unanimous

expression of the feelings of the populations, which made the execution of the arrangement impossible, and the incorporation of the Duchies as well as of Lombardy in the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel was successfully carried out.

From that moment some of the more daring spirits began to look upon a United Italy as a possibility, but these belonged exclusively to the republican followers of Mazzini, and at that time the strongest of the Neapolitan Liberals would have been found absolutely unanimous in repudiating with indignation the notion of their absorption into the comparatively small northern kingdom of Sardinia.

The reforming party at Naples wished to maintain the kingdom of the Two Sicilies as an independent Constitutional state, while the Sicilians, hating not only the Bourbon dynasty but the connection with Naples, wanted complete independence, with a Sovereign of their own; and it was not till after the extraordinary success of Garibaldi that all parties united in regarding incorporation with Piedmont as the only issue left open to them.

When King Ferdinand died it had been hoped that there would be at least some relaxation of the system he had maintained, and some disposition to govern with a little regard for law; and when it was seen that there was no appearance of any improvement the discontent among all classes became more intense and more dangerous.

Among the many evil growths springing from long misgovernment there was that singular institution called the Camorra. There was no class, high or low, that had not its representatives among the members of the society, which was a vast organised association for the extortion of blackmail in every conceivable shape and form. Officials, officers of the King's household, the police and others were affiliated with the most desperate of the criminal classes in carrying

out the depredations, and none was too high or too low to escape them. If a petition was to be presented to the Sovereign or to a Minister it had to be paid for; at every gate of the town Camorriste were stationed to exact a toll on each cart or donkey load brought to market by the peasants; and, on getting into a hackney *carrosel* in the street, I have seen one of the band run up and get his fee from the driver. No one thought of refusing to pay, for the consequences of a refusal were too well known, anyone rash enough to demur being apt to be found soon after mysteriously stabbed by some unknown individual, whom the police were careful never to discover. The association was rich and did a flourishing business, for, though the contributions levied by the lower members might be in pennies or halfpennies, those taken by the higher ones were on a different scale.

But while the police connived at ordinary criminals, their zeal and activity knew no bounds in hunting down supposed political offenders, and they treated as such all those who held opinions considered objectionable, although not accused of any illegal act. One day, in a conversation with the Minister, when he had frequently alluded to the revolutionists, upon my asking him what he meant by the term, he naïvely defined it as meaning "all those who wished to make changes not approved of by the Government." Thus every man who advocated any reform of prevailing abuses was regarded as a conspirator, and in order to deal with such persons a list had been made of them, and, under the name of the *Attendibili*, they were placed at the absolute discretion of the police of their districts. The *Attendibili* were of all classes, from the large landed proprietors and tradesmen down to the peasant, and were said to number some 150,000 persons. They could not move from the *rayon* assigned to them: the proprietor could not visit his neighbour, and the peasant could not carry his produce to the

market town if it lay beyond his bounds. On the slightest suspicion, or even without it, this surveillance could be changed to close imprisonment at the mere caprice of the police, from which there was no appeal.

Another frightful abuse was the arrest and imprisonment of men on secret private denunciation, more especially on that of the priests, who, when they wanted to get a man out of the way, sometimes with the most infamous object, accused him of *bestemmia* or blasphemy, and on the fall of the monarchy the number who were found in prison under this head almost exceeded belief, *bestemmia* being, in most cases, only another name for priestly denunciation.

Anyone of influence could get a person arrested, and I was once very unwittingly the cause of a man being put in prison for a fortnight, where no doubt I could have kept him as long as I chose. An English actress at one of the theatres had come to me to complain that her manager would not pay her according to her engagement, and asked me to intercede for her, which I did by requesting the Director-General of Theatres to have her complaint examined into. About a fortnight later another woman called in great distress, and, on being asked what she wanted, said she had come to beseech me not to keep her husband any longer in prison ! And when I asked what, in the name of fortune, she meant, she sobbed out that her husband was the manager of a theatre, and had been shut up by my desire on the complaint of one of his actresses, but for the sake of herself and children she hoped I would not keep him any longer in prison. It was an excellent example of the way things were done at Naples in those days, and no doubt the Director-General thought he had taken the simplest way of obliging the British Minister, without considering it at all necessary to make an enquiry into the merits of the case; though the fact of the complaining actress

being a very pretty woman may perhaps have influenced him as much as my recommendation.

The expiration of a condemned prisoner's sentence gave no security that he would be released, as I discovered upon an occasion when I had complained that a British subject was not discharged when he had completed the term of imprisonment to which he had been sentenced for a felony. The Minister had the man released at my demand, but explained that there was nothing irregular in his detention, as at Naples "no prisoner was discharged on the expiration of his sentence unless the police considered that it might be done without disadvantage." Practically, therefore, the shortest possible term to which a man could be sentenced might be indefinitely prolonged at the mere discretion of the police, and the Minister who explained these rules seemed quite incapable of perceiving their monstrosity.

Such was the system which the Neapolitan people had groaned under during the reign of Ferdinand, and from which they hoped to be relieved on the accession of his successor; and when it appeared that there was no change to be expected, it was not difficult to foresee that their patience must soon be exhausted.

Almost from the first day of my arrival at Naples I began to urge the Ministers either to bring to trial or to liberate the people who had been lying for years in prison uncondemned and untried, but I totally failed in my endeavours. When pressed, they admitted without the slightest hesitation or shame that these men were not tried because there was not sufficient evidence on which it would be possible to convict them, and that their detention was contrary to law; but as to releasing them in consequence of the illegality of their imprisonment—oh, that was quite another affair, and could not be thought of.

The Government were not content with refusing to let out the persons illegally imprisoned by King

Ferdinand, but continued to carry on arbitrary arrests as before, and amongst the persons taken up at that time there was a young man of the name of Pandola, whose mother, a sister of Mat. Higgins,* well known in London as the Gentle Giant, had asked me to intercede for him, and she came afterwards to thank me for the improvement in his treatment that I had succeeded in getting. She told me that for thirty-five days after his arrest, for which no cause was assigned, he, being like his uncle the giant, about seven feet high, had been shut up in a wretched subterranean cell, eight feet square, in which, for the first eighteen days, he was not even allowed a book; seeing absolutely no one, his food being thrust into the cell by the gaoler once in the twenty-four hours; and without his being told what he was accused of or who were his accusers. In consequence of my representations he was at last removed to better quarters, and ultimately released without ever being questioned or brought to trial; but there was nothing in the least unusual in this case, for there were numbers of similar ones, only with the difference that few of them were as fortunate as Pandola in having someone to interest himself about them.

The Government, however, found that it was absolutely necessary to do something to diminish the general discontent, and, as the list of the *Attendibili*, affecting as it did so many persons, caused more of it than any of the other abuses, and was moreover so manifestly illegal, it was pompously announced that the system should be abolished.

When the royal decree was published giving effect to this decision, I thought a real step towards improvement had been taken, and I innocently congratulated myself in having had a hand in bringing it about. But I was then still strange to the ways of Neapolitan Ministers, and it soon began to be whispered that no change had taken place in the position of the *Atten-*

* Also known as Jacob Omnim.

dibili, and it at last oozed out that the royal decree in their favour had been forwarded to the prefects of the provinces accompanied by a confidential ministerial letter which practically nullified it. The decree had been a mere sham; designed to throw dust in the eyes of the uninformed part of the public and of the foreign representatives, who with a great flourish of trumpets duly reported to their Governments the proof given by King Francis of his wish to remove any abuse complained of by his people, while in reality he had not the slightest intention of abandoning the system of governing the country solely by a police, irresponsible and set above the law.

The summer and winter of 1859 passed without the occurrence of anything serious, and, though there was plenty to indicate the existence of dangerous discontent, the Camarilla which surrounded the King continued to live in a fool's paradise, and persons who ought to have known better shared their sense of security.

Among the people who visited Naples at that time was Count Buol* Schauenstein, the late Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who ought to have known more than anyone about the state of affairs in Italy, and he declared to me that he had been astonished to find how entirely satisfactory everything was. He was of course prepared to find that there was immense exaggeration in the English accounts of misgovernment and discontent; but he was not prepared to learn, as he now had, that there was really neither general discontent nor any kind of misgovernment likely to lead to it. He had, he said, been a week at Naples making enquiries, and he was perfectly satisfied from all he had heard that there was nothing to justify any apprehension of coming trouble for the

* Karl Ferdinand Count Buol von Schauenstein, Austrian statesman. Represented Austria at the Dresden Conference of 1850-51, and again at Vienna in 1855. Was for many years Minister for Foreign Affairs. Belonged to the Metternich school of politics.

new Sovereign, and he seemed to have a contemptuous pity for me when I expressed a very contrary opinion.

Count Buol's doubts upon another subject had also been removed. He said that he had not known what to think of the annual miracle of the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius, and had been rather inclined to look upon it as a trick; but he had now witnessed it, and was fully satisfied of the reality of the miracle, and that all imposture was impossible!

In fact, everything was perfect in this model monarchy, in the opinion of Count Buol, scarcely six months before the breaking up of the Neapolitan kingdom, and when it was already evident to everyone who chose to enquire for himself that the whole concern was rotten to the very core; but if he, who had played a great part in European politics, and was certainly not wanting in intelligence, allowed himself to be persuaded by the Camarilla of the excellence of the Government and the contentedness of the kingdom, it is scarcely to be wondered at if the King, with his narrow mind, was lulled into a fatal security.

Count Buol's opinions, as those of the late Foreign Minister of Austria, would naturally have great weight with the King, and it cannot be doubted that he urged His Majesty to pay no heed to the recommendations of those who were counselling the adoption of liberal reforms; but while the Government professed to feel no anxiety they stimulated the police to greater activity than ever, and in December they issued a secret order directing the Intendants of the provinces to "proceed without the least hesitation to arrest anyone who may afford grounds of guilt and even of simple suspicion," and they were told to show by their acts their obedience to these instructions.

The Intendants were not backward in acting in the way that was expected of them by those on whose favour they depended, and unmotived arrests became more frequent than ever. At the beginning of March

1860 I wrote that the Government no longer stopped short at arresting persons upon whom grounds of suspicion might rest, but had determined to arrest men free of all suspicion excepting that of holding liberal opinions. A large batch had been ordered to be seized, of whom some had been able to conceal themselves, and among them were no less than five of my own friends or acquaintances, men of the highest station, and certainly not conspirators or revolutionists, though holding Liberal, and most of them very moderate Liberal, opinions—Prince Torella, his brother the Marquis de Bella, Prince Camporeale, Duke Proto, and the Marquis Vulcano.

When I spoke of these arrests to the Minister the next day, he said that it had been done to prevent a contemplated demonstration in favour of annexation to Sardinia, and, upon my asking whether he or anyone else could believe that a man like Prince Torella would be a leader in such a demonstration, he at once replied that he did not, and that the Prince's arrest had been an "error," but that he had since been released.

I begged him not to talk to me about a man like Prince Torella being arrested by mistake; the Government no doubt felt that they had committed a mistake, but it was that of miscalculating the effect of their ill-advised measure which now forced them to retrace their steps.

The Minister having then authorised me to convey to some of those who were eluding the police the assurance that they should not be further molested, I left them, saying that "As I felt convinced that the destruction both of the King and of his dynasty was inevitable unless wiser counsels were listened to, I would beg him to request for me the honour of an audience of His Majesty, in order that, when the catastrophe arrived, I might not have upon my conscience the reflection that I had not done all in my power to save an inexperienced Sovereign from ruin."

When I got my audience I spoke to the King as plainly as I had spoken to his Minister, and I did all I could to open his eyes to the real state of things, and to the dangers that were approaching him, but he could not be brought to see that there were any grievances of which his people could complain, or any discontent except among a few factious, ill-disposed individuals. He showed no disposition to govern otherwise than through his police, and expressed, and I believe felt, perfect confidence in his security.

When King Francis succeeded to the throne our Government were anxious for the maintenance of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and for the avoidance of a revolution likely to endanger the general peace, which was not to be hoped for if the brutal police despotism was continued; and in the interest of the new King I was instructed to protest urgently against it, while carefully avoiding every appearance of dictation, and giving no opinion as to the time or mode of restoring to animation the Constitution that had long been suspended.

Lord John Russell's despatches were admirable. He had hardly been a fortnight in office when he wrote: " You will press strongly on the Minister the necessity of abolishing as soon as possible the despotism of the police. Men may differ about the merits of representative constitutions; but there can be no difference of opinion among enlightened men about the necessity of a due, impartial and speedy administration of justice."

Again, on July 9 he wrote: " Her Majesty's Government concur in the opinion you express of the importance of the King's deciding at once to adopt a liberal system of internal policy as the only chance of averting a political convulsion and of maintaining himself and his dynasty on the throne.

" It is hardly credible that either His Majesty, or any of the counsellors by whom he is surrounded, should

shut their eyes to the perils of the present moment, or expect that when the rest of Italy is agitated by the hopes of liberty and improvement in its social position, Naples alone should remain uninfluenced by the general movement.

"The King may now with a good grace enter upon a new system of government, without exposing himself to any imputation of inconsistency.

"It may suit the purposes of those who have thriven on past abuses to encourage the King to follow in his father's footsteps, for a change of system would probably lead to their ruin; but it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the King has now to choose between the ruin of his evil counsellors and his own: *if he supports and upholds them, and places himself under their guidance, it requires not much foresight to predict that the Bourbon dynasty will cease to reign at Naples, by whatever combination, regal or republican, it may be replaced.*

"Her Majesty's Government fully admit that it is not desirable that any Government should be hasty or intrusive in giving advice regarding domestic changes in another country, but when the throne of an ally may be endangered it becomes the duty of a friendly Power to say that, notwithstanding its desire to see the present dynasty maintained on the throne of Naples, neither the moral nor the material support of England is to be looked for by the King, if, by a continual denial of justice and the refusal of an improved form of internal administration, the Neapolitan people should be driven into insurrection and should succeed in expelling the present dynasty from the throne."

It is altogether untrue that, as has often been asserted, Lord Palmerston's Government was ill-disposed towards King Francis from the outset of his reign, or that at the last he had any just cause of complaint against them. They had wished, by the only practicable means, to save him from the fate

they saw impending over him, and they had warned him that if he chose to neglect those means he had no sympathy to look for from England; but he thought fit to laugh at their warnings and their advice, and he had nobody to thank for his fate but himself and his Camarilla. Even up to the very eve of the sailing of Garibaldi's expedition they continued to show their good-will towards him, by pressing the Sardinian Government to engage to abstain from any aggression or hostile act against him.

It cost Count Cavour nothing to give a promise he had not the slightest intention of keeping, and during the events that followed, in spite of my own strong sympathy with the Italian Liberals and my abhorrence of the Neapolitan Government, I saw enough to revolt me of the proceedings of the Ré Galantuomo and his great Minister.

Three years before, when Pisacani with his band of volunteers was defeated in his attempt to land and get up a revolution in the Neapolitan States, Count Cavour had hastened to express to the King of Naples the indignation of his Sovereign at such a criminal attack upon a friendly State by desperate conspirators, which he said was a "crime of robbery and rebellion deserving to be punished by the ordinary law, and in no way to be confounded with a state of legal war."

But although Garibaldi's expedition was the exact counterpart of that of Pisacani, composed like it of the same disreputable elements, of adventurers of all nationalities—English, Italians, Poles, Hungarians, etc.—with scarcely a shred of character among them, though full of the dare-devil courage requisite for such an enterprise, Cavour would hardly have been open to reproach if he had simply taken advantage of their success to forward the ambition of his country; but between this and the conniving at and assisting a filibustering expedition against a friendly State, while

deluding its Sovereign with misleading assurances of good-will, there is a very vast difference.

At the time when Cavour promised our Government to abstain from every hostile act against Naples, his agents there and in Sicily had long been working to stir up revolutionary movements: Garibaldi's expedition was being got ready by means of money furnished by Victor Emmanuel and of arms professedly stolen from the royal arsenals; Admiral Persano was instructed not to interfere with it, and was even permitted on one occasion to escort it and protect it from the Neapolitan cruisers. Cavour had resolved to make use of Garibaldi, but he dreaded his getting entirely into the hands of the "party of action" or Mazzinian republicans, of whom his partisans were mainly composed, and his correspondence with Persano shows his anxiety upon this score, and that he felt the necessity of being ready at the proper moment to take the control of events from the hands of the Dictator and to transfer it to those of his own Sovereign.

The two men were indispensable to each other, but there was distrust on both sides, and on that of Garibaldi at least a mortal hatred of the Minister to whose more than connivance he alone owed his success, and through whom he was at last saved from utter destruction by the opportune intervention of the regular Sardinian army; but, as that intervention, while saving him and his volunteers, necessarily transferred his authority to the King, the late Dictator had to retire to his island of Caprera in the disgust and anger with which he pursued Count Cavour to the end of his life with relentless bitterness.

Counting upon the discontent prevailing in Sicily and Naples, Cavour and Garibaldi had hoped to get up a general insurrection, which was to be the excuse for the landing of bands of sympathising volunteers held in readiness to ensure the success of the move-

ment; and with this object the latter was ready to resort to means from which Cavour, unscrupulous as he was, would most assuredly have recoiled; for Garibaldi's plan was that the insurrection should commence with the assassination of Maniscalco, the Chief of Police, and one or two other obnoxious individuals.

When this plot became known to me, through a letter accidentally mis-sent to one of our Consuls and forwarded to me, I at first entirely refused to consider it authentic, or to believe that Garibaldi could sanction anything that appeared so contrary to a character that had in it so much that was great and generous; but unfortunately there can be no doubt of his having accepted the hateful Mazzinian doctrine of the dagger, as was proved when a letter of his was published, openly advocating assassination as a legitimate arm against the "agents of tyranny." The bulletins of his Committee at Naples, of which I have still some copies, bear the device of three fraternal hands grasping a dagger; and during his Dictatorship he issued a decree conferring a pension on the family of a certain Agesilao Milano as a man entitled to the gratitude of his country for the attempted murder of King Ferdinand, for which he was executed. Although, when the Dictator's Neapolitan decrees were confirmed *en bloc* by the Italian Government, this one among the rest acquired the force of law, Victor Emmanuel's Ministers afterwards declared to me that, whatever might be the legal right of the Milano family, they never had paid and never would pay a farthing of a grant made for such an infamous cause; but the blot upon Garibaldi must always remain.

All efforts to get up insurrections having entirely failed, Garibaldi determined to try what he could do with his volunteers, trusting to being joined by the populations, who received him indeed with enthusiasm, but gave him little help either in money or in fighting men; and his extraordinary success was achieved by

the determined courage of the "Thousand of Marsala" and the treachery of the Neapolitan officers, who had been already corrupted and secured by the Sardinian agents.

When the conquest of Sicily had been accomplished and Garibaldi was preparing for that of Naples, Count Cavour's difficulty became very great, for Victor Emmanuel—no doubt upon the demand of the Emperor Napoleon, who did not wish the movement to extend beyond Sicily—sent an envoy to Garibaldi asking him not to pass the Straits.

This was no doubt a mere piece of acting, for Cavour at all events was resolved that the conquest of Italy should follow the conquest of Sicily, and he sent a letter to Persano along with the King's envoy, which was certain to prevent the latter from being listened to. He fully recognised the fact that it was vain to wait for the Neapolitans to rise; but he was not to be deterred by that: he desired Admiral Persano to congratulate Garibaldi on his victories, and added, "I cannot see what there is to prevent him from passing over to the Continent. I should have preferred that the Neapolitans themselves should accomplish at least the beginning of the work of regeneration, but, as they will not or cannot move, let Garibaldi act. The enterprise cannot stop half-way." Then again, "The problem we have to solve is this—to help the revolution, but to help it in such a way that it may *appear in the eyes of Europe to have been a spontaneous act*. If you can manage it in that way France and England will be with us, but if not I know not what they may do."

It was so managed, and England and France acquiesced and accepted the *fait accompli*, willingly on the part of our Government, which by this time had become convinced that the annexation of the Two Sicilies to Victor Emmanuel's kingdom would be the best solution of the difficulty, but grudgingly

by France, which had proposed to us to join in opposing any attempt on the part of Garibaldi to pass to the mainland. In the face of the positive refusal of England to depart from the principle of non-intervention, which they had both professed, the Emperor did not venture alone upon a measure that would raise the wrath of all the Liberals throughout Italy, and he was forced to remain a passive spectator of events which could not be agreeable to him.

He had been acting a suspicious part throughout; and although it is not yet ascertained whether he had a previous knowledge of, or had given a sanction to, Garibaldi's enterprise against Sicily, there is sufficient evidence that he regarded it with favour at a very early date, and hoped to turn it to his own account. That he would knowingly countenance anything that was to lead to the absorption of the Two Sicilies into the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel without any compensation or equivalent for France cannot for a moment be supposed, and there are strong grounds for believing that he counted upon being able to get Prince Murat placed on the throne of the island if King Francis was expelled from it, thus adding greatly to the power of France in the Mediterranean.

If he should fail in this, through the annexation of Sicily to Piedmont, he would still have in reserve the alternative of demanding the cession to France of the island of Sardinia as a balance to what was acquired by Victor Emmanuel, and his Minister at Naples went so far as to declare in plain terms that the annexation would make this "indispensable." These calculations, of which I was well aware, gave me much anxiety while the events were in progress, but they were defeated by the promptitude with which Cavour availed himself of the position created by Garibaldi, and by the steady support given by Her Majesty's Government to Victor Emmanuel and his great, though unscrupulous Minister.

If they had consented to act with the Emperor in stopping Garibaldi at the Straits of Messina we should not have seen the unification of Italy quietly accomplished; and the Italians, as they were well aware, mainly owed that great result to Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell.

No clue to what France was driving at could be obtained from the attitude of my French colleague,* which was perplexing and continually changing, for at one moment he went out of his way to advertise himself as supporting the Liberal party, and at the next he was seen to be hand and glove with the Palace reactionaries; but it was not in the nature of the man to remain quiet, and as he was entirely ignorant of his Emperor's real designs he kept dancing first on one leg and then on the other, according to what he supposed them at the moment to be, with the result that in the end both he and his Government were regarded with an equal distrust by all parties.

The Emperor Napoleon always loved a tortuous mode of proceeding, and it was his habit on critical occasions to employ, in addition to his accredited Ministers, unavowed agents, to whom, unknown to his Minister for Foreign Affairs, he conveyed his more secret views; and the language held at Turin by these agents was frequently so much at variance with that which Baron Brenier was directed by Count Thouvenel to hold at Naples that it was scarcely surprising that he should be perplexed.

When Garibaldi had effected the conquest of Sicily the Court of Naples at last became thoroughly alarmed, and awoke to the necessity of trying to satisfy the people. A Constitution was proclaimed—a general amnesty granted—the disbanding of the foreign mercenary troops promised—the reactionary Ministers, with most of the Camarilla, dismissed, and a new Ministry formed of honourable, honest men, with

* Baron Brenier, French Envoy at the Neapolitan Court.

Spinelli at its head and De Martino as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but with one false brother in their midst in Liborio Romano, the Minister of the Interior, who from the outset was working steadily, under the direction of Count Cavour, to compass the ruin of the King he was pretending to serve.

The first act of the new Ministers was to accept all the conditions proposed by Cavour for a friendly alliance between Naples and Sardinia, for which he professed himself anxious, and they despatched to Turin, in order to come to a complete understanding, the Signor Manna, an honest Liberal, but most simple-minded man, whom Cavour befooled to the top of his bent, writing to Villamarina, his Minister at Naples—as the latter himself told me—that it was delightful to have to deal with such an agent, “as he believes everything I tell him!” He redoubled his assurances of a wish for a friendly alliance, and at the very same time he was writing to Admiral Persano to encourage Garibaldi without further delay to leave Sicily and to proceed at once to the conquest of Naples.

Although the treacherous duplicity with which Victor Emmanuel and his Government had been acting was not fully known till some years later, I was pretty well informed of it through my intimacy with the Marquis Villamarina, the Piedmontese Minister. It was not an edifying sight, and might well have turned one’s sympathies to the victim of these intrigues, if it had not been for the knowledge that the victim was entirely undeserving of either sympathy or pity, that he was not one whit less false than those who were deceiving him, and that he was not acting loyally by his own Liberal Ministers, but continued to the end to coquet with the reactionaries.

CHAPTER II

NAPLES, JULY–AUGUST 1860

[Mr. Elliot's journal opens with an entry dated July 6, 1860. Events had been shaping themselves quickly. The war declared by Sardinia and France against Austria was terminated by the victories of Magenta and Solferino, but the Preliminary Treaty concluded by the Emperor acting independently and signed at Villa Franca in July 1859 left Austria in possession of Venetia. Italian patriots were indignant, and when the Sardinians learnt not only that Venetia was sacrificed but that the Emperor's support had been bought at the price of the cession of Nice and Savoy to France their feelings may be better imagined than described. In March 1860 the States of Central Italy had voted their union to the Kingdom of Victor Emmanuel, and almost simultaneously the revolution in Southern Italy had broken out, and Garibaldi sailed from Genoa with a few hundred men to the aid of the Sicilian insurgents. From this time forward the attitude of France became less and less friendly towards the advocates of Liberal policy; the Emperor realised that by the Treaty of Villa Franca and the annexation of Savoy and Nice he had lost all popularity in Italy, where he was now known as *il gran traditore*; and the pressure exerted by the clerical party in France was daily increasing, in particular the feeling in the French fleet was strongly opposed to Garibaldi and the insurgents.]

ABOUT two months after the landing of Garibaldi in Sicily, seeing that stirring times were approaching, I began noting down passing events in letters to my brother George, to whom, as Lord John's private secretary, I was free to speak openly, but which were chiefly intended as a sort of journal for myself; and the following extracts from them give a more or less consecutive account of the occurrences as they unfolded themselves from that time down to the final collapse of the Neapolitan dynasty.

The journal begins just after the formation of the Liberal administration of Spinelli and De Martino, who had undertaken the wellnigh hopeless task of trying to save the King through the newly proclaimed Constitution, to which they were determined to remain faithful; and these two men deserve to be mentioned as the only Neapolitans of whom it could be said, after the close of the drama, that they throughout played a thoroughly honest and honourable part, for the general action of their countrymen was beneath contempt.

Castellamare, July 6, 1860.—There is little or no change in the state of things since I last wrote, and although the Government have given all they possibly can give—Constitution, etc.—there is not an appearance of satisfaction among the people, who have become used to thinking that the one thing to be wished for is the fall of the Bourbon dynasty, and have for the moment no intention of being satisfied with anything else.

The feeling in favour of annexation to Piedmont is now certainly very universal, though I believe those who declare that it springs from the belief that it is the best arm with which they can eject the Bourbons rather than from any real wish for it. But whether this is so or not, there it is—a great and undeniable fact.

One unaccountable impression prevailing among many sensible people is that France would not be unfavourable to annexation, but, within the last few days, Brenier, the French Minister, has opened the eyes of one or two of those who were most strongly of this opinion, for, after arguing against annexation, he blurted out, “ Well, you have convinced me of one thing of which I was pretty well aware, that in this country there are only Absolutists and Mazzinians, but, if you do not choose to be satisfied with a Constitution, you may trust me when I tell you that you shall not have annexation.” This was plain speaking,

and may do good, for it is now known and spread about.

It is irritating to me to see the French playing a deep game without being able to be certain what is aimed at, but one object clearly is to excite distrust of both England and Sardinia, and Brenier is beginning to hint that, if annexation does take place, France must take care of herself, as she had been "obliged" to do by taking Savoy and Nice after the annexation of the Duchies.

July 7.—I found De Martino, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, very low this morning, in consequence of hearing from Turin that, as price of an alliance, Sardinia insists that the Sicilians should be left absolutely free to settle their future lot, and that our Government consider the demand very moderate.

Things are looking uneasy at Naples, the troops and Lazzaroni dissatisfied and eager for pillage, and no one heartily on the side of the Government.

July 8.—For some weeks I have hardly had time for writing, and there is still no great prospect of our being near an end, for, as ladies say under certain interesting circumstances, it is by no means impossible that we "must be worse before we are better." Barring a change of dynasty, no revolution could well be more complete than that which we have already had, but no one appears inclined to be satisfied with it, and there is every wish that the trifling exception I have mentioned should be remedied, for there is a distrust of the race which seems insuperable, and which is not much to be wondered at.

If the Constitution now granted is accepted, it will be the fault of the people themselves if they cannot keep it, now that it is backed with a proposed alliance with Piedmont, who would, of course, at once make its suspension a matter of personal quarrel.

A year ago there was hardly an annexationist to be found in this part of Italy, and now pretty nearly

the whole country is so for the moment. I believe, however, that it is only for the moment, and that, as any stick is good enough to beat a dog with, annexation was adopted as the most probable way of escaping from a rule of which they were thoroughly sick. The people knew very well that Piedmont would not resist the bait, and that, openly or underhand, the Piedmontese would do the work which they themselves are too soft or too timid to attempt.

Exactly the same thing took place in Sicily, which most assuredly has not gained her own independence, but owes it entirely to Garibaldi and his marvellous band.

Garibaldi and "our own correspondent" of course praise up the Sicilians, but every account without exception which I have received from Palermo shows this to be the case. Amongst others, the other day a Yankee captain, who had been all the time at Palermo, and is an out-and-out sympathiser, declared to me that the Sicilians had done almost nothing, and that the royal army of about 20,000 men had been literally driven out by Garibaldi and his 900.

The power of his name is something wonderful. His people were twice driven back on a bridge the day they entered Palermo, and the royal troops had stood firm without wavering, till, on advancing a third and last time to the attack, the order was given to do so with cries of "Viva Garibaldi," whereupon the Neapolitan soldiers at once threw down their arms and cut and ran for it. I believe this to be literally true, and it gives a poor prospect for the royal cause if the Chieftain should make his appearance on the mainland, as he threatens.

However, it is said that the soldiers fought well at Palermo, but the officers detestably or not at all. At one place, Miselmeri, I think, where there were 130 soldiers killed or wounded, only two officers got slightly touched. The hope of pillage and plunder

has a wonderful effect upon the Neapolitan soldier, and with a prospect of it he is ready to run some risk.

Their loot has been almost publicly selling at some of the provincial towns where they have been sent since their return from Sicily, and it is not altogether agreeable to know that the greater part of our Castellamare garrison consists of a regiment which in Sicily particularly distinguished itself in burning and sacking the small country town of Carini. Two nights ago these worthies went the length of showing manifest signs of disgust at having been kept here so long without getting anything for their pains. Besides this, we have a prison containing about a thousand convicts, the most thorough cut-throat-looking villains that one ever saw, in whom even I, with all my old tenderness for convicts, cannot feel the smallest interest; and these gentlemen are eagerly looking for the moment when they may break loose.

All this sounds very alarming, but I assure you our nerves are not in the slightest degree affected, and we sleep as quietly as if neither soldier nor convict was within a hundred miles, notwithstanding the example of panic set by our French colleague, who has a house here also, and who for the last ten days has had a bodyguard of sailors, who mount guard all night on the top of it, and occasionally sound midnight alarms and disturb all the inmates out of their slumbers.

Italian dogs generally pass one-half of the night in barking, and Castellamare donkeys keep braying at intervals from sunset to sunrise, and one evening that they had been more busy than usual in this way they inspired a panic in the gallant breasts of the French garrison. Messengers were sent round to their various neighbours and country-people, who came and took refuge under the diplomatic roof and the sacred Tricolour, and in the morning were intensely disgusted to find that, excepting themselves, no one had been disturbed or frightened.

They, as well as we, have got a ship of war in the harbour, from which, if occasion should call for it, assistance could be got in a very short time, but to keep up a chronic state of panic is perfectly absurd. However, if the convicts were to break out, I should also take measures for the security of the house, but in the meantime am quite satisfied with knowing that if we made a signal of distress it would be understood by our ship.

I wish the public had been so considerate as to have chosen another time of year for their revolutionary proceedings, for to me it is very inconvenient and annoying to have to run in and out between Naples and Castellamare, as the railroad in the dog-days is not amusing, and I find that during the last week I spent exactly twenty-four hours on the road. I have established a good sailing-boat, and, if not kept in town till the breeze dies away, I sail back from town, and thus, instead of an odious roasting, spend a couple of very agreeable hours, finishing off with a swim to give one an appetite for dinner. Our real heats have not begun yet in earnest, though to-day they look as if they were coming, but I scarcely think we have hitherto had the thermometer above 80.

July 18.—The outbreak of the soldiers on Sunday evening was one of those things which appear almost incredible till one knows a little what the discipline of the Neapolitan army is, and then one may be prepared for anything. Perhaps some of the secrets of the movement may come out in the course of the enquiries which are to be made; but, though the Government wish for publicity, there may be names mixed up which they may be afraid to publish. At present all that is certain is that a number of soldiers ran down the most public streets forcing people to cry “Viva il Rè,” and though the people when invited in that way would have cried “Viva il Diavolo,” their compliance did not save them from being slashed and cut. Conyngham

was at a window in the Toledo, and saw them pass under his feet, acting literally as if they were mad or drunk, which they probably were, having been primed beforehand, for they went cutting indiscriminately at carriages, lamp-posts, or anything that refused to shout for the King. Our Consul, Bonham, found himself in the middle of it before he knew where he was, and was surrounded and made to show his loyalty like the rest, which he did without being invited twice, but, not having taken off his hat at the mention of the sacred name of royalty, it was knocked off by a neat cut from a sword. Of course, I have asked for satisfaction.

The Prussian Minister, Perponcher, who had only arrived three days before, was close behind Bonham, and would have been treated in the same way if an officer had not given him a convoy. The officers behaved well throughout, and did what they could—to the extent, it is said, of running some of the men through the body. Then came the turn of the French Admiral, who had just landed and got into a carriage, about which there was a sort of consultation as to what was to be done, when it was decided simply to ascertain that he had a loyal coachman, who took the test, and the Admiral, being surrounded by his boat's crew, was left in peace. He has declared, however, to Admiral Mundy* that if he sees anything of the kind again he will at once land armed men, and this is, no doubt, what he is panting to do.

Brenier also talks of his having himself received no proper satisfaction for his broken head, and says that Thouvenel will certainly require more. I asked him whether the King had not sent his A.D.C. to express his regrets and condolence, and whether both Princes of the Royal Family and the Ministers had not called upon him for the same purpose, and I said that it seemed to me that the reparation must either be by words or in money, and that, as he could not wish for

* In command of British Squadron.

the latter, I did not see why he should not be satisfied with the verbal excuses he had received. He then said that the Government might at least have put into the instructions of the Marquis de la Greca, who has gone on a special mission to Paris and London, that he was to express to the Emperor the regret of the Neapolitan Government for the outrage. (He had been struck in the street with a stick some time before.) I consequently gave De Martino a hint, and he said he would at once send a telegraphic instruction to this effect.

The French are evidently determined not to be satisfied if they can help it, and it is well to leave them no reason to complain. They have in their hearts no more wish than Garibaldi himself to see the Bourbons really maintained, in a way likely to be permanent, upon the throne; but they thought it necessary to make a show of giving the advice calculated to give them a right to say that they had done what they could to save them. Then they insisted upon their advice being followed when nothing was prepared, and no new Ministers ready, so as to give every chance of the concessions of the King breaking down at once. Then they began to blacken everything that was done by the Government, and to try indirectly to prevent the public from receiving it as satisfactory. Then came strong declarations against annexation to Piedmont from the French Minister, while, underhand, his Legation was doing everything to be popular with the annexationists, and to make them believe that France would not object to see it carried out.

Now the question is, what all this means, and it seems to me it can only be explained thus:

First of all, if the dynasty is saved it is to be the doing of France alone, and it will be expected to be thoroughly subservient and properly grateful to its saviours. But, if the dynasty falls, there must either be the annexation to Sardinia or the choice of a new

Sovereign. In the former case we may make up our minds for a demand for compensation in the shape of the Island of Sardinia or Genoa, or both, and we shall be told that France always opposed the annexation, and is obliged to make the demand when it was carried in spite of her. If, however, there is to be a new Sovereign chosen, we shall have intrigues of all kinds to direct the choice into French channels; and they have already secured some nominations that will help them towards their object, and within the last ten days one begins again at times to hear the name of Murat, which had before been almost forgotten.

However, I do not myself believe that any amount of intrigue would carry through a French Prince against one of the House of Savoy, and I don't feel much doubt that a Savoy Sovereign is exactly the arrangement which would suit people best throughout the country; but would the French ever consent to this, or would they say that it was annexation in disguise ? If they were to come down with any such pretension, of course it would be necessary to insist on the exclusion of the French Prince also.

All this is like settling what is to be done with the skin of the live lion, but the poor beast is so nearly done that it is just as well to speculate a little about it.

July 20.—We yesterday got the paper with Lord John's answer to Sir R. Peel's questions about Sardinia, Sicily, and annexation, which will delight the Liberals of Italy, and if other countries could only be induced to speak in the same way everything would go smoothly enough; but, as they do not do so, I am not sure that it was prudent to give the annexationists such immense encouragement as they will find in the unqualified declaration that our Government so strongly maintains the right of the Italians to decide upon their own destinies. I had a long talk yesterday with some stout annexationists, whose language I

believe fairly to represent the views of the party, which do not appear to me to be such as are much to our advantage. They say, which is certainly true, that if we stand aloof the annexation will soon take place. Then they say that if, in consequence, France demands Sardinia or Genoa, England will come forward and say that it is not to be, and that England, backed by all Italy, will be strong enough to beat France. This seems to be only another way of saying that we must be prepared to go to war with France to help the Italians to try the experiment of Italian unity, and to enable Sardinia to enjoy the fruit of an unprincipled aggressive policy.

July 22.—The new Government have been doing all that men could do to save the dynasty and to keep the revolution out of Naples, but they were called in so late that they have very uphill work of it. They have just played their last card, and have determined to give up Sicily altogether, withdrawing about 20,000 men they still have at Messina and Syracuse. Their reason for this is that they feel that the existence of the dynasty depends upon the acceptance by Sardinia of their offered friendship, which they don't believe possible if the war in Sicily is continued.

At or near Messina there are from fifteen to seventeen thousand troops, and it might be thought that in a strong place like that they might strike a blow; but the disaffection in the navy has become so great that the garrison of Messina could no longer count on support from the sea-side, without which the position would not be tenable. You have probably heard that the captain and officers of the *Veloce*, one of the Neapolitan war steamers, coolly went and gave her up to Garibaldi at Palermo, and then went out and captured two small postal steamers. A short time ago Cavour mentioned certain conditions on which Piedmont would be disposed to be friends, and, now that the whole of these have been complied with, he will be

rather puzzled, I should think, to find a decent excuse for declining the alliance.

July 24.—Yesterday we heard that Cavour had announced that the King would send an aide-de-camp to Garibaldi with an autograph request not to attack the continental Kingdom of Naples, which caused no little delight to this Government; but it does not make matters so clear, and it may, indeed, perhaps bring on other complications, for it is by no means certain that the public in Sardinia may not take upon themselves violently to resent this alliance with the Bourbons. It is possible also that Garibaldi may disobey this order of the King's, and that we may have further confusion in Sicily, where he puts out all his orders in the name of Victor Emmanuel.

Brenier declares that when Garibaldi left Palermo with the expedition against the royalists of Milazzo, his vessels were convoyed by the Sardinian Admiral in the frigate *Carlo Alberto*; but I have not yet heard the story confirmed from other quarters, so, as the newspapers say, “*Je lui en laisse toute la responsabilité.*” He, the busy B., is, I am told, furious at the abandonment of the island, and has written to De Martino to say so. I, on the contrary, only wish that it had been done sooner; for to-day we receive news from Messina that the troops have been well beaten by Garibaldi at Milazzo, where their best man, Bosco, is shut up in the citadel with a strong body which Garibaldi will not allow to leave with the honours of war.

The truth is that we are in such a state of complicated confusion that I cannot see any tolerable escape from the mess, and while it is certain that the more England keeps out of it the better, one cannot help, at the same time, seeing that things may drift into such a current that we may ultimately be dragged into them in the most disagreeable way in the world.

Naples remains quiet, though there was one small

repetition of the disgraceful affair of the 15th, which, by the way, the troops have tried to repeat in many country towns; in fact, our real danger—I mean the personal danger of the public—consists at present entirely in the reactionist leaning of the army, for among the soldiers it is very strong, and their wish for pillage increases the risk. The disgraced Guards who were ordered to Portici refused to move till the King put himself at their head, and so they went with more of the appearance of triumph than of disgrace.

July 26.—Brenier yesterday read me a despatch from Thouvenel, or rather great part of one, saying that Lord John, after having shown himself disposed to come to an understanding with France with regard to Naples, had now announced the determination of the English Government to abstain completely from all interference, and adding that, however he may regret this determination, it will not in any way make the Emperor modify his own attitude. I asked whether the attitude alluded to was that of non-interference, but was told that it meant just the contrary and the employment of strong pressure at Turin, where the Sardinian Government are to be held responsible for all the consequences if they do not put an end to the attacks upon Naples by their subjects. Brenier dwells very much upon Garibaldi having been convoyed the other day by the Sardinian frigate, which certainly would be a monstrous proceeding on the part of Admiral Persano *if true*, but it had not yet been confirmed from any other quarter. Thouvenel has also sent copies of despatches, from Gortchakow and Schleinitz to the Russian and Prussian Ministers at Paris, saying that the concessions of the King of Naples are such as to lead to the belief that the questions at issue between His Majesty and his subjects may be satisfactorily arranged, and saying that the time had come for “une action commune

diplomatique " on the part of the Great Powers, one object of which is to be the maintenance of the union of Sicily and Naples under one Crown.

This is the diplomatic jargon in which they convey the proposal for a direct interference in the affairs of this country, and France, having the same leaning, will find herself backed by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, leaving us to stand by ourselves as the advocates of non-interference.

If they insist I suppose it will be carried out, but as long as we don't join in anything of the kind, I don't see what more we could do.

There is still much chance that events may go so fast as to baffle all the intentions of France and the Northern Powers, and if Garibaldi snaps his fingers at Victor Emmanuel's orders not to attack the Continent, but comes across with some force, I believe the fate of the Royal Family would very soon be decided.

The King's next brother, Count Trani, Filangieri used to speak of as the " Mouchard " of the Queen-Mother, sitting in the council and carrying everything to her. Count Trapani, the King's uncle, though he voted in the council for granting the Constitution, is at the bottom of and inspires all the reactionist hopes that still prevail strongly in the army. Count Aquila, another uncle, has been giving himself out as a tremendous Liberal, but is not trusted by a soul: he has been hanging on to the French for some time past, and he and the busy B. hunted in couples during the whole of the struggle with the King to get the Constitution, etc.

At the time, I heard that he was working with the object of getting the King to go, and of taking the Regency for himself, and now it seems so certain that it was so that some of the Ministers were for packing him off, and had obtained the King's consent, but the majority of the Council was against it. To prevent

it from having a purely reactionist appearance, Count Trapani would have been sent at the same time.

Count Aquila is at the head of the navy, and the recent cases of mutiny and misconduct in that service are said to have been of his cooking.

Brenier professes to have heard of no suspicions against His Royal Highness, and as they must have reached him this assumed ignorance looks as if they were pals.

July 28.—Yesterday De Martino told me that it is decided not to evacuate the citadel of Messina, a decision no doubt taken in consequence of the strong disapprobation expressed by Brenier of the determination to abandon the whole island. The vagaries he and his Government are playing are incessant. In your last letter you ask whether it is true that the man who wounded him has been identified and is a reactionist. There is no truth in this at all. Two or three notorious reactionists and leaders of that branch of the Lazzaroni have been shut up on suspicion, without there being, I believe, a shadow of evidence against them; but it was wished that the blame should fall upon that party, and the Government gratified the French Minister by taking up these individuals, who are happily so generally hated that no one thinks of finding fault with their being kept in a little seclusion.

Bosco and his troops, whom Garibaldi had let out from Milazzo, have been arriving at Castellamare during the last two days, and one good result of this is that the rascally 8th Regiment, which has been stationed there to our great discomfort, is to be sent off to Calabria, being replaced by the 1st, which is well spoken of.

Admiral Mundy told me yesterday that he had received from the Sardinian Admiral, Persano, a hint that Garibaldi was just going to start for the Con-

tinent, so that, if not stopped by the King's mandate, we shall have stirring events before long.

It is quite true that Persano convoyed Garibaldi to Milazzo. By the bye, it is a curious coincidence that the American ship which was at Palermo during the siege, and whose captain is of course a good Italian patriot, is at this moment so short of powder that she cannot even fire a salute—or rather she was, as she has now borrowed from Admiral Mundy. Can you guess how this came about?

July 29.—At Scafati, the next station to Pompeii, the people have been murdering the proprietor of a large mill, and anyone who expresses the slightest disapproval of the measure is threatened with the same treatment. I believe his offence was that of being a Swiss or a German, and the other foreigners employed there dare not now show themselves, but this is the only outrage I have heard of for some time past.

July 31.—In his political journal of the 19th, Goodwin (Consul at Palermo) says: "It would be well if public spirit kept pace with private activity. The case is otherwise. The support given to Garibaldi has been slender compared to the resources of the country. The city of Palermo has given 1,000L., and other towns, etc., etc., making up in all about 5,000L. The mining towns of Grgenti and Aragona have given 350L. between them; Catania, Caltanissetta, and Trapani have given little or nothing. Manifestos and addresses make a grand show in the papers, but men, money, and materials are wanting." This account agrees with every one that I have heard from the most opposite sources, and makes Garibaldi's feat still more marvellous than it otherwise would be; but it gives a bad look-out for the future.

I found De Martino yesterday very much put out at Lord John's having said, according to Thouvenel, that Her Majesty's Government not only will not join

in helping to prevent Garibaldi from crossing to the mainland, but that they will protest against it if the French propose to do it alone.

The night before last a grand row was announced as positively to come off in Naples; but, as we have these positive assurances about twice every week, we are getting used to them and don't feel any great alarm. However, this one was really to have taken place, it seems, but at the last moment a sudden thought struck the combatants, and they determined to swear eternal friendship, instead of cutting each other's throats, so the evening was spent in the most harmonious fraternisation between the troops and the people.

By the way, you must recollect that, when we now speak of the *Lazzaroni*, we no longer mean the *Sanfedisti*, who were ready to cut all Liberal throats, for these have for the moment disappeared from the face of the earth, and the voice of the *Lazzaroni* is now held to represent the honest popular voice prepared to shout for liberty and order.

The *Lazzaroni* have long been divided into two parties, the Liberal, living chiefly in the upper part of the town, and the *Sanfedisti*, or Court party, living about the port and the Santa Lucia, which last were kept regularly in the pay of the Court, a good many, perhaps five or six thousand, being armed and kept faithful by the promise that whenever there was an outbreak they should have the privilege of pillaging the houses and shops of all suspected of Liberalism.

Their chief organiser and colonel was the notorious Marella, who, from having been, I believe, himself one of the *Lazzaroni*, had risen, through the liberality of the secret police, to be a man of considerable prosperity, owning a very large solid-looking house on the Chiaja and two of the most fashionable of the bathing establishments in the Villa Reale. This worthy and his two sons are now in prison, on the accusation, I

believe, of having broken Brenier's head, but without a jot of evidence against them; and his whole gang is broken up, many having come round to the Liberal party, which they now think the winning side; but if the soldiers were to succeed in getting up a good reactionary movement we should pretty soon find them all coming out from their holes and corners to take part in the plunder.

August 1.—Perhaps you read in *The Times* the other day a lamentable account of an individual found in the prison here, into which he had been put at the request of the Roman police. I went with Villamarina (the Sardinian Minister) to see the poor wretch, who had been kept about two years in the Roman and four in the Neapolitan prisons, without ever having been tried; but a more uninteresting martyr I have never beheld. He would not give his real name or history, and it was pretty clear that he had either something very discreditable to conceal or that he meditated some revenge against someone. We gathered that he had been a suspected agent of Mazzini. There seemed no ground for considering him a Neapolitan, but he would give no clue to his real nationality. It now turns out that he was one of the persons suspected of wishing to assassinate the Emperor Napoleon, and I suspect that he may very likely have been kept all this time out of mischief at the suggestion of France to the Roman police, who, getting tired of him, passed him on here.

Castellamare was last night roused out of its slumber by an alarm given of the approach of vessels full of Garibaldians. The garrison was called to arms, and the railroad was busy all night bringing fresh troops from Torre dell' Annunziata to be ready to oppose their landing in the morning; but when the day broke the formidable invaders turned out to be two small coasting craft loaded with limestone.

August 6.—Though we have not had any more

alarms at Castellamare itself, we live in a constant succession of rumours of landings at different places, so that we shall be sure to disbelieve it when it does come; and, as Admiral Persano arrived here three days ago, it is generally supposed that we shall not have very much longer to wait, and the Admiral himself showed Admiral Mundy a letter he had just had from Garibaldi, saying that he had written to King Victor Emmanuel to say that he could not listen to his advice not to cross the Straits, and asking permission to do so on the 15th.

It was not to be expected that he would pause in his progress, and if the King's letter was really the meaningless production given in the *Nord*, the whole thing was a joke, for it could not possibly have any real effect. It is impossible to take implicitly the report of a Neapolitan, but according to General Clary, who had an interview with Garibaldi at Messina, the Dictator has still enough on his hands to keep the world in hot water for some little time to come. The programme he announced is, first Naples, then the Marches, then Venetia, and finally Savoy and Nice, after which he is to rest on his laurels.

What do you think of the private advice of the Emperor to Cavour, which I mention in a note to Lord John: "Do nothing to help the King of Naples, and do not work openly against him; if he falls, so much the better for you," and this at a moment when he is professing to do all he can to save the King?

A resolution taken by this Government to dismiss the foreign troops was abandoned, as I am almost certain, through Brenier's opposition to the measure. The French here seem to be very fierce against Garibaldi, and I am told that the young naval officers are loud in their abuse of him, and are beginning to show an anxiety to have some of their people on shore.

The non-naval Powers are beginning to send their subjects to me to secure British protection in the

event of trouble, and I do not discourage them, for the effect is not bad when they show a preference for us: we shall have the Swiss, the Prussians, Hanoverians, Saxons, Wurtembergers, and Belgians, and perhaps more before we have done with it.

Thank goodness, I do not the least fear that the Court will ask for asylum in an English ship, as there are Spaniards here, on board of which, I take it for granted, His Majesty would go. There is a possible event, upon which I have not, however, thought it necessary to ask for provisional instructions, as, I believe, some of my colleagues have done—I mean the possibility of the King going to Gaëta and inviting the Foreign Ministers to accompany him. My own feeling would be entirely against going with him (and of course if the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not go it would be out of the question), but when the time comes I shall telegraph for instructions, and in the meantime you may tell Lord John that it is possible the question may some day be put to him; but you may say that I myself think that the best thing would be that I should continue here, keeping the *Intrepid* gunboat, which would carry me back and forward to Gaëta once or twice a week to see De Martino; but though I am accredited to the King I see no reason why I should be tied to his tail, so as to make a political demonstration of adherence to him.

August 8.—This unfortunate Royal Family seems bent on making itself contemptible to the end of the chapter, but even from them one could hardly have expected anything like the last proceeding of the Count of Syracuse,* who two days ago told *The Times* “own correspondent” that he had sent to King Victor Emmanuel his adhesion to the annexation, and that it had been accepted. Till within the last fortnight “our own correspondent” has had a sort of idea that the Count of Syracuse might be

* Uncle to King Francis.

erected into a King in due time; but latterly he has become convinced that, if the present King goes, his whole kith and kin must go with him, and he was astounded by this declaration, and asked what His Royal Highness meant by giving his adhesion to the annexation, and whether he had become a Sardinian subject.

He said Yes, that he was now a Sardinian subject, and would soon be the only Bourbon Prince who could live in Italy; and, on being further questioned, said that the King here did not yet know it, but would do so the following day. What followed was very amusing. "Our own correspondent" telegraphed his news to *The Times*, not mentioning how he heard it; but his telegram, as he might have guessed, was not forwarded, and he was summoned first to see the Minister of the Interior and then the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who assured him that the thing was not true.

Wreford, the correspondent, is quite a truthful man, and there can be no doubt that the Prince told him what he says; but it seems to be no less certain that neither the Government nor the King knew of this royal desertion till they learnt it from the telegram of the newspaper correspondent.

I was not able yesterday to find either De Martino or Villamarina, so could not get enough of the story on authority to send it home by yesterday's messenger, for I should have liked to say at the same time what the Government were prepared to do.

Syracuse says that the Sardinian ships of war now here are put at his disposition, but I don't know what he means by this.

While things of this kind are going on I often do not send home all the information I might get if I went oftener to De Martino, who is perfectly open and frank, and much disposed to ask my opinion and advice, which I think it much better not to give too much;

for, if I did get into the habit of being consulted daily, it would almost infallibly give us the appearance at least of being more mixed up in matters here than would be at all desirable. It would be very easy to acquire a name for having "great influence over the Government," which might be flattering to one's vanity, but certain to be inconvenient sooner or later. For instance, there is the question of the foreign troops which De Martino spoke of the other day, and I said that their being kept on was a violation of the Constitution and an irritation to the people, in both of which he perfectly agreed; but then he asked whether, at a moment when an invasion was imminent, the Government would be justified in disbanding 4,000 of the best troops they had for repelling it.

There is one piece of advice I should be uncommonly tempted to give, and that is that the King should pack off every single member of his family—man, woman, and child—except his wife. The Count of Syracuse has thrown him off; Aquila is plotting against him, for himself or for France; Trapani is intriguing as hard as he can for reaction and divine right, of which Trani seems to be looked to as the future champion; while the Count of Caserta, the next brother, is said to have more brains and devil than any of them, and has been bred up by the same old mother, who certainly has done enough to entitle her to pass the rest of her days in tranquillity in foreign lands.

I saw yesterday some English travellers just arrived from Sicily—enthusiastic, as they all are, for Garibaldi, and as full of contempt and indignation against the Sicilians. In fact, I have not yet seen one single person who has been there who does not speak in the same way, and, according to my last informant, Garibaldi said exactly the same thing to himself. They give little or no money for the cause, very few soldiers, and at the same time are full of envy and jealousy of their liberators. It certainly is a his-

torical fact that in 1848, while they were for a year entire masters of the island, they organised nothing for themselves, and this is perhaps as strong an argument as could be given in favour of annexation, for they appear thoroughly unfitted to take care of themselves.

The truth of the Syracuse affair I have not yet thoroughly cleared up, but a very amusing effect of his vagary has been to send his latterly ultra-Liberal brother, Aquila, slap back to reaction. The latter meant to have started himself as the Liberal one of the family, and now his brother has taken the wind so completely out of his sails that he is driven to try something else. Was there ever such a set? The Government are seriously thinking of having the whole of that generation packed off.

The Government have just put an end to one of the great means of reactionist intrigue by breaking up the King's private Chancellerie, and putting the telegraphs so much under the Minister of the Interior that His Majesty cannot carry on any further correspondence with the provincial authorities, who have, besides, had their cyphers changed, so that no private correspondence can be carried on with the Princes or royal household, which latter, moreover, has been well cleaned out.

That poor man De Martino is much to be pitied, for he undertook an almost hopeless job in trying to save the dynasty, and as his resignation would now probably bring a general smash he is in some sort tied to the concern, and his great ambition is only to get on as far as the meeting of the Chambers, which is in a month from this time, and still long to look forward to.

August 11.—The panic in Naples appears to be increasing and spreading every day, and it must be confessed there is cause enough to be anxious. Amongst other things that cause it, there is just now a report that a number of persons have been found

wearing the uniform of the National Guard without belonging to it, and armed with revolvers, 4,000 of which are said to have been distributed by Count Aquila among persons intended to be employed in the reaction. What the real truth of this is I cannot yet say, but it is quite certain that he is working in that direction at present as hard as he was in the other a short time ago; and he is now pressing for the establishment of the state of siege and a retrograde Ministry, in which he is being keenly backed by Brenier. His Royal Highness had the face the other day in the King's presence to complain that the Count of Syracuse was aiming at taking the position he had destined for himself when His Majesty has to bolt.

Villamarina has instructions to try by all means to prevent the arrival of Garibaldi, as Cavour says there is nothing he dreads so much as the establishment of a Dictatorship here such as that of Palermo, and that Garibaldi is surrounded at present by such a set of republican *canaille* that his arrival here would be disastrous. In fact, it is clear that the Sardinian Cabinet is in a most monstrous fright, and their instructions now are that a movement should be encouraged, so that the revolution may be accomplished by the Neapolitans themselves and a Government of some kind established by the nation, so that Garibaldi should have no excuse for coming. They seem to me to forget that, though a movement may perhaps be excited or provoked, it is by no means impossible that it may be suppressed, and how would matters then stand?

However, the present instructions to the Sardinian agents are that they should not give the support to Garibaldi here that "*they gave in Sicily*," and these words are a quotation, and not my own. In the meantime there is every appearance of an attack soon to be made from Sicily, where an army of about 20,000 men is collected and numbers of large boats

prepared for carrying them. The Faro is fortified with heavy guns, "stolen" from the arsenal at Genoa.

At Messina the Neapolitan General Clary is recalled for having threatened to bombard the town if a landing was attempted in Calabria, which would have been a direct violation of his own Convention with Medici.* The advance of Bosco from Messina towards Milazzo, which ended in the capture of that place and the evacuation of it by the royal troops, now turns out not to have been a movement of pure defence, as was said, the Neapolitan Government having undertaken to rest on the defensive; but the King privately ordered the advance, writing to the General that it was their time to make a great coup, and leaving the Ministers in total ignorance of what he had ordered.

There had altogether been a rivalry in intrigue and falsehood between the Neapolitan Court and generals and the Sardinian Government, in which it is difficult to say which have proved themselves the greatest adepts. Brenier, as I think I told you, is again strongly in the reaction, and at the same moment Prince Napoleon is writing to Victor Emmanuel that the moment for the liberation of Italy is come, and that courage on his part is all that is required.

I saw to-day M. Devincenzi, who says he knows you all well, and saw Lord John just before leaving London. He is very much alarmed at the state in which he finds things here, and is disposed to blame me for not trying to counteract Brenier's bad advice, not with the Ministers, but with the King.

I am certain, however, that I am right in not asking to see the King to give him advice which he does not ask, and which he would not follow when he knew that

* *Medici*, Giacomo, b. 1817, d. 1882. Patriot and soldier. Sailed for Sicily with Garibaldi's second expedition, took part in the whole campaign, forced Messina to capitulate after a siege of eight days; joined the Regular Army and was appointed Military Commandant of Palermo. Senator in 1870, and Marquis of the Vascello and first A.D.C. to the King in 1876

we should not stand by him if he did take it; and if he did, it would be difficult not to be bound to give him more support than desirable.

August 15.—We had our first alarm at Castellamare the night before last. I was just going to bed, about a quarter to twelve, when a sharp fire of musketry began down at the harbour, which is where the prison is, in which are confined about 1,000 convicts, whom we supposed to be breaking loose, and whose escape would be a greater danger to all the non-combatants and peaceable inhabitants of the town than any common political movement.

After this firing had gone on some little time, some additional excitement was produced by the cannon beginning also to fire; but, although all this was taking place very close to us, we could neither see it nor succeed in getting any correct information as to what was going on, and by one o'clock, or soon after, everything got quiet, and it was clear that the attempt, whatever it was, had failed.

We had seen a boat (though the night was dark) put off from the *Renown*, and felt no doubt it was a message sent to tell us the news, and shortly after the commander, Lethbridge, came and said he was sent to say that all was quiet again; but at that time he was under the impression that it had been a movement of the prisoners, some of whom are in an old hulk at the entrance of the harbour, and it was only after he left us that he found out the real facts, which he sent up to let us know by an Englishman he met down in the town. It turned out that it had been a most dashing attempt to cut out and carry off a Neapolitan two-decker which is lying close to the arsenal, preparing for sea. A steamer, supposed to be the *Veloce*, whose captain deserted with her to Garibaldi a few weeks ago, came quietly in without showing lights and brought up close to the arsenal, answering, when hailed, that she was a Frenchman: almost immediately after they

lowered boats and tried to cut the hawsers of the ship which lay close by; but the people were baffled by finding her moored with a very heavy chain, and then they tried to carry her by boarding, whereupon the firing commenced from both sides, and ended by the aggressors being beaten off, there being on the ship one man killed and four wounded, one of the latter being the Captain Acton who had commanded the *Stromboli* at Marsala, when Garibaldi landed, and who has been not more than a week since acquitted by the Court of Inquiry of having favoured the landing.

The strange steamer at first lay so much in a line with the French ship *Eylau* that the Neapolitans did not dare to fire cannon at her, and even some of the musket balls fell on board the Frenchman, and when she retired she slipped between her and the *Renown*, so as to make it impossible for many shots to be fired at her, though as it was some balls went near both ships. It certainly was a wonderfully plucky proceeding, but they must have counted on treachery on the part of the Neapolitans, or they never could have tried such a wild scheme.

You may imagine the panic this night attack created in the weak-minded inhabitants of this fashionable summer resort; for, though there was no reason to suppose that any of us were in danger, firing in anger has a very ugly sound, and it having taken place at night of course added to the fear. Annie was not in the least disturbed, and took the matter very quietly, entering into the spirit of the thing as soon as she knew the dashing nature of the attempt; but I believe our house was almost the only one where so much philosophy was shown, and Brenier's was full of refugees long after we were quietly snoring again.

In Naples, at the same time, matters were looking very ugly, and there the panic that prevailed really had some good cause; for there was no doubt that the

Count of Aquila was pushing on a reaction in order to carry out his own wild schemes. As far as I can gather of his game, it was to advise reactionary measures which he knew must provoke an immediate collision with the Liberals, which he meant to take advantage of, fancying that, by throwing himself into the arms of the extreme Liberals and appealing to universal suffrage, he might be elected vicar or regent in the place of the King. The scheme seems so wild as to be almost incredible, but still it was on the point of being tried; and it is, I believe, certain that he was distributing large numbers of revolvers among the lowest of the people, whom he meant to back him up; but after a tremendous struggle with the Government he has at last been shipped off, under the nominal pretext of going to England on matters connected with the Marine, of which he was Commandant. During the fight for the mastery between him and the Ministry he is said to have told De Martino that he would not have twenty-four hours to live; and Pianelli, the Minister of War, was threatened with being "shot down" by his own soldiers.

In consequence of the attempt at Castellamare a state of siege has been proclaimed at Naples. De Martino was averse to it, and only consented on condition of the Queen-Mother being absolutely packed off, and the National Guards of the provinces being supplied with arms, of which they are still almost deficient.

The King has written to his step-mother to say she must go to Marseilles, and naming the persons to go with her. De Martino also told me that a thing I had been working at quietly for some little time is decided upon, and that, if the landing of Garibaldi takes place, the King will go out to meet him, and leave none of his army behind in Naples. It will give him a larger force to bring against the invader, and, if he beats him, he will march back into Naples without the least

trouble, and, whichever way things go, it diminishes the chances of atrocities in the town.

The publication by Garibaldi of the Sardinian *Statuto* for Sicily is a very suspicious proceeding, and gives good ground for supposing that he does not believe that the vote of the country would be for the unconditional annexation; and therefore he chooses to assume that the annexation was *de facto* voted by the people when they welcomed him with cries of "Viva Vittorio Emmanuele!"

The letters from Palermo say that the Sicilians have no sort of intention of being provincialised, and that they would not send deputies to a central Parliament; but in the meantime public functionaries have been forced to take a new oath of fidelity to Victor Emmanuel and the *Statuto*.

While he has 20,000 men there, there can be no serious opposition made to him, but when his army crosses to the mainland, unless he does his work very quickly, he may find troubles spring up behind him.

The French Vice-Consul at Messina, writing, however, with a very evident bias against him, speaks of his prestige being much diminished, and of his being spoken of in the most contemptuous terms as a politician. There is also a disagreeable occurrence which will alarm the moderate people. There were about 900 Mazzinian volunteers who had been drilling near Leghorn, who were supposed to have been destined for the Roman States, and these have now gone to Sicily, as has also the famous Mazzinian, Colonel La Cicilia. I don't think we can now doubt that the Mazzinians believe Garibaldi to be doing their work for them, and are therefore seconding him to the best of their power, and it is quite evident also that the Sardinian Government are daily getting into a greater fright as to the turn which matters may take.

August 17.—Villamarina's language yesterday was a good confirmation of my last sentence. He has in

fact asked that a considerable force of Bersaglieri should be put on board the Sardinian ships, not as troops, but as a kind of marines, in case of being wanted, which he considers they may be either if the French show a disposition for intervention, or if anarchy and republicanism should set themselves up here, which he says the safety of Piedmont will make it absolutely necessary to put down. He tells Cavour that he does not ask him for instructions, but that when the men are sent he will act as he knows is best; and, if the public feeling in Sardinia resents any opposition to Garibaldi his proceedings can be disavowed by the Government. There is certainly a change coming over people's feelings here about the Dictator, whose arrival was looked forward to with impatience by half the country, and now many people are beginning to see that when he does come they will be absolutely at his disposal in a manner they do not relish.

It was no easy matter the other day to get Aquila off, for, I believe, he began by refusing to budge; but the Government had taken the precaution of ordering him to go on professional duty to England to buy ships, and he was told that if he disobeyed their orders he would be lodged in the fortress, and His Royal Highness took the hint and consented to be towed out in his yacht, while the Princess went in a Brazilian frigate.

What led at last to the decision to send him off was the arrival of three cases of revolvers and one case of pictures of him waving his hat, which have fallen into the hands of the Government.

I did not know till yesterday that I had a personal interest in getting him off, but I hear that I am on a list of those who were to be done for if his plan had come off, which part of the programme I hope may be omitted in the next performance that may be decided on.

August 20.—The Bersaglieri I mentioned, or at least some of them, came two days ago, and were the cause of the garrison being got under arms; for either by stupidity or design a boatful of them armed with their rifles and everything apparently ready for landing tried first to pass through a passage under one of the forts, and then wanted to land and pass round it, in both of which operations they found they would be opposed, and the affair created no little excitement among the public, who not unnaturally have learnt to look upon the Sardinians and Garibaldians as identical, and the attempt to land with their arms was considered very impudent.

During the state of siege, as our officers really wish our people to be kept out of harm's way, leave from our ships has been stopped; but it is very different with the Sardinians, for these chasseurs, who are picked infantry, having no business on board ship at all, have been parading all about the town, fraternising with the soldiers and trying to debauch them, being in fact the most active revolutionary agents that could be sent; and Admiral Persano appears to be as unscrupulous an officer as an unscrupulous master could wish to employ.

I mentioned in my letter of the 11th that the Sardinian Government wished a revolution to be accomplished without Garibaldi; he, it appears, wished that it should be begun without him, and that he should arrive by the invitation of the revolted nation; but it has been found impossible to get the people to move, though perhaps these Bersaglieri may succeed in doing so by persuading them that the Sardinian Government are already sending infantry to support them as soon as they rise. This is what at this moment is going on in the streets of Naples, and if it was possible to feel the slightest possible interest in the King or his dynasty the proceedings of the “Rè Galantuomo” would certainly excite it.

We should have to go back a long way to find such a course of deliberate underhand work as has been carried on by our Imperial ally and our pet Constitutional King. If the latter would even now behave like a gentleman and go to war with Naples I would forgive him, for it would be the greatest benefit he could confer upon Italy, as he might conquer this country and place it at once under a regular Government; but the deliberate encouragement of a revolution which neither he nor anyone else can be sure of guiding until it has spread ruin through half the Peninsula, while professing friendship to his victim all the time, is as discreditable as anything ever done by a Bourbon.

We know nothing more yet of the six steamers which left Cagliari on the 16th.

My letters from Messina are also barren, but speak of many of Garibaldi's men being in hospital with the malarial fever. A Frenchman who came from there the other day told me that a very large number of Garibaldi's men were leaving him; but I don't believe it at all, for the French are evidently under orders just now to run him down as far as they can.

August 21.—Well, at last he has landed with about 4,000 men at the toe of the boot, and we shall soon be out of our pain, one way or the other, though it is very likely that the 20,000 royal troops now in Calabria may give more trouble than the good folks in general calculate. The Basilicata is up, but the importance of the movement is not known. It is quite settled *at present* that, when the danger approaches, the King goes to meet it with all the troops from Naples, a great blessing for us.

August 25.—As the more there is to write the less time there is for writing, it is not easy to jot down half the things which, both for your sake and my own I should like to remember. The card house is tumbling down as fast as it can, and if it goes on at its

present rate the process does not promise to be either long or sanguinary.

The whole of Calabria has fallen into Garibaldi's hands almost without a blow being struck, and of the Neapolitan army there nothing now remains except, I believe, about a single brigade out of the five that were in those provinces. Some seven or eight thousand men surrendered at discretion—on what grounds I know not—and their General, with, it is said, a great part of the soldiers, has gone over to the army of the Dictator.

A traveller who came up from Calabria two days ago declares that the country is quite unanimous in favour of Garibaldi, even in parts where he had not yet arrived.

The Basilicata is already risen, and a provisional Government established at its capital, Potenza, and throughout the rest of the country the same thing may occur at any moment; and there is no reason why the invaders should not march straight to Naples, or at least to within a very short distance of it, and then may begin the unpleasant part of the business for ourselves personally, and for those who look to us for protection. The Government still apprehend reactionist pillage and atrocities of all kinds if there is fighting in the streets, and have just made an effort on the plea of humanity and the interests of our countrymen to induce us to come to their assistance, and put ourselves between Garibaldi and them.

I was in hopes of getting my Sunday quietly at Castellamare, but while I was still on board the *London*, where we had gone to church, De Martino and Brenier made their appearance to talk over a very serious proposition. This was that the English and French Ministers should help to bring about a regular neutralisation of Naples, so that there should be no fighting there, and that the inhabitants and the property might remain secure. The result was most desirable,

but the means of arriving at it which were proposed were not at all to my taste, for the suggestion in fact amounted to this—that the King should declare the town neutralised, sending out of it all the troops but the ordinary garrison, and that Brenier and I should let Garibaldi know that it was expected he would consent to consider it as neutral territory, the undertaking being that the town was to be given to whichever of the belligerents finally came out victorious. We were, in fact, to be the stakeholders who were to hand over the prize to the conqueror.

It is not pleasant to have to refuse to lend a hand to prevent, as you are told, the massacre and pillage of a great town, but it was so clear that it was in reality an intervention that was required that I said I could certainly not consent to anything of the kind, for De Martino had openly said, in reply to my question, that the neutralisation must be imposed upon Garibaldi if he was not disposed to accept it voluntarily. That, of course, was conclusive, but Brenier did not speak nearly so plainly as I did, and, I thought, was far from rejecting the notion of our taking the matter in hand.

It was then settled that there should be a meeting of the Corps Diplomatique at De Martino's house, at which the proposal of the Government should be made to the different Ministers, though the French, English and Sardinian were the only ones who could have really anything to say in the business. By the way, Brenier tried to get rid of having Villamarina by suggesting that only the representatives of the great Powers should be called; but I insisted, and so did De Martino, that the Sardinian Minister was the only useful one of the whole lot of us. And so it turned out at the meeting held this evening at De Martino's, where I again said I would not be a party to *demanding* Garibaldi's consent to the neutralisation scheme. I insisted that the proper thing would be for the

Neapolitan Government to propose it themselves to Garibaldi, saying at the same time that a formal engagement had been made, in the presence of all the Foreign Ministers in Naples, that if he was victorious in the war the town should be given up to him; but the old objection was made that they could not treat with the Sicilian Dictator. Was there ever such nonsense—after one General after another has had to negotiate with him and to sign capitulations without number?

At last it was started (after all progress seemed hopeless) that Villamarina might be the medium of conveying the proposal of the Neapolitan Government, and this idea was happily carried out, and I hope promises well.

When it was suggested to him he at once saw the advantage it would be for his King to appear in the character of the saviour of one of his future capitals, and he said he was ready at once to telegraph to Turin to state the arrangement the Neapolitan Government wished to make to save needless bloodshed, in which they are backed by the whole Corps Diplomatique, but that there being a difficulty in conveying this to the Dictator, His Majesty is asked by Villamarina if he will sanction his taking it himself to Garibaldi, unofficially and without in any way guaranteeing the neutralisation.

August 29.—Villamarina has been refused permission to communicate the neutralisation scheme to Garibaldi. De Martino has sent a circular to the Foreign Ministers, saying that orders had been given to the Generals to confine their action to country beyond the walls, and the troops are to be reduced to the ordinary peace garrison, and that all fears of a bombardment are to be laid aside.

The accounts from Calabria were that an entire brigade, of which one of the Generals is most appropriately named Brigante, had laid down their arms

and the Generals taken service under Garibaldi, but it turns out that the Generals were found to be betraying them by their men, who, on making the discovery, killed them, as they deserved.

August 31.—This doomed race of Bourbons seems determined to be true to its traditions to the end, and another reactionist plot has been discovered, to which the King was evidently privy, and his uncle the Count Trapani the chief concocter. This last-named worthy wrote to me only two days ago to ask me to take all his property under the protection of Her Majesty's Legation, to which I at once wrote an answer civilly declining to do so; and at the very moment when he was asking this he was cooking a plot of which the first act was to have been the arrest of the Ministers. If I happen to be thrown in his way, I shall be much tempted to "give him a bit of my mind" for his impudence in coming to me under such circumstances.

You will perhaps recollect that in the Aquila plot a secretary of the French Legation was deeply mixed, as well as another Frenchman of the name of d'Ajous. In this one the chief organ is also a Frenchman, who gives himself out as the secretary of Count Trapani, and next to him comes a certain Prince C——, a Neapolitan of the worst possible character, well known as devoted to France, a former Court spy and convicted cheater at cards, who is looked upon shyly by everyone here, but who was invited down to Castellamare to dine with Brenier last Sunday, when the plot was nearly ripe.

Papers have been found in the Frenchman's rooms which are said to give a good clue to what was intended, and implicate the Pope, Antonelli,* Lamori-

* Giacomo Antonelli, Cardinal, b. 1806. Was President and Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Liberal administration of the Vatican which promulgated the *Statuto* or Constitution so soon disregarded. Accompanied the Pope in his flight to Gaëta,

cière * and others. The consequence has been that the Ministers have resigned and only hold office till their successors are named. If reactionist names are selected it may push the Neapolitans to extremities, but they feel marvellously strongly the wisdom of not risking life or limb in their own affairs and of allowing Garibaldi and his people to have all the honour and all the knocks. The figure this people is making is something too deplorable. The republicans alone are active and stirring, but the annexationists are all at sixes and sevens, quarrelling already about the loaves and fishes which they don't deserve to have any share of.

The party which considers itself immensely superior to all others flatters itself that it can wait till Garibaldi has driven away the King, and that when he arrives at the gates of Naples they will be able to say that they are much obliged for what he has done, but that henceforth they will manage their own affairs; and they take it for granted that, after eating an ice, he will move on and leave them to themselves.

One of the chief clubs by which all these matters are arranged, and where they are discussed, is the "National Committee," which adopted as their seal what they considered the appropriate national arms—*i.e.*, three fraternal hands grasping a dagger. These blackguards feel no sort of shame in proclaiming that

and returned to Rome as an ardent reactionary. Remained the most important personage at the Papal Court, and died in 1876, bequeathing a property of £1,600,000 to his three brothers.

* Christophe Léon Juchault de Lamoricière, *b.* 1806. Distinguished himself in command of French troops in the Algerian war of 1847. Ordered the attack on the barricades in Paris in 1848 and quelled the rioting; arrested on the occasion of the Coup d'Etat in 1852, and banished from France. Commanded the troops of Pope Pius IX. when the Italians threatened the States of the Church, was defeated at Castelfidardo by the Sardinian General Cialdini; surrendered at Ancona, September 10, 1860. Retired into private life and died in 1865.

to be the national weapon, but the want of all feeling of honour prevailing from highest to lowest is of bad augury for the success of the future free government of the country.

I can give you a splendid instance of this in the conduct of my own landlord, a certain General of high rank, one of the most hated members of the old Camarilla, who has passed his life in the King's ante-chamber, and has feathered his nest handsomely through the favour of the Court. This worthy had to give up his places, and retired in a very creditable manner to Switzerland; but in a very short time it began to be rumoured that he was on board one of the Sardinian ships, and now he coolly publishes an address to the army, of which he is still a retired General, calling upon it to give its adhesion to Victor Emmanuel.

The Count of Syracuse goes to-night to Turin in a Sardinian ship upon the invitation of the King.

I found Villamarina to-day in better spirits at the way things were going, and he told me in confidence that he was much pleased to know that all misunderstanding between Garibaldi and Cavour was at an end, and that he is to receive the Dictator well when he comes. He said that he had been writing to urge Cavour to make up their differences, representing that it would be most mischievous to be at variance, "after having supported Garibaldi by every means in his power."

It is quite time that there should be some real understanding, and I have to-day sent a memorandum in a confidential despatch, saying why I believe it would be advantageous that Sardinian authorities should be installed at Naples as soon as possible after the King's departure.

It is, as you say, sad to reflect that I should have to fall with the dynasty which has so richly deserved its fate, which, I maintain, I have not. The prospect

is not cheery, for I am not eligible for any pension whatever, and not having, like Cincinnatus, even a plough to retire to, I must remain in the unenviable position of a servant out of place, and it is very likely I may have to wait long for another.

There is no particular news from the seat of war except that the country is ready to receive the Liberator with open arms whenever he appears, and the King's troops waiting to give him battle at Salerno are said to be ready to lay down their arms. Brenier's demand for satisfaction is still immensely commented upon, and gives no small disgust.

CHAPTER III

NAPLES, SEPTEMBER 1860

[This chapter deals almost entirely with the internal condition of the town of Naples after the entry of Garibaldi, and with the uncertainty which still prevailed in regard to the action of Sardinia; an uncertainty which did not endure long, an advance of the Piedmontese troops having become a necessity if King Francis's return to his capital was to be prevented, the forces of the "Garibaldini," in spite of the victory gained by them at the battle of the Volturno, being quite inadequate to accomplish the reduction of the fortified towns of Capua and Gaëta. The arrival of King Victor Emmanuel's army sealed the fate of the Bourbon dynasty.]

September 5.—If I write every day it accumulates to such a mass, and if I put it off for a few days I am astonished to find how much has passed that I should have liked to mention; and when events are particularly stirring it is almost impossible not to begin by speaking of the last thing that has been producing a great impression on one.

That last event now is that the King, having confided the care of Naples to the municipality and the National Guard, announces his own intention of retiring to Gaëta. This resolution must be an immense relief to everyone in Naples, for it gives every prospect of a quiet transition, which is the one thing that people have latterly been anxious about.

As I have not yet heard of the King being actually gone, it would be rash to speak of it as a fact; but in truth he seems to have nothing else to do, for the ground is gradually giving way under his feet, and every day brings fresh accounts of defection in the

army and navy. The latter especially has behaved in a manner so disgraceful that I don't think it could have been equalled in any other country, and its last performance was to refuse to go to sea when ordered to cruise in the direction of Salerno. They then announced that they had no objection to go towards Gaëta, but that they would not go anywhere where they might be called upon to fight !

It shows what a Government gains by destroying every feeling of honour and self-respect in a whole nation, but it is impossible to describe the loathsome exhibition that has been made, during all these late times of excitement, of meanness, cowardice, ingratitude, and every other low quality. The men that lived at Court, and fattened upon the Court, have been among the first to rat, or at least to run away, leaving their " poor young King," as they always called him, to shift for himself, after having themselves done all that was possible to get him into his present mess by encouraging him to resist all change in the system under which they alone prospered.

And the Liberals have not shown to any better advantage, the only appearance of vigour they have exhibited being a determination to illuminate the town in honour of the King's departure, which they will no doubt boast of as a vast act of courage.

I wish to goodness we could get rid of the regiment that takes care of us at Castellamare, but as long as we keep them I shall not feel certain that some troubles may not take place there, as they are the people who had to capitulate at Reggio, and feel extremely sore against the National Guard, who took part against them, and they are quite numerous enough to eat up bodily our poor little National Guard here, who have in all no more than a hundred miserable flint muskets to defend the place with. They have been trying hard to get the arms to which they are entitled, and last week a formal order for

them was given by the Minister of War, but the officer in command at the arsenal refused to obey, as he had private orders from the King not to issue any arms to the National Guard. This is the way he tries to be a true constitutional Sovereign; but in common justice one must admit that His Majesty was undoubtedly right if he believed that every musket issued to the National Guard would be used against himself if there was to be a fight between him and Garibaldi.

The news from Sicily is not good, and at Messina there have been murders and banishments under threat of the dagger in case of hesitation.

The Government had published in the official paper that they merely held office till their successors were found, but they will now, I imagine, hold on till they can resign their functions into the hands of the Dictator, though I should not be surprised if one of them, Liborio Romano, the Minister of the Interior, who, I am convinced, has been playing the annexationist game throughout, should not resign even then. (This proved correct; he had been a traitor all the time and in communication with Cavour and Garibaldi, under whom he remained Minister.)

September 6.—This morning I met in the railway in plain clothes an artillery officer whom I had seen sometimes last year at the Princess Filangieri's, and who had arrived only two days ago from the citadel of Messina. He says there are about 4,500 Neapolitan troops in the citadel, but that they are an atrocious set; that they would not even obey the King if he were to order them to evacuate without fighting, and that they threatened to kill their officers, who, they declared, were betraying them. Not far wrong either, thought I to myself, feeling quite refreshed at hearing that there was a set of men disposed to show spirit and courage. About half an hour after abusing the villains for daring to express doubts of the integrity

of their officers, my friend became confidential and informed me that he was one of a number of young men who are trying to raise a *corps d'élite* of volunteers (against the King, of course, whose uniform he was wearing three days before). Their chief difficulty, he said, was about arms, which they were ready to buy if they knew where, and asked if our ships of war would not sell them a number of revolvers, etc. When I said certainly not, he would not for a long time believe that I was serious, saying that the Sardinian ships of war had let them have a hundred muskets, but they were not good, and more were wanted.

I cannot tell you the extent to which it revolts me to have to talk civilly to animals of this description, and it is forced upon me much oftener than is agreeable.

I asked Brenier yesterday what was the reason that the Emperor had hesitated to receive the Duc de Cajanello, who had been sent to him with the excuses about the broken head.

He told me that the reason of the hesitation was that De Martino, very much contrary to his—the B.'s—advice, had chosen that the King, instead of confining the mission to its ostensible object, should write a letter to the Emperor again invoking His Imperial Majesty's support, and the Emperor was not anxious that such an appeal should be made to him. I spoke to De Martino about this to-day, and said that Brenier spoke of the ill-advised letter having been written quite against his persuasion, which made the little Minister for Foreign Affairs nearly jump out of his chair, declaring that Brenier for a week before had been urging a fresh appeal to France and England, which last was always added for form's sake.

De Martino upon this likewise told me that one of his own chief reasons for resigning was the discovery that Brenier had induced Prince Ischetella and Prince

Cutrofiano to get the King to telegraph an appeal for support to the Emperor, of which he, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had been kept in entire ignorance.

One has to choose between the two stories the best way one can.

I got rather a curious letter to-day from Mr. Gallenga, who calls himself "one of Garibaldi's staff," and is, I believe, the "chef d'état-major," dated Salerno this morning, where he says the General will be in a few hours; that he has ordered landings to be made in the Gulf of Salerno and in the Bay of Naples, and in the name of humanity he calls upon me to do what I can to prevent the Government from resorting to a bombardment if the forts should be attacked.

This letter was brought to me by one of the active men of the Comitato of the Dagger. I told him that I could not answer Gallenga's letter and commence a correspondence with Garibaldi's staff, but that he might say that we had received assurances from the Government that there would under no circumstances be a bombardment, though the forts would of course fire upon any assailants; and I also told him that they must not reckon upon our ships remaining in their present positions if it was intended to make the attack in such a manner as to get them as shields from the fire of the forts; that we should do nothing to oppose the attacking party, but that we should not remain to cover the landing and paralyse the fire of the defenders.

In that case, said he, the plan must be abandoned: so it appears that they intended to slip in among the numerous foreign men-of-war, which are now lying so close together that the Neapolitans could not fire upon any invaders without hitting the ships.

I had some unsatisfactory talk afterwards with this man, who was loud in his complaints of the Moderate or Cavour Committee, who wish for immediate

annexation. He says that his own party will not consent to be annexed to form a province of Sardinia, and that the annexation cannot take place till Garibaldi can offer the whole of Italy to Victor Emmanuel, with Rome as the capital of the kingdom, and this, he said, he knew to be Garibaldi's intention.

I suggested that an attack on the city of Rome entailed a collision with France, upon which my gentleman contradicted me, and swore that he was in correspondence with Mœquard, the Emperor's secretary, and that he had the assurance that all His Imperial Majesty required was that the Holy Father should not be driven out of the Vatican and St. Angelo. Of course I don't believe all this, but it at least shows to what extremities they mean to push things, and Garibaldi unquestionably leans much more to these men than to the moderates.

September 9.—On the evening of the 6th the King confided the care of his capital to the municipality and the National Guard, issued a very creditable farewell address and protest, and, embarking on board of one of his smallest steamers, sailed for Gaëta, accompanied by two Spanish ships, with the Spanish Minister on board, serving as an escort.

The navy behaved disgracefully to the end, having refused to accompany him even to Gaëta.

With the exception of about 2,000 men, the whole of the troops were also sent out of town, so that it became pretty evident that no great troubles were to be feared, though, even then, I doubt whether anyone expected the holiday entry which the Dictator made the next morning, and which really was worthy of the rest of his marvellous progress, from Marsala to the present time.

It is, however, literally true that, within fifteen hours after the King had left his capital, where a few days ago he had nearly 20,000 men, Garibaldi arrived

by railroad, accompanied by about a third of his staff, two or three newspaper correspondents, and four or five sympathisers who had hooked on to him—in all, from fifteen to twenty persons—his extreme advanced guard not having arrived within thirty miles of Salerno.

It was by the greatest piece of good fortune that I did not absolutely arrive in the same train with him, and accompany him from the station. The train from Castellamare joins in with the one from Salerno at Torre dell' Annunziata, and as I had some suspicions that some of the foremost Garibaldians might be coming up, or that the train might be taken up for them, I had asked Admiral Mundy to send over the *Intrepid* gunboat to secure my getting into town, and I carried Brenier over with me.

If it had not been for this precaution we should absolutely have come by the same train, and, though I should have liked extremely to have seen him arriving and received by the town, I should have been excessively put out by knowing that all Naples would be saying that, within a few hours of the King's departure, I had gone out to meet and to welcome the Dictator upon his arrival. As it was, Brenier's carriage had gone to the station to meet its master, and the world persists in saying that it came back full of the red-shirted followers.

Of course his reception was enthusiastic, and the Neapolitans had an opportunity of showing what a base calumny it had been to accuse them of want of courage; for as soon as it was quite certain that the soldiers were irrevocably gone, and that there was not a chance of their having an enemy in their neighbourhood, arms were dragged out from every hole and corner and paraded and brandished in the most heroic manner; red shirts were mounted, as spotless and bright as the first day of a hunting coat, their owners proudly feeling that their posses-

sion entitled them to all the glories of Sicily and Calabria.

However, while the town was running mad with flags, daggers, and red shirts, the thinking portion of the public was in the most gloomy and despairing humour, for it was understood that Garibaldi had thrown himself entirely into the hands of the extreme party, and that he would not hear of annexation till both the Roman States and Venetia had been conquered.

Villamarina had been desired to enter at once into good relations with him, and had gone round in a steamer to Salerno to meet him, but just arrived too late; and on his return to Naples, finding the party which he had joined, declared that he would not go to him. The Sardinian Admiral, Persano, who throughout has been helping him as much as it was possible to do without taking an actual part in the hostilities, was in no less despair, for he received letters from Garibaldi himself, saying that, after remaining a few days in Naples, he intended to march to Rome and then to attack Venetia, and when all Italy was conquered he would make it over to King Victor Emmanuel.

Yesterday things looked a shade better, for the Dictator had formed his administration entirely of men belonging to the moderate party, and he had likewise made over the fleet to Admiral Persano, to be added to the navy of the King of Sardinia, and the royal Sardinian flag has been hoisted in the ships—a proceeding which, I think, must force the Sardinian Government at once to take an open part; but they have preferred the underhand dealings so long that it will now be extremely difficult for them to follow any satisfactory course.

I had a long talk with Gallenga, which did not help me to make me see things in a more cheerful light: he is on Garibaldi's staff, and is correspondent of *The*

Times. He was the F.O. examiner who passed French for Italian on his examination; and Arribavene, the correspondent of the *Daily News*, also with Garibaldi, passed Conyngham in the same way, so that the Legation feels at home with the staff.

However, Gallenga told me that Garibaldi speaks like a madman, and declares that he will march from hence to Rome—not meaning the Roman States, but the town itself—and that, as for the French, he is not afraid of them, for that there is in France so strong a party in favour of him that the Emperor dare not oppose him. When he has conquered Rome he will attack Venetia, and, when that likewise is mastered, the crown of the United Italian kingdom will, from Rome as its capital, be offered to Victor Emmanuel.

It is, in fact, an exact repetition of what I told you he said in his letters to Persano; but it is still not unlikely that the language may be used as a blind, and that his real intentions may be to attack Lamoricière, but not Rome.

I also saw a Commander Forbes, who has attached himself to the Dictator; but I really have not time to write down what he said in detail, though the upshot of it all was that, in point of fact, the whole of the southern part of the kingdom, from Reggio to Naples, has been conquered by Garibaldi single-handed and without an army at all, for he seems all along to have been from thirty to sixty miles in advance of it, the people rising and the troops falling back or capitulating as he advanced.

At Salerno the Government had a very strong force last week, but at last Garibaldi entered it at least sixty miles in advance of the foremost of his troops.

The bewilderment and disorganisation of the royalists was very much helped by a most amusing trick of Peard, Garibaldi's Englishman as he is called, who went into the telegraph stations and dictated

despatches to the Minister of War at Naples, as though they were sent by their own Generals, and these, as you may imagine, were calculated to create no small confusion.

Three of the late Ministers continue to hold their places under the Dictator, the only important one of them being Romano, the Minister of the Interior, who has manifestly been false throughout. Of the others, the President, Spinelli, has gone abroad, and De Martino remains quietly here.

To these men we have reason to be grateful, for they had a double task, in the first part of which they failed, and succeeded in the latter. They had to try to save the dynasty under a Constitution, and this, I believe, they honestly endeavoured to do; but they had also the duty of trying to prevent the transition from being attended by disorder and excesses in the event of its being impossible to hold the King up.

September 11.—As you are taking your holiday you may perhaps not know that I had instructions to see Garibaldi if he came here, and to tell him that, though I could not hold official intercourse with him, I should remain at Naples till further orders; and that I was also to tell him from Lord John that any attack upon Venetia would be attended with calamity to Italy. The first question was as to how I was to see the great man without exciting all the remarks that would have been made if I had gone to call upon him; so it was settled that we should meet on board the *Hannibal* when he went to call on Admiral Mundy, and our interview came off yesterday morning.

When I went on board he was already in the Admiral's cabin, with Bertani and another officer of his staff and most of the captains of our ships, including the Commodore, and we began by exchanging civilities, amongst which I believe I must plead guilty to having expressed my own admiration of the extraordinary results he had obtained with such small

means; and then the “assistants,” as the French papers call them, were asked to retire, and the Admiral, Garibaldi, and myself remained to have our talk alone, when I duly delivered my message as I was ordered.

He at once said that he would make no mystery about his plans and intentions, but would tell me that he meant immediately to push on to Rome, and when there to offer the kingdom of Italy to King Victor Emmanuel, whose business it would be to proceed to the liberation of Venice, from which task he would not be able to shrink without forfeiting his whole position and popularity. If Austria would consent to give it up by purchase or negotiation, so much the better; but, if not, it must be wrested from her by the sword; and he was sure that, in advising that no attack should be made on Venice, Lord John did not fairly represent the generous sympathies of the British nation, which he knew to be with him. He recognised how much Italy owed to the English Government, but he declared that both Lord John and Lord Palmerston were too old to enter into the warmth of feeling that runs through the country.

I said that I was quite ready to admit that the whole of England was with him at heart, but that nevertheless we were a practical nation, and, if he was believed to be pushing things to such an extremity as to make it probable that they would end by a European war, he might be sure that he would very soon forfeit the sympathies and good wishes of the English.

He would not admit that an attack on Venice was the least likely to result in a war, and he hinted that Austria was so rotten at heart that very little was required to make her fall to pieces, and that he knew, through his Hungarian adherents, that Hungary was on the verge of revolution.

We then talked of Rome and the French garrison, and he is as fully prepared as Cobden could have been to “crumple up” Napoleon and his whole army. He

asked what right the Emperor had to keep him out of Rome, which is an Italian town, saying, "I'm not afraid, I assure you, of this M. Napoleon: it is because Cavour was afraid of him that he allowed Sardinia to be dragged through the mud, and consented to the cession of Savoy and Nice, which I never should have allowed, for I should have made Napoleon afraid of me."

He spoke as if he really thought the expulsion of the French from Rome a matter of no great difficulty, and said he had so many adherents in France that the Emperor would scarcely dare to go against him; adding that, when a robber is in your house you do him honour enough if you ask him to go out, but, if he does not choose to do so, he cannot complain of being turned out by force.

There is no use in telling you what I said in answer to all this, which from anyone else might be taken simply as rodomontade, but one has certainly no right to apply such a word to Garibaldi. The real truth is that he is an enthusiast, pursuing his Italian unity to its utmost extent, and determined to risk all that has been won rather than stop one step short of the accomplishment of the whole.

I put him in mind that in 1848, when Sardinia did not choose to listen to reason, she not only lost in a few weeks the whole of Lombardy, which she had already secured, but fixed the Austrian yoke more firmly than ever on the whole of Italy. If he neglects to secure, as he goes along, what he has conquered, the same thing may very possibly happen again here, if he should break down before Lamoricière or the French garrison.

The last few weeks have given me a lower opinion than ever of the Neapolitan people; and if the army of Garibaldi was dispersed I fully believe that, with a single regiment, the King might march back, take possession of the capital, and rule as he did before, in spite of the arming of the National Guard and the

exhibitions of martial valour which we have lately had in the streets.

In the event, however, of a possible attempt at a return by the King if Garibaldi should meet with a reverse, Sardinia would, I think, be forced to step in to prevent such a calamity, for she is now so far committed that it would be next to impossible for her to avoid it.

The Neapolitan navy has been quietly made over to the King of Sardinia, though the two countries have never been at war, and the Sardinian Bersaglieri have been landed from the ships and are doing duty at Naples, and their force is going to be greatly increased.

The ships will hardly be returned under any circumstances, and, if Garibaldi should chance to be beaten, the presence of the Sardinian troops will, I hope, entail the certainty that their Government would insist on the will of the nation deciding whether the King should come back or not.

Villamarina was in black despair ten days ago, for Garibaldi was supposed to have thrown himself entirely into the hands of the republicans, but he is now more hopeful, as all the nominations have been of moderate men, and the expressions of love and admiration of Victor Emmanuel on the part of the Dictator are unbounded; but the fact of the extreme influence of Bertani over him can still not be disputed, and, when the fighting is over, there will be a great push made in the republican interests.

In consequence of Villamarina's entreaties he consents not to attack Rome till the Sardinian Government have had time to try to obtain by negotiation the withdrawal of the French garrison; but I cannot conceive that this can be seriously expected by them, though the persons on Garibaldi's staff look upon the French simply as the Pope's bodyguard, and think that His Holiness will withdraw at once from Rome and carry them with him.

I could not even find from Villamarina what was intended by this negotiation, but Hudson* writes that the Sardinian Government were determined to stop Garibaldi *côte que côte*, so I suppose there is some manœuvre on foot between them and the Emperor.

If Rome is attacked, I don't see how it will be possible to escape from French intervention in Italy.

In a proclamation to the Palermitans, published in the official paper last night, Garibaldi tells them that it is from the steps of the Quirinal that he will pronounce the annexation of Sicily; and, after a menace of this nature, I doubt whether any country would be justified in complaining if the Emperor were at once to send 20,000 more troops to Cività Vecchia.

September 16.—I had no opportunity of sending letters last week, and the consequence has been that I have allowed many days to pass without writing, but I don't recollect that there are great arrears to work up.

The Neapolitans are in a shocking fright at the Dictator's intention of going to Rome, and the address to the Palermitans produced a fall in the Funds of about 9 per cent. at one jump, and it has been since increasing.

Villamarina and others have been pressing me to use all my efforts to persuade Garibaldi to be moderate; and, as diplomatists are to him a suspected race, they wished me to get Admiral Mundy and all the British travellers in Naples to preach moderation to him.

It is curious that Mundy is supposed to have more weight with him than almost anyone else; and as it is quite certain that our good Admiral cannot be said to

* Sir James Hudson, G.C.B. A distinguished diplomatist and friend of Cavour, remarkable for the zeal with which he upheld the cause of Italian unity. He was Minister at Turin from 1851 to 1863, when he retired from the diplomatic service.

be a man of commanding mind, it shows how easily very inferior people may guide him, if he chances to be taken with them.

The English travellers who were to be set at him were Lord Llanover and Mr. Edwin James, which last, it seems, gives himself out as having come on a mission to the Dictator. To me he was more modest, denying the fact, but saying that Lord Palmerston, hearing he was going to Naples, had asked him to give Garibaldi good advice. I had no hesitation in asking both of them to take opportunities of speaking to Garibaldi, and of saying that the sympathy of England, to which he holds much, would be forfeited if he is seen inclining to Mazzinianism or taking a line which must lead to a European war; and I think they both of them seemed not a little flattered when I said that Garibaldi would be much more likely to consider them the representatives of the English people than he would me, and they promised to do all they could.

The Admiral was also to speak in the same sense, and I begged him particularly to point out how completely he will be playing the French game if he forces on an intervention. Brenier has been astounded by getting orders to leave Naples immediately, and, as he only got them by telegraph, he doesn't know what it means; for, till the King leaves his country, there seems no reason for the foreign Ministers doing so, and if they must not stay at the capital, they ought to go to Gaëta. I hope I am not to receive similar instructions.

I cannot even surmise what turn things are going to take here. There are already above 1,500 Sardinian troops at Naples, and they are also said to have entered the Papal States from the north. The French at the same time have added 5,000 men to their Roman garrison, and have almost officially announced their determination to defend Rome, Civitâ Vecchia, Viterbo, and Perugia—in fact, the Patrimony of St. Peter—

and if they do this at a time of excitement 15,000 men will not be sufficient; and, notwithstanding all this, there are symptoms of an understanding among the chief actors which I cannot comprehend.

September 17.—The symptoms of an understanding between France and Sardinia certainly do not appear very evident to-day, for we have just heard of the withdrawal of the French Legation from Turin, which Brenier announced as a fact, and as having been caused by the Sardinian invasion of the Papal territory.

The Sardinian Government certainly do carry on business in a most unconscionable manner, and it was strong enough to send to the Pope as an ultimatum a suggestion to give up Rome, to disband his foreign troops, and not to oppose revolts in the provinces; but to back up this modest proposal by a summary invasion without waiting for an answer or declaring war, is a piece of impudence which no country but Sardinia would have had the face to attempt.

Garibaldi has just published a sort of manifesto against Cavour, in the shape of a letter in which he declares it impossible he should ever be reconciled with the man who consented to the sale of an Italian province; and this letter has produced immense dissatisfaction among the moderate party here who hold to the Sardinian Government, of which they consider Cavour the representative; and they would now give their ears to get rid of their Liberator, who, they find, is leading them by a road they did not wish to travel.

No small disgust has been created by the nomination of Alexandre Dumas as the Director of the Museum and of Pompeii, etc., and people fully expect that, with such a blackguard there, some of the greatest treasures will soon be missing. The said Alexandre Dumas is lodged at one of the royal palaces, drinking the King's wines and feasting at the public

expense with the choice company that he is in the habit of keeping about him, among which there is a very charming midshipwoman, who does duty in the yacht in a dapper jacket and trousers.

I was very glad to-day to get the telegram from Lord John, sent on from Genoa by steamer desiring me to stay at Naples till further orders, for I was rather afraid the bad example of the French might be followed, which would, I think, have been a mistake.

The country is in a very uncomfortable state, for police there is next to none, while there is a decided disposition to annex property belonging to other people.

At Castellamare we have now got 120 good Piedmontese soldiers to look after our convicts, and I can assure you they were much wanted, for the National Guard thought the best way of managing the prisoners was by keeping them in good humour; so they struck off their chains and let them go out without a guard in bands of two or three hundred at a time. The odd thing was that, as they look upon themselves as political victims, they had such confidence that Garibaldi would release them that they almost all came back to their prisons at night, though some were too wise.

September 19.—Garibaldi came back yesterday from Sicily, where he had gone to see if people were as discontented as was said; and because he was received with great clamour he is satisfied that the island is in good humour.

Immediately on his return he went off to Capua, where an attack was made this morning, which resulted in the troops, without loss on their own side, beating off the assailants with a loss of about 150 men, which will put the King's people in spirits. An attack on a walled town without ladders or cannon sounds like a curious proceeding, but it must probably have

been expected that the garrison was ready to capitulate. Since his return Garibaldi is said to talk more wildly than ever of going against Rome, and it is thought he may try to push on before the Piedmontese can get between him and it. It seems that one of the reasons that make him feel such profound admiration for King Victor Emmanuel is that His Majesty gave him 3,000,000 francs out of his private purse to enable him to undertake the Sicilian expedition, which Cavour thought too desperate. This is a fact, and not a rumour.

Another thing that I cannot quite answer for, though I believe it to be true, is that Garibaldi has sent to Turin an aide-de-camp of the King's, who had been attached to his person throughout the expedition, to say that he will at once have the annexation if the King will change his Ministers. His hatred against Cavour knows no bounds, but we must wait to see whether the "Galantuomo" consents to the trifling sacrifice.

By the way, there has very nearly been a vacancy in the representation of Marylebone, Mr. Edwin James having gone down this morning to see what was going on at Capua, when a round shot, which did not seem disposed to respect the sacred character of a British M.P., came popping through the splashboard of the carriage in which he was. I forget whether I mentioned yesterday that Mazzini had arrived here, and that one or two demonstrations that were wished to be made in his honour have been put down. Another person has also arrived, and caused no less sensation—*i.e.*, the fair Skittles*—who is now at the Hôtel Vittoria, where she will meet another frail sister, known as the Countess Martini, but now travelling in a becoming uniform with Garibaldi's army, to which she professed to be a Florence Nightingale, and in that

* A notorious *demi-mondaine*.

character collected offerings, which, however, stopped short in her own pocket, at which the Dictator is not over well pleased.

I mentioned yesterday that our neighbours, the convicts, had been having some entire liberty, and I find that on going over the muster not less than 160 are absent without leave: however, they will probably not remain in this neighbourhood, and will do us no harm.

September 21.—The loss at Capua seems to have been greater than was at first said, and the casualties are now set down at 600, but a more serious attack was expected for to-day. Garibaldi is so hot upon his Roman project that people are afraid he may try to push on there with a few thousand men at once, so as not to be intercepted by the Piedmontese, who, however, cannot be long before they do this, as they cannot meet with any serious opposition on their road; and, unprovoked as was the invasion of the Pope's dominions, everyone must wish them the speediest possible success.

September 23.—The appearance of affairs here does not improve, and it is said that the provisional Government, which was mostly composed of moderate men, will positively not remain, and are to be replaced by others who are either republicans themselves or who will allow others to make them drift into that channel.

Mazzini is here, as I think I told you, and it is said that he has made his peace with Garibaldi by declaring himself a convert to the project of a United Italy under Victor Emmanuel, and to have abandoned republican principles; and it is added that the Dictator, satisfied with this assurance, has consented to be reconciled with him.

It is scarcely conceivable that a man of his determination of character should at the same time be so childishly weak and credulous.

Ledru Rollin* is likewise either here or coming immediately, and there is every appearance of the republicans making a push, but the approach of the Sardinians will be a great check to them.

On the other hand, Garibaldi is daily losing credit with the moderates, and will have to lean more and more on the republicans. He is now showing a disposition to lay his hands on about £2,000,000 standing in the name of various members of the Royal Family in the Great Book, which in all countries has been held sacred even by revolutionary Governments, and this will disgust many people. Alexandre Dumas's nomination to the Direction of the Museum was so openly and generally abused that he has actually been shamed into going away and giving it up. The Neapolitan captain, Anguissola, who gave up the *Veloce* in such a discreditable manner, is petted and advanced, while an exception is made against the captain and officers of the only vessel which performed its duty honourably, and they are not allowed to give their adhesion to the new Government; and altogether, according to the present system, those who can boast of having acted with the most notorious treachery and bad faith are they who will be put in the highest places.

There has been another serious check to the Garibaldians near Capua, and they are said to have

* *B. 1807, d. 1874.* Called by Victor Hugo "the Tribune of the Revolution of February 1848." During the reign of Louis Philippe obtained a great reputation as an agitator and leader of the working-men's party. Elected deputy in 1841, became a member of the Provisional Government in 1848; elected in May one of the five in whose hands the Constituent Assembly placed the interim Government of France, but resigned in June. Was a candidate for the Presidency in December, when he was defeated by Louis Napoleon. Attempted to provoke a rising against the latter, failed and fled to England, and joined Kossuth, Mazzini and Ruge. He published a passionate invective against England, *De la Décadence de l'Angleterre*, but for twenty years continued to live alternately in London and Brussels until amnestied in 1870.

been driven out of Cajazzo, which they had occupied the other day on the north-east of it, and to which they attached such importance, and they are said to have lost a considerable number of prisoners. The Royal army is said to be behaving with frightful brutality in the town, and to have nailed one of their Generals to the gates. If he was preparing to betray his men he certainly deserved the lynching, and Garibaldi's whole proceedings with regard to Capua look as if he had calculated on partizans inside the town. There will be some bloody scenes acted there, for the Garibaldians are furious at the opposition they have met with, and vow that they will give no quarter.

Some fine bodies of men have been joining them from Calabria, but will they hang long together if opposed?

September 25.—The battle that was expected at Capua is postponed, to the disappointment of the numerous British visitors who had gone down on purpose to witness it, and whose presence ought to have been sufficient to prevent the respective Generals from causing them such a shabby vexation.

The advance of the Sardinians is very satisfactory to the Neapolitans, who are daily getting more afraid of Mazzini and Ledru Rollin, who is certainly here, and who, as well as the former, has had an interview with Garibaldi; but these wretched people, although they groan over the presence of the republicans, and to strangers avow their dread of the line taken by Garibaldi, dare not take any means of expressing their feelings to him.

What a capital memorandum that was of the Sardinian Government on the entry of their army into the Papal States! If it had only left out about the demand that the Pope should dismiss his mercenaries it would have been perfect. There is also a malicious humour about it that is very amusing when it speaks of the young King of Naples not only having turned a

deaf ear to England and France, but to that King who took the most undoubted interest in his welfare—*i.e.*, Victor Emmanuel.

September 27.—There has been no outward progress in affairs during the last few days, but there has, I believe, been the immense advance in Garibaldi having been brought to see that he must abandon the Roman part of his project; so that there are hopes of these Neapolitan matters being brought to some practical conclusion, though Garibaldi's own programme will not be more completely carried out than was the Emperor's by the peace of Villafranca.

The resistance of the King's troops at Capua will put the Sardinians in an awkward position, but it will not do for them to hesitate now; and notwithstanding all their protestations of a wish to be friends with Francis II., nothing remains for them but to come and give him the *coup de grâce*, and to take absolute possession of the kingdom, which is fast getting as anxious to be out of Garibaldi's hands as it was a few weeks ago to get into them.

To the despair of his real admirers, he unfortunately considers himself a great administrator, and issues decrees, of which some are good, but others as monstrous as anything that was issued by the kings his predecessors. He loves to come down upon the priests, and, though I have certainly little enough sympathy for all that fry, I must confess that they will have good right to grumble a bit. He began by confiscating the property of the Jesuits; then he laid hands on that of the bishops, who are to have an allowance of “not more” than 2,000 ducats, or £330, a year; and now there is a thundering decree by which priests who preach “censure upon the institutions or laws” are to be fined and imprisoned; and, though the minimums of these fines and imprisonments are prescribed, the maximums are not, so that the culprits are liable to anything short of death, and

the reverend padres had therefore better mind their P's and Q's.

I am excessively disgusted at having been kept so entirely in the dark as to anything that may have been said at Paris, Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburg, or London, upon Neapolitan affairs; but I can assure you that I am as absolutely ignorant of all the European features of the Neapolitan affairs as if I had nothing to do with them, for not one single word has been sent to me from any of these places from the time of Garibaldi's landing in Sicily. I presume that there must have been some conversations about our concerns, and I do not think it fair that they should have been kept from me. However, I am now so near my last hour that I should be in charity with all men when I expire and shall reserve all my wrath for Hammond, whom I will haunt when the grave closes over the Neapolitan mission.

September 29.—It is amusing to us, who are on the spot, to see the absurd mistakes that the best-informed people in England are making about Garibaldi and Neapolitan affairs. *The Times* and *Punch* immediately began to imagine him making war upon St. Januarius and analysing the blood of the Saint, when in point of fact he was treating him with the greatest respect. Indeed, the liquefaction came off last week with the usual *éclat*, and with one decided improvement for the benefit of the devout worshippers, by the Saint being subjected to the rules of military punctuality. He does not generally condescend to allow his blood to liquefy till the true believers, having exhausted both their patience and their prayers, fall to work to abuse and slang him in good round terms. This time, how ever, the miracle was announced for nine o'clock, and, as the clock struck, sure enough it took place, thus clearly proving to the multitude how high the Dictator stands in the good graces of the Saint.

The next amusing thing is the unbounded admiration which is expressed because Garibaldi does not allow his actions to be influenced by Cavour's hostility to him ! Why, his hatred of Cavour is, after the Unity, the one idea which influences every step he takes, and he seems to me to have given himself no pains to conceal it.

He first published a letter saying he never would be reconciled with Cavour, and next he sends a letter to Victor Emmanuel offering to have immediate annexation if he will dismiss his Minister; or, in other words, making the fate of the whole kingdom of Naples depend upon his having his revenge upon Cavour.

However, Cavour has done him, as well as the Italian cause, immense service in taking the Roman business out of his hands; for what his mad project would have come to may be surmised from what is now taking place at Capua, where this irresistible army, that was to eat up Lamoricière, to drive the French out of Rome, and finally to master the famous Quadrilateral, find themselves stopped for three weeks by the despised Neapolitans and a fourth-rate fortress, which they may very likely not be able to get into at all till they get the Sardinians to help them. Matters may change before my letter is sent off, but up to to-day the accounts are not encouraging for the Garibaldians.

The Sicilians maintain their new character of being fit for nothing. Colonel Dunn, a former English officer, was supposed to have done wonders in organising a Sicilian brigade, from whom immense things were expected, and who, on landing here last week, were at once pushed to Capua, whose gates were almost expected to fall down at their approach; but, instead of this, on the first shots being fired on them, they threw down their arms and ran away as hard as their legs could carry them. Their officers have in consequence been reduced to the ranks.

Besides this, the officers who have been through the campaign are beginning to complain that their men do not fight as they did; but I take the fact of the matter to be that there are very few of them who have ever fought at all. Except at Milazzo and Reggio, they have scarcely had to face a shot, and a large proportion of them will no doubt prove to be true Neapolitans—*i.e.*, very devils against an enemy who runs away as soon as they get in sight, but very poor stuff against men who will stand up against them.

Capua is in a very feverish country, and the malaria will soon begin to play Old Harry among them, so, as I said before, they must have the Sardinians to get them out of their difficulties; but what excuse is to be found for invading the country and knocking on the head the young King, who with 40,000 or 50,000 men is still holding his ground. However, excuse or no excuse, they must now go on, for if Victor Emmanuel stops to look behind him we shall soon see him become a pillar of salt.

The Neapolitans are at last giving proof of what is for them a great act of courage in signing addresses inviting Victor Emmanuel to come at once and take possession of the Kingdom; and it is high time, for ugly things are doing which very much lower one's opinion of Garibaldi.

A new Ministry was formed yesterday, and the man who is made Minister of Marine is Anguissola, who, while he commanded the *Veloce*, deliberately ran it into Palermo and gave it up to Garibaldi.

His reconciliation with Mazzini is true, and he seems openly to adhere to the doctrine of the dagger, for in last night's *Gazette* appeared a decree, signed by Garibaldi, announcing that the memory of Agesilao Milano, who tried to assassinate the King, was "sacred to the country on whose altars he had sacrificed himself with incomparable heroism, while

freeing her from the tyrant who was oppressing her."

Six months ago there was almost convincing proof that he was encouraging an attempt to assassinate Maniscalco, the Prefect of Police of Palermo; but I thought it so contrary to what I imagined to be the character of the man that I never would believe the evidence, but now I feel no doubt whatever that it was true.

CHAPTER IV

NAPLES, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1860

[“The battle of the Volturno saved Naples from the Bourbons, but did not deliver Capua to Garibaldi. It redressed the balance of the war which had begun to incline against him, but did not weigh down the scales on his side. A condition of military stale-mate continued for more than three weeks of October until Victor Emmanuel’s army arrived upon the scene” (*Garibaldi and the Making of Italy*, chap. xiv.). These words of Mr. Trevelyan’s sum up the military position in the month of October. Mr. Elliot’s journal gives a picture of the political side of events. From the time of the arrival of King Victor Emmanuel and the Sardinian troops in the South of Italy it was inevitable that Garibaldi’s influence should wane; his military talent and high, unselfish patriotism had achieved almost miraculous results, but his genius was not constructive, and the task of consolidating United Italy passed into other hands. Mr. Elliot left Naples before the fall of Gaëta, but the issue of the siege was already a foregone conclusion; on the 19th of January 1861 the last of the French ships at Gaëta was withdrawn, the blockade was enforced by Admiral Persano, and on the 13th of February the fortress capitulated, the King and Queen* embarked in a French steamer for Civitâ Vecchia and took up their residence at Rome. (See *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. ii., p. 249.)]

October 2.—Every time that I have to go into town—which, thank goodness, I have no longer to do every day—I hear things painted out in blacker colours, and the hero of a month ago spoken of in very different language from what used to be used. He is now

* The Queen, who showed great courage throughout the siege and the previous disturbances, was a Bavarian Princess and youngest sister of the late Empress of Austria.

abused for much that is not his fault, as well as for a good deal that is.

The poor people complain that there is no work, that food is much dearer, that their horses and donkeys are carried to Capua and not paid for, the cabs and hackney coaches carried off to the camp for the wounded, etc.

The republicans complain that he is going to hand over the country as a province to Piedmont, and printed notices are in circulation, pressing the Neapolitans—after shedding their blood (!) to get rid of one King—not to allow themselves to be transferred to another; and the annexationists complain that the real government of the country has been put into the hands of the republicans, who are working the provinces in their own views; that the expenses are increasing; that not a farthing comes into the Treasury; that plundering is going on in every department, and nothing but confusion everywhere—all of which is perfectly true, and will go on increasing till the direction of matters is got out of the hands of the people who now conduct them.

Craven* was down at Caserta two days ago to see Garibaldi about his railway affairs, and the account of his audience is most amusing. It seems that the Dictator always takes a sleep after dinner, and Craven was ushered into the room, which was full of people, just as he was preparing to go to bed. The Dictator asked what he wanted, but did not the least interrupt his proceedings, making the inquiry while his head and shoulders were being slipped out of a red shirt, previous to being encased in something else. Craven made his speech, to which Garibaldi answered, being then busily employed in uncasing his nether limbs, after which,

* Augustus Craven, a retired diplomatist who had made Naples his home since 1853. Translated into French the Correspondence of Lord Palmerston and the Prince Consort. Was the husband of the well-known authoress of the *Récit d'une Sœur*.

with a “ By your leave,” he slipped into bed, and the conversation continued till it was brought to a conclusion by the great man, from his bed, signing an order of some kind, which Craven carried off. The scene must have been most amusing, and it took place within one room of that in which the late King died, a year and a half ago.

October 4.—The affair before Capua turns out to have been an uncommonly serious business—a sort of Inkerman, in which it was a toss-up whether the whole expeditionary army would not be destroyed; and, if the royal troops had not been checked, a few hours more would have seen them well on towards Naples. Garibaldi, as usual, seems to have performed marvels, and some of his followers showed themselves worthy of their chief, but many of them cut and ran early in the day, which makes the resistance of the others the more gallant.

There are, of course, multitudes of reports of what took place, but every single account that deserves the slightest credit shows the utter worthlessness of the whole southern population as far as fighting is concerned. It was at first said that the Calabrians fought well, but even this turns out to be untrue, except when the enemy was at a very great distance, while the other Neapolitans and the Sicilians did not fight at all; and the official paper is talking angrily of the punishments to be inflicted on the runaways. However, the success of the resistance was at last decisive, and, besides the killed and wounded—who, they say, are very numerous—they have nearly 3,000 prisoners to show, which is no small matter.

Their own loss is at the same time so great that, if the royalists have the pluck (of which there is not much chance) to try it again, they will find the best of Garibaldi’s men very much reduced in numbers.

There is, however, now a new element to take into

calculation, which is the part that Sardinia will play. When Villamarina heard how badly things were going for Garibaldi at Capua he immediately sent to the front some hundreds of the picked Sardinian troops who are here maintaining order, though I believe none of these arrived in time to take part in the action; but there they were, sent to a field of action in order to join in it, which may be sufficient to induce their royal master to throw off the mask. But, whether these men fought or not, it is certain that the fortune of the day was in great part decided by a number of Sardinian artillerymen, who had been *sent disguised as Garibaldians*, in red shirts to serve the General's guns, he having no men up to the work. What a way of making war for a King who professes to be the Galantuomo *par excellence*!

October 6.—Nothing new that I know of, except that it is said—with I don't know what truth—that several thousand Piedmontese troops are to arrive here at once. Pallavicini has been appointed Pro-Dictator, which is rather a move towards Sardinia, and he has written a letter to "My dear Mazzini" to leave Naples, where his presence troubles the Unity. The evident intimacy of all these gentlemen is a suspicious business.

We had another murder two nights ago within about a hundred yards of this house, and I am told that there was one more yesterday. Within the last six weeks there have been three or four within ear-shot of our door, and there is not a talk of anyone being taken up or tried; and the same thing is going on all over the country, so that it is high time that some sort of Government were established. Of course, I do not include among the murders the killing of the old policemen and spies, which took place some time ago and was looked upon as a matter of course, and which, moreover, was not done as extensively as might have been feared.

Would you conceive it possible that the Neapolitans, who pretend that a great national movement has been going on in their country, have not moved a hand for the reception of the sick and wounded from Capua, some of whom, amounting to many hundreds, were left for twenty-four hours after being brought to Naples without persons being found even to give them a glass of water, and the authorities have now summoned to the work the *French Sœurs de Charité* from Castellamare ?

It is a literal truth that of all the Neapolitans I am acquainted with, most of whom profess the hottest patriotism, not one single one that I have heard of joined Garibaldi, or risked the tip of his nose, and now they do not even stir to save the sick and wounded.

Arrivabene, the correspondent of the *Daily News*, has been missing since the morning of the first. He was not a man to run into any needless danger, and he may have been taken prisoner.

October 8.—I am in constant expectation of receiving orders to start without more delay, and now that Victor Emmanuel seems to be positively coming it may be considered that I ought to evacuate the place before he takes possession. Whatever he may intend to do himself, it is quite time that his troops should arrive, if it is meant to prevent King Francis II. from reappearing in his capital some fine morning, as he was within an ace of doing this day last week; and if they do not come soon it will be evident to the world that Garibaldi has broken down before Capua. His own officers are already pretty well aware of this, and the people of Naples are becoming alive to it, and the long and short of the matter is that, unless he had the Sardinian army to look to for support, his case would be as bad a one as could well be imagined. He has not got above twelve thousand men before Capua, and, though his Piedmontese, Lombards,

Poles, Hungarians, etc., are men he can thoroughly trust to, he can count on none of the others, the Sicilians, Calabrians, and other south country volunteers being absolutely useless.

The fine character one was taught to attribute to the Sicilians turns out a thorough imposture, and the Calabrians have shown themselves to be no better. The day before yesterday these hardy mountaineers discovered that they had had fighting enough, and wanted to return home. Their officers argued the point with them, and did their best to persuade them to remain, which at last they said they would do if it was promised that cannon should never be used against them; and, when this could not be guaranteed, the Dictator had to be sent for, but all his eloquence and influence could not prevent 1,200 of them from giving up the game and going home.

A man who was present said it was most amusing to see the packs and packages of these patriots examined before they were dismissed, and to watch the quantity and variety of the loot they were forced to disgorge. The presence of these heroes does not make the state of the country any more comfortable for the moment, for there is not an attempt to enforce any law or to hinder any crime, and the great Liberator has carried his nations of liberation to an extent that will make the quiet inhabitants of the land smart for many a day.

A few weeks ago there were at Castellamare about 1,400 convicts in the prisons and hulks, and now there are barely 300, so that above a thousand of the most thorough cut-throat villains have been let loose from this place alone, and, as the same thing is going on throughout the country, it is not surprising that murders and robberies go on merrily. The murders are taken, however, with a coolness that is quite delightful, and the remarks about them are almost invariably coupled with a declaration that the

murderer had performed a useful act to the community in ridding the world of a great blackguard, and no doubt the remark is perfectly true nine times out of ten.

Though ordinary crimes are not interfered with, the good old system goes on of shutting people up at once if they drop an idle word against anyone who wears a red shirt, and in the provinces they carry this still further. In the Abruzzi the Governor received orders from Naples to try to prevent petitions being got up to Victor Emmanuel to come to take possession of the kingdom, and the Governor thought the most effectual way of putting a stop to the petitions was by flogging those who had signed, which he did, and found it a very successful way of preventing them.

However, they may flog away as much as they please, but they will not get the notion of annexation out of people's heads, for it is still the general cry of the country, in spite of all the efforts of the republicans, who have been working very hard.

We are expecting in a day or two to see the first arrival of the "Excursionists" (Lord Palmerston's name for the British Garibaldian legion), and are curious to find whether they get on better together than the detached officers who are already here, and who can find no better amusement for their leisure hours than that of cutting each other's throats. There are, at this moment, two or three duels on the *tapis*, which are to come off to-morrow, barring sorties from Capua, one of the combatants being Lord St. Maur, the Duke of Somerset's son, whose opponent, luckily for him, has got a sprain in his sword arm, but whose proposal to exchange the sword for the pistol is politely declined by Lord St. Maur or his seconds—not from want of pluck, however, for he has, I believe, shown plenty of that on various occasions, especially once when he was seen, as he said,

“ Doing a little Rarey ”* with a restive horse while the shot was falling very thick.

According to all accounts, the English volunteers and amateurs have shown great coolness and head; and on the critical 1st of October, as well as previously, did much to turn the fortune of the day.

Arrivabene turns out to have been taken prisoner, and is quite safe. They are going to try to exchange him, and offer two Neapolitan colonels for him: such is the estimated value of a correspondent of a morning newspaper.

October 10.—For the last two or three days all Naples has been beaming with joy, and all troubles are supposed to be at an end, so that the only rueful countenance to be seen is that of Her Majesty’s Minister, who, with humble resignation, is awaiting the orders to pack up his baggage and be off. I told you, or if I did not you must know it in some other way, that invitations were sent to Victor Emmanuel to come at once and take possession, and these invitations have been accepted, and he is now on his way here.

What gave no less satisfaction was the arrival of a couple of thousand Sardinian troops, who came yesterday, and who have made the capital feel that it need no longer fear the re-entry of the Neapolitan army, which, not without reason, was looked upon as a very likely occurrence if this timely assistance had not arrived.

From the moment that Garibaldi made up his mind that he was himself virtually beaten, and that he could not, single-handed, carry out the programme he had

* Allusion to Mr. Rarey, a well-known horse-breaker. In the *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, vol. ii., p. 128, Lord Malmesbury writes: “ Aug. 4th. I went to see Mr. Rarey’s establishment. We had Cruiser the untameable stallion and a zebra shown us as being quite tame. The former certainly appeared to be so completely; he followed Mr. Rarey wherever he went without being led, and gave him his foot like a dog.”

so loudly proclaimed, he saw that it was only through Sardinian assistance that what he had gained could be secured, and he began to act like a sane man; but after all his published abuse of Cavour, and his boastings of the way in which he would turn "M. Napoleon" out of Rome and the Austrians out of Venice, it cost him a severe struggle to make a sort of public recognition that he was stopped by the deservedly despised army of Francis II.

He had to entreat Villamarina to let him have the artillerymen, who are really supposed to have saved his army.

The more one sees and hears what the army is, the more marvellous it makes what he has accomplished with it.

The vote of the country upon the annexation is to be taken on the 21st, by universal suffrage, and with nominal secret voting arranged in such a way that the votes will be well known and public opinion brought to bear upon the doubtfuls. This is quite an unnecessary piece of trickery, for the result of the voting cannot be doubtful, except in one or two unimportant places.

It seems to me curious that, as the vote is to be so soon, Victor Emmanuel does not wait till it is over before making his appearance. With the legitimate King still at Gaëta, his coming will have an odd effect, and it is rather a sell for him that the other does not quit the dominions, so that he might come to occupy a vacant throne.

It was not to be expected that a great revolution could take place without great evils; and in truth the state of the country is as bad as possible, and all the old abuses are continued and sometimes exaggerated by the new officials, who imprison and flog on suspicion or slight proof of political misdemeanours, while crime is left totally unpunished.

Yesterday we had another attempted murder here,

but the victim may recover. The liberation of the galley-slaves was too bad.

Naples, October 15.—To-day we have had the landing of the English “Excursionists,” who arrived yesterday and were horribly disgusted to find that, though they had been expected for a week, nothing was ready for them, so that they had to remain twenty-four hours longer on board. They are monstrous fine, business-like looking fellows, and the sooner they are at the front and fighting the better, for there they will do us credit, while here they are certain to do us very much the reverse.

Colonel Peard, Garibaldi’s famous Englishman, declares that anything disreputable which took place on the march from Reggio to Naples was done by our countrymen. This is not a pleasant distinction in a foreign land.

The Major Styles who collected the English regiment has made a bad start, for before he had been here an hour he found himself under arrest and threatened with a court-martial on account of some pecuniary transactions connected with the regiment. I believe the other officers are disgusted at finding that this “Captain Styles, late of the Guards,” had only been a sergeant in the regiment; but, if they can only get a little good fighting to do it will put them all in good humour. They were to go on to Caserta to-day, and it is by no means impossible that they may have had their hands in what was going on, for this morning Garibaldi sent to beg for more Sardinian soldiers, showing plainly that he was or expected to be hard pushed, for there were already between three and four thousand of these between Naples and Caserta, which was thought sufficient to cover the capital till Cialdini comes up with the bulk of the army. He is advancing with 18,000 men and Victor Emmanuel.

October 16.—Yesterday’s alarm of a sortie from Capua is now said to have been but a trifling affair, in

which the brunt was borne by the Piedmontese, who had been called to the front and who repulsed the Neapolitans.

Arrivabene made his appearance in Naples last night, having been liberated by the King's orders as an act of courtesy *to the Queen*. The meaning of this, I believe, is that among the letters he wrote to his friends in England there was one for Lady Ely, who was known to be one of the Queen's Ladies. He is very indignant, without reason as I think, at having been kept prisoner at all, as he declared to me in the most positive manner that he was a non-combatant, and had neither arms nor uniform. To other people, when he wishes to make himself out a hero, he says that he shot one man with his revolver before he was taken; and certainly on all ordinary occasions he is fond of exhibiting both sword and uniform, so that, being taken in the enemy's lines, he was, I think, quite liable to be kept prisoner.

I was right enough yesterday in saying that the British "Excursionists" could not too soon be sent to the front, for last night they immediately distinguished themselves in a truly national manner by getting drunk and disorderly, and in sleeping on and under the tables in the principal café of Naples, which has to-day been closed in consequence of them. They have not yet been here forty-eight hours, and already some extremely amusing applications have been made by them to the Consul. Some of them are in irons, and protest against being treated as soldiers, saying they came out as excursionists, and are not liable to military control and discipline. Another came with a touching appeal, saying that they had been ordered to Caserta, but that he was so incomplete in the knowledge of the management of his weapon that he protested against being sent out to be slaughtered.

I hear that the King and his people at Gaëta are

furious with us English, and especially with Admiral Mundy, for sending, as they declare, seamen to point the guns against Capua. It is not surprising, for the Italian papers have been singing the praises of some of the sailors from the ships of war who are supposed to have rendered important service to Garibaldi. I don't know of any having actually served the guns, but certainly one seaman of the *Renown*, having been appealed to to mount a disabled gun, set to work, and, with a little help, got it on its carriage and took it off. There are, however, deserters from the ships, and it is very likely some of them may have been taking an active part; and even yesterday, at the muster of the "Excursionists," I myself saw two of the *Agamemnon's* men in the ranks, evidently determined to go up to Caserta. While this sort of thing is going on, no persuasion would convince the Neapolitans that the people are not sent by the Government or the Admiral. A Neapolitan has no taste for the near neighbourhood of a place where bullets are flying or hard knocks to be expected, and he cannot understand that an English sailor feels an irresistible attraction for them.

The French Admiral went off this morning with the flagship and a two-decker, no one knows where, without giving a hint of his proceedings to anyone.

The *Cressy* is expected back to-morrow or next day, so that the captain* will be here to see the entrance of Victor Emmanuel.

I this morning got from Gaëta a note from General Casella, invoking the judgment of Europe upon the late decree in honour of Milano's memory, which has certainly much damaged Garibaldi in public estimation.

October 19.—The steamer did not go, but I have nothing to add. The election is the day after to-

* Captain the Hon. Charles G. J. B. Elliot, C.B., R.N., commanding H.M.S. *Cressy*; afterwards Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles, K.C.B., younger brother of Mr. Elliot.

morrow, but we are told it may perhaps be a fortnight before the result of it can be officially given out, and, from a telegram received last night, I suppose I am to remain for that.

Nothing new from Capua. The Piedmontese had been sent to the front to relieve Dunn's Division, which was worn out with work and could hold on no longer; they will now get a little rest and refresh themselves.

The vote on the annexation is to be taken in an artful way: first, not so secretly as to prevent public opinion from weighing on the voters, and, secondly, by not having an alternative between the annexation and anarchy. The separate monarchy men must either vote for the annexation or help to keep on the present state of things, which is insupportable. Most of the aristocracy will abstain, I expect, but the separatist *bourgeoisie*, which is large, will vote for the Unity to escape from the present anarchy.

October 23.—I shall not have many more letters to send you from Naples, for we are told to expect the new King on Saturday, though I doubt his coming quite so soon, as that inconsiderate young man, Francis II., seems bent on remaining at Gaëta in order to vex and annoy his royal brother.

Conceive my astonishment at receiving a telegraphic order to ask the Admiral for a ship to take me to Malta, and from there to go home. Of course it means Marseilles, but I have telegraphed back to ask what the deuce it does mean.

Nothing could be more quiet than the voting, but it was too unanimous by far, and proves too clearly how great a farce the whole thing was. There never could be even the shadow of a doubt that the result of the vote would give an enormous majority for Victor Emmanuel and the annexation, and if it was not that these people like trickery for the sake of trickery (just as they will not tell the truth when a lie will answer

their purpose) the vote might have been taken so as to allow the few friends of the Bourbon the power of recording their "No."

We hear to-day that Capua is evacuated, and I have no doubt it is true, for Cialdini, with his 18,000 men, was so far advanced that communication with Gaëta must soon have been cut off. He has issued a monstrous order for shooting all peasants found in arms for King Francis II., their legitimate Sovereign, and he announces that he had already been doing it. The Neapolitan soldiers committed all kinds of atrocities, but no officer ever gave such an order as that of the Sardinian General, though I have no doubt he was provoked to it by the excesses of the peasants.

October 27.—I have very few minutes before the boat goes, but I must try to keep a good name to the last and send you a line or two. My last piece of gossip about the evacuation of Capua turned out not to be true, and it still holds out; but it is a fact that Victor Emmanuel in person led an attack yesterday by his troops on the Neapolitan army on the Garigliano, between Capua and Gaëta, and considerably crumpled them up, but King Francis has still at Gaëta as many men as he knows what to do with.

An order has come to Persano to bombard it by sea on the 29th, though there may still be counter orders, as there were when it was intended to blockade it, which were given for reasons I need not mention in a letter that goes by post.

I expect to get away about this day week, for the return of the vote of the 21st will be sent in by Tuesday, and I don't suppose Victor Emmanuel will let many days pass without accepting this pleasant little estate, which would very soon run entirely to ruin if the present managers continue to direct it. The disorder (I don't mean material disorder) surpasses belief or description.

Garibaldi, pure himself as I believe him to be, gives the harpies about him *carte blanche* to pillage as they please, and, as they avail themselves freely of the liberty, a general scramble for good things is going on such as I do not suppose was ever witnessed in any other country.

The applicants for the governorships of provinces, of which there are fifteen, may literally be numbered by thousands, and there are above 2,500 who consider they have a right to expect to be made Cabinet Ministers.

Having been in prison for any cause whatever during the Bourbon reign is a claim considered irresistible by the candidates, and has constantly been the only qualification required in the filling up of the places; but these gentry now come to the Ministers, and back up their demands by exhibiting the muzzle of a pistol to induce them to acknowledge their merits—so that now the Minister of the Interior has literally got a guard of Piedmontese soldiers to protect him from the danger he ran from these noble aspirants for public service.

At the dockyard yesterday the people first struck work and then struck the chief man of it with daggers. In fact, I don't believe there is a royalist in the town who will not welcome the arrival of Victor Emmanuel as the only way of saving the country from the mess which would soon be ruin to everyone.

November 3.—We are leading such an unsettled life that I find that I do nothing and have time for nothing, if you understand that uncomfortable state; and during the last few days there have been various small occurrences worth writing down.

I did not write to you by the messenger on the 30th, as we had been taking a holiday the day before, and so let all letters get into arrear, and I believe we were much better employed enjoying the beauties of Capri than we could have been elsewhere. It is certainly a

beautiful island, and at 1,100 feet above the sea the thermometer was at 67° in the fullest possible shade—not bad for October 29.

The proceedings of the French Admiral have been the great talk since I last wrote, and more decided acts of intervention could not be imagined. First of all Persano, by order of Farini, who is with Victor Emmanuel, sent Rear-Admiral Albini to prepare to bombard Gaëta, where the *Renown* happened to be, having been sent there to see if the King would like to have an English ship to carry him away. He took with him two frigates and three small steamers, one of which went into the harbour with a flag of truce, and a boat went first to the French flagship and then to the *Renown* to warn any French or English subjects in Gaëta to take care of themselves. Thereupon the French Admiral, who had got the steam up in all his four great thundering liners, announced that he would not permit any act of hostility, and he sent out two of them—cleared for action, ports up, small-arm men ready, etc.—to place themselves between the Sardinians and the batteries, informing them at the same time in the most uncivil language that if they did not clear out of that he would soon turn them out.

The consequence was that the Sardinians could only make their bow and retire; but what can possibly be the object of allowing a war to go on by land while it is stopped by sea? The excuse made for it will probably be that Sardinia has not declared war, which of course is all stuff and nonsense, though it serves the latter right for the insuperable repugnance she shows for acting in a straightforward way and calling things by their right names, instead of harping upon the old nonsense of the abdication of the King and the revolution which has turned him out.

However, there it is, act of interference number one, soon to be followed by number two, which seems to

have been still more uncalled-for, though I have not yet got any official account of it.

Admiral Persano went down himself to the mouth of the Garigliano, with his ships and their boats, to cover Cialdini's operations in throwing a bridge across the river; and we hear, through some Spanish officers who have come up, that Admiral Le Barbier de Tinan would not allow this purely military measure to be carried out. Rumour says he has received from King Francis the Grand Cross of St. Januarius, and he has surely earned it.

I take it for granted that his Imperial master, and those who please, may believe that the thing was done upon the Admiral's own hook, but why the French squadron of four or five ships of the line was at Gaëta remains to be explained. The French Consul here said it was impossible for the Admiral to recognise a hostile act by Garibaldi's unacknowledged navy; but Albini is a Sardinian Admiral, commanding Sardinian ships, and Garibaldi had nothing whatever to do with it; but the long and the short of it is that the French cannot keep their fingers out of any pie within reach of them.

If a strong and united Italy can be created without any compensation to France it will be entirely Lord John's doing, and I believe in Italy Her Majesty's Government will have the credit of it; but I cannot say I feel easy on the subject yet, in spite of all the articles in the *Constitutional*.

Capua capitulated yesterday, and nearly 10,000 prisoners have fallen into the hands of the Sardinians, which is no great prize for them. The bombardment does not seem to have done much damage, and caused very little loss of life. It began the day before yesterday at four in the afternoon, and at daylight next morning the place gave in. Garibaldi was strongly against the bombardment, which, however, I believe to have been the most humane way of proceeding, as it brought the siege to a quick end.

He has been in a very bad humour, and will, I expect, go back to his island of Caprera as soon as Victor Emmanuel has made his entry. He again asked the King to get rid of Farini,* but His Majesty answered that, though he hated both Farini and Cavour as much as he could, yet as constitutional Sovereign he had to keep the Ministers the country demanded, and thereupon the General said he must himself be off.

They will keep up appearances a little while, but the Piedmontese and their partisans are already forgetting what they owe to him, and now only dwell upon the egregious faults and follies he has been committing from the day of his first arrival at Naples.

November 4.—The official declaration of the poll took place yesterday, when it was announced that there were for the annexation 1,302,064 “si” against 10,312 “no.” The population is, I believe, over 7,000,000, so that the vote is not a large one.

The decree of annexation will be issued in a day or two, and we should have been off if I had not received fresh instructions not to leave Naples as long as the King remains at Gaëta—at least unless I get other orders. So here we are as uncertain as ever, for though closely hemmed in about Gaëta, the place is said to be very strong, and His Majesty may still hold out some time. When the *Renown* was sent down there last week to see if the King would like to go away in her,

* B. at Russi in the Province of Ravenna in 1812. Was obliged in 1841 to leave Russi on account of his Liberal views, and took refuge at Turin; returned to the Papal States on the amnesty granted by Pope Pius IX. and held office under Rossi. Having again to quit Rome he found a refuge in Piedmont, where he held consecutively the posts of Minister of Public Instruction, Provisional Governor of Modena, and Minister of Commerce in Cavour’s last Cabinet. In December 1862 he became Prime Minister, but was compelled by ill-health to retire in the following March, and died in 1866. The moderation of his views caused him to be unfavourably regarded by Garibaldi.

the answer was that His Majesty was much obliged, but had no intention of leaving Gaëta at present.

The "Excursionists" are going on as badly as ever, or rather worse and worse, and we hear of nothing but pillage, mutiny, and squabbles.

November 5.—I left a corner to fill up with any news received by the messenger who ought to have arrived this morning, but the French steamers are now made to call at Gaëta, and therefore arrive late. I hear that what took place at the Garigliano was this: Persano arrived to cover Cialdini's operations; whereupon Le Barbier de Tinan told him he should not allow any hostile operations, to which Persano replied: "You are the stronger of the two, and may sink me if you please, but I have received orders from my King which I shall carry out at all risks." Bravo, Persano! He then went to work, and the Frenchman fired some shot across him, but, after all the bluster, carried the threat no further. He is now said to be recalled, but I can't yet swear to the correctness of this. *Agamemnon* has gone down to Palermo to relieve *Argus*, forty men having left her (*Agn.*) to take Garibaldi's service.

The Admiral will, I believe, give us the *Renown* to carry us off, when the day comes.

November 7.—I have not been able to find an opportunity of sending my letter, which contains too much treason for me to venture to trust to the French post, which would probably play the same trick that the Roman one does, of which I have had recent experience, having to-day received two letters from Odo Russell, dated respectively the 10th and 13th of September.

From all that I see I am just as likely to be off myself before the chance offers for sending the letter, so I may be giving myself a great deal of needless trouble in writing it; but as all Naples except myself is at this moment in the full enjoyment of a splendid "Gala Theatre" to celebrate the entry of King Victor

Emmanuel, while I cannot appear there to take part in the rejoicings, what can I do better than sit down and discharge my bile at you who cannot escape from it ? The entry took place this morning, and a poorer affair could not be imagined, for the weather was atrocious, and, none of the preparations being complete, the whole thing was completely *manqué*, so much so that I should not wonder if it were to be encored, as though it had not taken place.

In the course of the day appeared Victor Emmanuel's Address to the people of Naples and Sicily, accepting the supreme power which had been "conferred upon him by the universal suffrage of those two noble provinces"—an ugly word for them to swallow, and which will make many of them wince.

Lord John's despatch to Hudson commenting upon the disapproval of the other Powers of the proceedings of Sardinia is just beginning to be known, and is giving immense satisfaction, and it is no wonder, for a heartier approval of Victor Emmanuel's Government could hardly have been given; but, good as I think a great part of that despatch, it seems to me to contain important inaccuracies in points of fact, which it is so important to avoid when you show yourself ready to break a spear with all Europe upon a question of this sort. Why should it be pretended that since 1849 there had risen the conviction that a single Government in Italy was necessary for its independence ? As far as Naples and Sicily are concerned, the assertion is entirely incorrect, and any Neapolitan you choose to ask will tell you that the idea of annexation has sprung up within the last six months, before which time it absolutely did not exist.

The fault, however, which I chiefly find with the despatch is that it argues as if there had been a revolution in Naples, and as though Victor Emmanuel had been found fault with for having come to the assistance of a people struggling for their liberty;

whereas the charge against him is a very different one, and much more difficult to meet. It is notorious and admitted (at least, Villamarina admits it freely) that the funds for Garibaldi's expedition were furnished by King Victor Emmanuel himself; and nobody can deny that every possible assistance was furnished by Sardinia to Garibaldi from the very first—arms and ammunition from their ships of war, etc., etc.; and if Sardinia is to be effectively defended, we must stand up for her, not for having come to the assistance of a revolution, but for having with infinite difficulty succeeded in creating the appearance of one.

After the conquest of Sicily it was considered both by Garibaldi and the Sardinian party here that, previous to any invasion of the continent, there should be some kind of revolutionary movement in Naples to make it appear that the foreign aid had been sent in support of a national insurrection, but although they had the certainty that, on the first movement, they would receive the immediate assistance of Garibaldi's whole force, and although accredited Sardinian agents were pressing them to the utmost, Garibaldi was kept waiting a month at Messina, and found that there was not a chance of a single soul moving; and he then came over on his own hook, when he was no doubt wildly welcomed by the whole population, but we have no right to talk of there having been a revolution here.

Lord John attributes the success of Garibaldi's march from Reggio with 5,000 men to the general hatred of the Bourbon dynasty, and I do not believe he can exaggerate the general detestation in which it is held; but there was something more behind which ensured the success of the 35,000 (not 5,000) men, and that was the knowledge that they were supported by Sardinia.

The moderation of the "Italian Revolution" is explained in the same way. The people did not rise to

put down the oppression, and they could commit no acts of excess, for they were simply transferred from one set of rulers to another, and, as the royalists moved off the stage, the Garibaldians moved on, and their chief was always determined that his progress should not be accompanied by excesses.

November 13.—I had a long talk with Persano two or three days ago about the French interference at Gaëta, the Garigliano and Mola, and find that it was very much as I reported; but he added one or two things that I was not aware of: First, that it was by the pressing advice of Admiral de Tinan that the King had been persuaded not to quit Gaëta; and secondly, that the French men-of-war steamers tow the Neapolitan store-ships, or rather ships with supplies for the Neapolitans, in and out of Gaëta.

The Emperor has written to Victor Emmanuel to say that his Admiral has exceeded his instructions, but in spite of this disavowal we do not hear either that the Admiral is recalled or that the Sardinians are to be allowed to attack Gaëta by sea; and, as long as they are prevented from doing so, it can hardly be pretended that there is no French interference.

The only effect likely to be produced by it is that the French are now in the worst possible odour, while Lord John's despatch has raised the popularity of England to an immense height for the moment; but in these countries one cannot calculate upon any feeling lasting more than a week, and an inspired article in the *Constitutional* would be enough to make them worshippers of Napoleon, if he wishes to curry favour with them again, as he soon will.

Garibaldi, on his way out of the Bay four days ago, knocked up Admiral Mundy about five o'clock in the morning to say good-bye to him, and to thank him, England, Her Majesty's Government, and above all Lord John Russell for their sympathies for Italy;

and the Admiral, who knew nothing of Lord John's despatch, could not make out why his name had been brought so much forward. The same day Victor Emmanuel sent Admiral Persano also to convey his thanks to the Admiral, and summoned him to the palace, where he was very warm in his expression of gratitude to all, and especially to Lord John; but to my mind His Majesty was little short of brutal when he began to talk of shelling out the Royal Family from Gaëta. He may have to do it, but it should scarcely be spoken of in that manner.

I hope they may go after the first few shells, but it is a curious fatality if the new King has, without being at war, as we are told, to commence his reign over this kingdom by bombarding two of its towns. It is said that the young Queen has thrown her blandishments round Le Barbier de Tinan, who is a shaky old gentleman, and that this is one of the reasons he encourages them to stay.

We hope to get off the day after to-morrow, and that we may keep the magnificent weather we now have. Our hearts are very sore at the thoughts of going, and at this moment the auctioneer is selling our horses under the window, where poor Francis's pony, my own riding horse, etc., etc., etc., are going, going, going, so that it is time for us to follow them.

Here ends my journal of the last days of the reign of Francis II., King of the Two Sicilies, who left behind him no cause for regret except that his fall was not due either to the efforts of his subjects, who detested his rule, or to the open and honourable action of an avowed enemy, but was accomplished through a series of treacherous intrigues, revolting to all honourable minds, but conducted with a skill which ensured a result that every Neapolitan must feel grateful for.

When Count Cavour gave his underhand assistance to Garibaldi's expedition it was under the belief and

in the expectation that it would suffice to induce the discontented subjects of King Francis to rise in an insurrection that might afford to Victor Emmanuel, the avowed champion of Italian Liberalism, a plausible pretext for interfering on behalf of an Italian people striving to obtain constitutional freedom; but the apathy or want of courage of the populations falsified this calculation, as Cavour was at last obliged to admit in his letter to Persano. He said, however, that things had gone too far to stop half-way, and that Garibaldi should act alone without waiting for the insurrection which could not be provoked, and that all that remained was to try that there should be the appearance of one in the eyes of Europe, in which he was entirely successful; for people still talk of the Neapolitan Revolution, while in reality there never was the vestige of one in the proper sense of the word. The country was simply conquered by an invaded force, welcomed indeed by the populations, but without receiving from them any material assistance.

On being urged by Count Cavour, Garibaldi passed over from Sicily to the mainland, and then began his astonishing march from the Straits of Messina through Calabria and the Basilicata to Naples, the royal forces simply melting away at his approach and capitulating to him when he was miles ahead of his own most advanced troops; but with his triumphant entry into Naples his part was played out.

It was impossible to dissuade him from his mad determination to drive the French out of Rome and the Austrians out of Venetia, and he ended his extraordinary enterprise with the humiliation of being stopped at Capua by the remnant of King Francis's army, and of being only saved from utter destruction by the timely intervention of the Piedmontese, upon which the Dictator retired in disgust to his island of Caprera, after having accomplished one of the most extraordinary feats that ever was performed.

When I left Naples the King was still at Gaëta, but on his quitting his dominions the Legation was abolished, and I remained unemployed for nearly three years, with the exception of two short special missions to Greece, where another King was expelled from his throne by his own subjects without foreign aid or intrigue.

CHAPTER V

GREECE—I., 1862-1863

[To elucidate the condition of affairs in Greece at the time when Mr. Elliot entered on his first Special Mission to that country, it is necessary to say a few words respecting its previous history. In the year 1827 the National Assembly of Nauplia had proclaimed the Greek patriot Capodistria President of the country for seven years, but after his assassination on October 9, 1831, the confusion in Greece became such that the French troops then in occupation of the Morea were obliged to garrison Nauplia, Patras and, later, Argos. Such was the state of Greece at the time when Prince Otho of Bavaria accepted the throne. By a treaty signed at Constantinople in July 1832 the Sultan agreed to recognise the new Kingdom, while England, France and Russia guaranteed a Greek loan of £2,400,000, and negotiated the formal admission of King Otho into the ranks of the European sovereigns. The young Prince, aged seventeen, landed at Nauplia in February 1833 and was most favourably received. In 1837 he married Princess Amelia of Oldenburg. The hopes entertained at his accession were, however, disappointed; his rule was practically despotic, and many of the worst abuses of the Turkish Government, such as the tithe system, were continued. Insecurity and brigandage, resulting from the incapacity of the King and his Ministers, were rife, the relations between the Guaranteeing Powers were frequently strained, and the discontent arising from the misgovernment of the country continued to grow until they culminated in the events related by Mr. Elliot in the following chapter.]

IN the spring of 1862 I was at home, having been unemployed since my return from Naples, when the news was received of the death of Sir Thomas Wyse, our Minister at Athens; and the Government at once determined to send me on a special mission to Greece, which was in a most critical state, and where there

was only an inexperienced young attaché in charge of the Legation.

Insurrections had broken out at various parts of the kingdom, especially at Nauplia, where it had been very formidable, and, although these had been suppressed, the feeling against the Court was so strong that when a young man belonging to a good family of the name of Dosios made an attempt one day to shoot the Queen as she returned from riding, he was much more generally regarded as a patriotic hero than as a dastardly assassin.

The instructions given me for my guidance were rather vague, but they touched three special causes of the prevailing discontent—*i.e.*, the want of such reforms as should ensure the observance of constitutional government, the dissatisfaction with the narrow limits of the kingdom, and the unsettled state of the succession to the throne; and I was to make it clear that Her Majesty's Government were determined to adhere firmly to all their engagements, whether to Greece or to Turkey.

Otho had been twenty-nine years on the throne, and during that long period had done literally nothing to develop the resources of his kingdom or to promote the prosperity of his people. Not ten miles of road beyond the immediate neighbourhood of Athens had been made throughout the length and breadth of the country; industrial enterprises were discouraged by means of lavish corruption and by intimidation, the Elective Chamber had been degraded till it was nothing but an assembly of Court nominees; arbitrary arrests and imprisonment were freely resorted to against those who gave offence to the Government; brigandage, which was rife everywhere, was especially countenanced on the Turkish frontier, where many of the chiefs were in the actual pay of the Court, which was unremitting in its endeavours to divert the attention of the people from their own grievances

by encouraging them to make incursions into the Turkish provinces.

It was to be my business to make King Otho understand that Her Majesty's Government would not countenance such proceedings, and also, if possible, to get him to see that, if he did not satisfy the just demand of his people for a total change of the system of government by a fair observance of the Constitution, he would not long be able to maintain himself on his throne. My task would, therefore, be not unlike what it was at Naples, and the probability was that I should not now be more listened to than I was then, and that the result would be the same.

Before leaving London I saw Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador, who read me part of a letter from Prince Gortchakoff upon the state of Greece, in which he observed that the present insurrection must leave the King even weaker than he was before, and that His Majesty, being a constitutional King, ought to understand that he should fulfil the obligations this imposed upon him.

The letter touched upon the question of the succession, and said that it was impossible to expect a nation to sit down contentedly in perfect ignorance as to who their next Sovereign might be.

Baron Brunnow dwelt upon the harmony prevailing between England and Russia with respect to Greece, observing that the hostility of the Emperor Nicholas to everything like constitutional government which had formerly been the cause of divergence was, under the Emperor Alexander, now happily at an end. The remembrance that the Greek Constitution had laid it down that the next King must belong to the National Church had probably a good deal to do with this new-born affection of Prince Gortchakoff and Baron Brunnow for constitutional government, as the Duke of Leuchtenberg, the Czar's nephew, who had this qualification, would in their estimation make an

eligible candidate for the succession to the throne if the Bavarians were out of the way.

At Paris I saw M. de Thouvenel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, having long been French Minister at Athens, took much interest in the country. He did not greatly believe in the discontent said to be caused by a desire for internal reform, although he admitted that some had been produced by the interference of the Government in the elections, and by the arbitrary suppression of most of the local and provincial institutions. The two subjects of real interest were, he said, the question of the succession and the impatience of the people at their territorial limits. He did not believe that the sensible and thinking men were desirous of an aggressive movement upon Turkey; for, although there was not a Greek who had not absolute faith in the re-establishment of a Greek Empire, on the ruins of the Turk, at some future period, he did not consider that it need cause any present anxiety.

The question of the succession, on the other hand, was one about which the Greek nation had become impatient, and it called for immediate attention. He was convinced that any Prince who, after arriving at years of maturity, changed his religion for the sake of mounting the throne would by that very act for ever forfeit the respect of his future subjects; and he was sure that the Greeks would again accept a Sovereign of another religion if they were assured of his children being brought up as Greeks; but he did not know how to overcome the stiffness of Russia for a rigid adherence to the clause in the Constitution relative to the religion of the next King.

De Thouvenel did not seem to remember that people do not usually feel any very prolonged contempt for those who, even from interested motives, change *to* their own views, however much they might resent a change *from* them, and that therefore the Greeks

would probably be much more flattered than irritated by a Prince adopting their religion on their account.

His mention of the stiffness of Russia on this question showed that it had been discussed by the two Governments, and, as it was certain that France took no deep interest in the Bavarians, it provoked a suspicion that Thouvenel had in his eye some other candidate of more French proclivities.

At Vienna, where I saw Count Rechberg, the Austrian Prime Minister, I perceived that he entertained the same suspicion, and also that he looked upon the candidature of the Duke of Leuchtenberg for the succession as both imminent and alarming.

M. Schrenck, the Bavarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw at Munich, took the matter very easily, not seeming to think it necessary for us to trouble ourselves about it, as he considered that the succession was so irrevocably settled on the Bavarian dynasty that it could not be disturbed.

The Greeks, he said, should remain satisfied with knowing that whenever the throne became vacant a Prince would be found ready to mount it, but it could hardly be expected that a Bavarian Prince should change his religion without the absolute certainty of receiving the reward of his apostacy. Suppose the Queen of Greece were to die, and then supposing that, however improbable, the King, having married again, were to have a direct heir, in what position it would place the unfortunate Bavarian Prince, who might have to remain at Munich, saddled with his Greek religion, adopted in the full expectation of his becoming King of the Hellenes.

It was a difficult question to deal with, and was made the more so by the indifference shown to it by King Otho and the Bavarian Government, who were satisfied with believing that, whenever the time came, the arrangement made on Otho's accession would be enforced by the three Protecting Powers. But though

one of the arrangements was that, failing Otho's male issue, the Crown should go to one of his brothers or his descendants, a clause in the Greek Constitution, also recognised by the Powers, required that the successor should belong to the Greek Church, to which none of the Bavarian Princes had shown a disposition to conform, and to this clause the Russian Government attached more importance than to the maintenance of the Bavarian dynasty.

As the Protecting Powers had long tolerated an habitual disregard of other provisions of the Constitution, there seemed to be no imperative reason why they should insist upon the observance of this one if the Greeks themselves were willing to modify it.

We arrived at Athens on the 12th of May, 1862, and my letters, from which I copy extracts, give a description of the state of things that I found there:

Athens, May 13.—I was astonished to find at Corfu that a belief in an English Prince as the future King of Greece had for some time past been commonly accepted.

It seems that the Ionians delight in the idea, supposing that it would bring the immediate annexation of the islands to Greece. The most amusing part of it was that the Greek Consul-General, a certain Vitalis, came to me to argue in favour of the scheme, which he took up with such eagerness that it was all I could do to prevent him from undertaking that his King should be shaken out of his rickety throne to make room for Prince Alfred.

I was told there that the Russian influence had greatly declined in Greece, and that except the fanatical party there are not now many who expect much from that quarter. The publication of Sir Hamilton Seymour's secret despatches, from which they perceived the determination of Russia never to permit the reconstruction of a powerful Greek Empire, worked an entire change among the Greeks, who to

a man look to the re-establishment of the Empire as simply a question of time.

I had heard much of the hopelessness of trying to seat Otho firmly on his throne by inducing him to make internal reforms, but till I got here I had no notion of the extent of his unpopularity or of the contempt that is felt for him. In 1854 and during the Crimean War he was extremely popular, merely because it was believed that he was preparing for active aggression upon Turkey, but since that idea has been abandoned he has sunk to the lowest stage of contempt in the eyes of his subjects. The succession question, again, puts him in a cleft stick, and my instructions are not quite fair to him in this matter, when they say that it depends entirely upon him to render the succession easy. What is easy to one man is by no means so to another, and, though many people find no great difficulty in producing a son to succeed them, His Majesty has found the task a simple impossibility; and failing that natural solution it is not so plain how an heir is to be got, as long as the Bavarian Princes choose to go on under the comfortable conviction that it would not suit the Great Powers to allow the succession to be altered, and that therefore they need not trouble themselves about the matter.

As far as I can yet form an opinion, the feeling of the country appears to be so unanimous and so strong against the Bavarians that, if the throne were vacant to-morrow, I believe that nothing short of absolute force on the part of the Allies would suffice to secure it to one of those Princes.

The best arrangement that could be made at present as far as I can see, is that the youngest, instead of the eldest, of the sons of King Luitpold should be looked upon as the future King of Greece, and that he should be at once sent here to live with King Otho, and be brought up in the Greek religion and to take the position of the heir-presumptive.

However, Bourée, the French Minister here, and de Thouvenel at Paris and other people, agree in declaring that the only thing that carries Otho through is the absence of anyone to put in his place. They say that, if there was a man here to whom the public could look with the slightest degree of hope, you could not guarantee the King six months of reign. At this particular moment things are in a queer state: the Ministers resigned about ten days ago, and not a step has been taken towards getting new ones.

May 20.—I forget whether you have ever been here in the course of your wanderings. It is a place to visit, but not to live in if one can help it. In fact, to enjoy oneself at Athens one ought to be on such familiar terms with all the old gentlemen and ladies, gods and goddesses, satyrs and nymphs who lived two thousand years ago as to make one quite contented with them without troubling oneself about their descendants. Unfortunately, I have not kept up a sufficient acquaintance with these respectable persons to make me feel quite at home among them now that I am thrown into their society, and so I lose much of the pleasure and advantage of this chance visit. The moderns are unsatisfactory enough, one and all dreaming all day and all night of devouring great slices of Turkey, and forgetting that Bubbly Jock is still a good deal stronger than his would-be consumer.

May 22.—I have been idle about writing, but I should have had nothing to record except the sayings of my various colleagues. Bourée, the Frenchman, and Bludoff, the Russian, seem the two best. Photiades Bey,* the Turkish Minister, keeps his eyes very

* Afterward Pasha. A well-known Turkish diplomatist who for many years represented the Porte at Athens. A Greek Christian by birth, but an Ottoman subject, he served the Porte honestly and well. He was brother-in-law to Musurus Pasha, who was for so long Turkish Ambassador in London.

open to all the intriguing that is going on in the neighbouring provinces, but he is a Greek himself, and has all kinds of secret agents to get him information, to which he seems to attach more credit than I should be disposed to do: a spy is exactly the last person whose information I should trust.

A few days ago I dined at the Palace and sat next the Queen, who is a gossiping sort of a woman and agreeable in that way. As I could not get hold of the King, I thought I would pin her a little, and got upon the subject of the succession, which they fancied I had been sent here to agitate: I told her that this was exactly contrary to the fact, as my Government wished it to remain as it had been settled, only that we thought it unfortunate that nothing was done to facilitate it. She professed to regret very much that the visit of the two Bavarian Princes had been interrupted by the outbreak at Nauplia, though everyone believes that she was delighted to have an excuse for turning them back. One cannot pretend to say that her aversion to have the heir in Athens is quite without sense, for at least two people out of three will tell you that nothing keeps Otho on his throne but the fact of there being no one at hand to take his place.

She alluded to the difficulty of getting a grown-up man to change his religion, and said that both the King and herself were most anxious to have a child to bring up as the future Sovereign.

The Bavarian Minister is detestable on this matter, and scouts the idea of a child being sent to be bred up as heir, and, in his inward heart, I am sure that he thinks the Three Powers will stuff the Bavarian Prince down the throats of the Greeks whether he adopts the Orthodox religion or not. If they, the Greeks, could get a Prince to their taste, they might consent to forego the clause in the Constitution about the religion of the next King, but assuredly they will never give way for the sake of a Bavarian.

Last night we dined at Bourée's, who had a party in the evening, when we had a first view of the Athenian beauties. There were certainly some very pretty girls.

May 25.—A delicious breeze, no Greek Ministers to call on, and no visits from colleagues, have combined to make this a thoroughly enjoyable day—quite the first of the kind I have had. I could not resist strolling towards Lycabettus, which lies close to the town on the north or north-east, rising out of the plain in a fine bold rocky outline considerably higher than the Acropolis on the other side. As I got to the beginning of the rise I found it gave views of the town and of the Acropolis that were quite new to me, and from some points wonderfully striking, so there was nothing for it but to try to clamber to the top, which is nothing at all of a business except that it is warm work. There is a little chapel at the top, and I had been told that a leper takes up his abode there, and amuses himself by throwing stones down on the heads of the people who don't give him money, so I had taken the precaution of putting some coppers into my pocket for his particular benefit; whether moved thereto by charity or by a wish to save my own cranium is a question that need not be decided. At about twenty or thirty yards from the top I turned round to gaze at the view one can never get tired of, looking over the Acropolis and Ægina rising high out of the beautiful blue sea, and over Salamis at the distant high mountains of the Peloponnesus, and to the left at Hymettus running down to little low islands, but unfortunately coming too far forward to allow one to see Cape Sunium.

Whilst I was enjoying myself to my heart's content I discovered that my position was causing the greatest agitation to two white-petticoated individuals near the foot of the hill, which they were breasting at a speed likely to break their wind, and shouting to me at the same time. Not knowing whether this might

not be the ferocious leper, who like the giant in "Jack the Giantkiller" had got a companion ten times worse than himself, I took a good look through my glasses, which satisfied me that their skin was in quite a wholesome state, and that one had a formidable Turkish sword, and the other some sort of instrument of offence which I could not quite make out. Ten miles away from Athens they might have been brigands, and I began to think how curious it would be to be carried to the mountains and to have to enter "ransom" as one of the items in the account of the special mission to be charged against Her Majesty's Government.

By shouting and gesticulating they made me understand that they wanted me to come down, which, as I saw that they were people in authority, I began to do, and soon reached them, when we had a lively though quite friendly conversation, neither party understanding a single word, though I saw that I had been guilty of some great indiscretion or breach of decorum; and we proceeded amicably down the hill together till we came to a track leading to another point, where I thought I would go, as I had been cheated of my first attempt. So I managed to make my two friends understand that I would go that way; but I soon found that this did not square with their notions, and they made me understand that I must accompany them to a building which they pointed out at the edge of the town, and which I instinctively guessed to be the police-station; and, as if to leave no doubt on the matter, one got in front and the other behind, and so, to my immense amusement, we continued the descent, I being manifestly taken into custody on the very first walk I had attempted at Athens.

When we got to the police-house there were four other men there, and we had some splendid pantomime, with the best possible humour on both sides, and so

well acted on theirs at least that I understood them to say that, if they had not rushed up the hill I should have got into a frightful scrape with the old man of the mountain at the top; that he would have robbed me and stripped me and then rolled down pieces of rock which would infallibly have crushed me as flat as a pancake. On my part I made them understand that I was an extremely great man, and nothing could surpass their civility, which indeed they carried to an inconvenient pitch, for the chief man ordered one of them out to convoy me safely to the top and protect me from the enemy. As I had been within twenty yards of the top already, I had no sort of wish to face the hot hill-side again, and intimated as much. Not at all. I was assured there was no danger; my guide was pointed to with pride to show that he would single-handed have withstood the whole force at Thermopylæ, and unless I was content to be branded as a coward up I must go again whether I liked it or not. The whole thing was thoroughly good fun, except this last climb, which carried the joke a little too far.

Drove to what is called the Queen's Farm, about three miles beyond Patissia. The Queen has done a great deal in the way of making roads and improvements immediately round Athens, but the progress does not extend beyond the range of Her Majesty's rides.

The number of roads in various directions is considerable: they have trees planted on each side, and some of them have fringes of oleander, at present in full bloom, but none of these roads go far enough into the country to do any good. They were made solely for the Queen's enjoyment. It is curious enough that, in all these things, one never hears anything of the King. It is always the Queen who does everything. The Palace Gardens are the "Queen's Gardens," the farm is the "Queen's Farm," the model

village near it is the “Queen’s Village,” the roads are the “Queen’s roads,” the trees in the streets of Athens are planted by “the Queen.” With all this, he [the King] is not spoken of as an imbecile: he is very slow in making up his mind and dull of comprehension, making him very unlike the people he has to reign over, though one of themselves gives him credit for having on his arrival at once discovered that they were all mercenary and corruptible, and for having steadily acted upon his discovery.

A goodish story is told to show how at once the Greeks began to poke their fun at him and his Bavarians. Soon after his arrival he made an excursion to Thebes, about which one of his Bavarian suite, being rather ignorant, tried in a laudable manner to pick up as much information as he could, which he carried back to his royal master. “Sire, do you know that this Thebes is a very famous place, the capital of Boeotia, the country of Epaminondas and Plutarch? And do you know, sire, they say that we Bavarians are the Boeotians of Germany?” His Majesty is supposed to have thought the compliment very prettily turned.

I have had a good deal of talk with Mavrocordato, who is now quite blind, though his intellect is clear. His distrust of the King is complete, and he does not believe that the proposed reform of the Electoral Law will have any practical effect: he says that the Electoral lists were full of the names of children in the cradle and of men who had been years in their graves, and when I asked Coundourioti whether this was true, he said there could be no doubt of it, and that the elections had been a mere farce—a very pretty admission for one of the King’s Ministers whose official existence had only been kept up by a Chamber so chosen.

May 26.—About five days ago I had it conveyed to the King that I was at His Majesty’s orders if he chose

to send for me, and that if he did not I should ask for an audience. As I have received no invitation from the King to wait upon him, I have told Coundourioti that I want to have an audience, as it is high time that I saw His Majesty. He evidently did not like this at all, but said he would take his master's orders. He repeated what he had already told me four or five times, that the new Ministry was on the point of being formed; but I will not wait any longer without at least trying to have my say out with the King.

People differ much as to what he is likely to do: some, and among them old Tricoupi, formerly Greek Minister in London, think he really means to try the constitutional line, but many others say that it is all sham. The thing for us to do is to try to get him—whether he is true or not—so far on the road that it will be difficult for him to turn back.

May 29.—In consequence of my application I received an intimation to be at the Palace yesterday afternoon, when the King received me in private audience—that is to say, in the presence of Coundourioti.

I found His Majesty standing in the centre of a large room in an attitude of attention, and it became evident that, instead of talking things over, it was expected that I should make a sort of harangue; so off I set at the top of my voice,* and was rather well pleased with myself for the number of disagreeable things I was able to say.

There is nothing more difficult than to pitch into a person who shows no fight. If one starts by intimating in courtly language, “Sire, you are a muff,” and is stoutly contradicted, there is no difficulty in bringing forward the evidence to prove one's assertion; but if you begin with “Sire, you are a muff,” and receive nothing but a low bow in return, it is not easy to carry

* King Otho was exceedingly deaf.

on the attack with any decency and propriety, and I had some of this difficulty yesterday.

However, I did manage to explain that Her Majesty's Government considered that Greece was in a very critical state, and that they believed one great reason was the contempt shown for the Constitution, and I pointed out to the King how desirable it was that the unpopularity, which now falls directly on his own royal shoulders, should be transferred to those of his Ministers, as would be the case if he were known to be really governing through them in a constitutional way.

I spoke of the contempt into which the Chamber had fallen by the exercise of the Government influence at the elections, which he admitted; and though he denied that it was against the Constitution, said that he had been so completely misunderstood that he had quite made up his mind that the elections shall henceforth be absolutely free, and that not the slightest influence shall be exercised by the Government.

He said, however—and I believe truly—that the present Electoral Law places an immense deal of power in the hands of the mayors, and that, till this is restricted, the freedom of election cannot be considered as secured; for which reason he wants now to pass such a law before the dissolution.

As far as words can go, therefore, he is pledged to have a new Chamber freely elected, and this will be no small step, *if* it can be obtained.

In answer to what I said about the danger of aggression upon Turkey, he, of course, said that much of his unpopularity was caused by the reproach that he did not encourage the "Grande Idée." As I knew this to be true, I did not contradict it, but launched into a pretty flight of fancy upon the way in which he might legitimately damage Turkey by showing such an example of good government, and by developing the resources of the country, that the Christians in

Turkey could not but compare the rule of their Mahometan masters with the enlightened administration of Christian Greece.

On the succession question he said that great difficulty was caused by a clause in the marriage settlements of Prince Luitpold, under which all the children were to be brought up in the Catholic Church.

To-day being Ascension day was a great popular fête, and all the world, including the King and Queen, promenaded on the Pentelicus road. While standing looking about us, a pistol shot was fired by an individual nearly touching our carriage, and I saw the man who fired it running away as hard as he could; but no one tried to stop him, and why should they for he had only shot another man in the belly. It will probably be magnified into another attempt on the King or Queen, who were fully two hundred yards off.

It is three weeks to-day since I arrived here, and, though the Ministers had then already resigned a week, nothing has yet been done in forming an Administration.

It is not wonderful that the King's position should be getting worse and worse, and, though no one seems to expect an immediate catastrophe, I should think that he must inevitably come to grief unless he turns over an entirely new leaf without more loss of time.

Even the people least likely to be of that way of thinking are now speaking constitutionalism; at least, they talk it to me, and, amongst others, Wendlandt, the King's private secretary, who has always been supposed to be of the other faction, told me the other day that he was convinced nothing could save the King but a frank adoption of Constitutional Government; that what His Majesty had hitherto done had been meant for the best; but that it was now evident that freely elected Chambers and a Ministry enjoying their confidence were what must be tried and persisted

in. Excellent good constitutional language—but is it all talk?

My belief is that the King and all of them have had a gliff, and at present mean to try a new line; but “when the devil was sick, the devil a saint would be,” and whether the next line is to be verified is what we must wait to see.

June 5.—Yesterday we dined at Testa’s, the Austrian Minister, which I hope concludes our diplomatic dinners, which are very painful in this hot weather and with the company we are confined to.

As it is, I am nearly written out, and in one or two weeks I shall certainly be pumped dry, for I cannot go on any longer repeating that the King’s unpopularity is so great that nothing but the want of someone to put in his place keeps him on his throne. It is no doubt as true as Gospel, but even of Gospel one cannot go on for ever repeating the same chapter.

People tell me now that a spirit of disaffection has got to such a height in the army that some expect it to show itself before long in overt acts, and declare that it will be a much more serious affair than that of Nauplia. If the part of the army which then remained true were now to rise against him it would be “Good-night to Otho.” No one expects the non-military part of the people to rise, but still more certain is it that they would not stir in defence of the King if the army should fail him.

I have heard from Sir Henry Storks, who says that the Ionian Parliament closed their session by voting an address to the Queen for union with Greece. It is curious how little anxious Greece seems to be to have them. I suppose the reason is as I have been told—that the Greeks are afraid that the Ionians would carry off too large a share of the loaves and fishes. Nevertheless, I wish an attempt were made to come to an arrangement by which they should be given up to

Greece, except Corfu, which should be retained as a military possession.

An impression is gaining ground that the King does not after all mean to dissolve the Chambers at the end of the Extraordinary Session. I called upon Wendlandt, and what he said rather confirmed the report—that is to say, he told me that it is not quite decided whether the dissolution is to be immediate, on account of the harvest and other inconveniences.

I told him that these were very minor evils to those which must immediately result from a postponement of the dissolution which would be taken as evidence that the King did not intend to dissolve; and the distrust of the King was so great that it was indispensable for him to take steps at once to restore confidence in his intention, which could only be done by his Ministers at once making in his name a declaration of his intention to dissolve as soon as the Electoral Law was passed, and to have the new elections free from all influence.

I asked Wendlandt to tell the King what I had been saying, which he promised to do. He confirmed all I said of the general distrust of the King, declaring that it had now penetrated into every class of society. He assured me that five out of the seven new Ministers had been selected, and have accepted: if so, tomorrow we should see the Government formed. Wendlandt spoke of the insuperable hesitation of the King in making up his mind. I made some strongish remarks, which I meant him to repeat, of the fatal consequences of hesitation in moments of difficulty, and on getting home I wrote him a long letter recapitulating what I had been saying, so that he can show it to the King if he likes.

I hope I spoke plainly enough to the King the other day: I believe I did, but am rather alarmed by hearing from various quarters that their Majesties are much pleased with me, and are convinced that I have their

interests at heart. It is difficult in a set speech to a King to bring all his misdeeds before him, but I do think that I told him very distinctly that he had done the things he ought not to have done, and had left undone the things he ought to have done.

Last night an officer who had been active in dispersing the Nauplia insurgents was shot at his own door.

June 8.—At last we have a Government, and Theocari belongs to it, as well as several others who are considered respectable people. The bad one of the lot is Spiro Milio, the Minister of War, whose character will not bear too close examination, and who, as Wendlandt told me, had been accused of some “gaspillage,” but a trifle of this kind is so common among all who have been in office that perhaps it may not be considered any very serious objection.

When they were sworn in, the King addressed them publicly in the presence of the Metropolitan and the whole Court, and said he intended to pass the Electoral Law, to have the next elections quite freely conducted, and in every respect to govern in a strictly constitutional manner.

Though as yet these are but words, it is a step to have got the King to make this open declaration, and I am conceited enough to believe that it was in part produced by my letter to Wendlandt, which can only have been received six or eight hours before the swearing-in.

To-day Wendlandt called to thank me in the King's name for my “excellent advice,” which His Majesty is determined to follow as far as possible, etc., etc. He was to give me the most positive assurance that, whatever is decided as to the moment for the new elections, the present Chamber shall sit no more after voting the Electoral Law.

The Ministers are preparing a programme, which will be out in a day or two, and then will be the

moment when the special mission ought to have taken its departure, and the want of a telegraph is a nuisance for I might at once have been authorised to announce Scarlett's appointment and my own disappearance, which would have made a much better end than having to stay to witness the squabbling over the National Guard and the Electoral Law.

June 9.—Saw Theocari, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs. He speaks very fairly, and declares that the Government will not remain in if the King swerves from his present constitutional intentions. However, no one believes in improvement, and the common declaration is that King Otho has become impossible.

June 12.—Theocari, the one man who gave the Government a stamp of respectability, has had an apoplectic or paralytic attack.

To-day I had the visit of the Prime Minister, Colocotroni, and of the black sheep of the lot, Spiro Milio, the Minister of War. Colocotroni wears the white fustinella or petticoat, and does not speak a word of French, and brought the other as his interpreter. He is not to be trusted.

June 19.—Photiades, the Turkish Minister, told me an amusing story. A few nights ago he was told that two men wished to see him on important business, and had them ushered in, when there appeared two wild-looking individuals in Albanian dresses, who gave the names of two of the most notorious of the brigand chiefs. Our friend evidently did not like the appearance or names of his visitors, but asked them civilly to what he was indebted for the honour of their visit, to which they replied that they had come to offer their services if he had anything he wanted done in their line of business: they further said that they had been employed (as Photiades already knew) in the incursions into Thessaly in 1854, since which time they had received a pension from the Greek Government till

the Nauplia insurrection made money scarce and their pay was stopped. Consequently, being hard up and in no good humour with the Greek Government, they hinted that if Photiades had any little job to do, such as putting King Otho out of the way, they were quite ready to execute the commission faithfully and like men of honour. Photiades thanked them, but said he had no employment for them; but that he would do what he could to get the Greek Government to continue their pensions: so next day he got hold of Colocotroni, King Otho's Prime Minister, and told him the story from one end to the other, and in two hours orders were given for the continuance of the pensions, and for the payment of all arrears to these two worthies, one of whom makes a boast that in his professional career he has with his own hand killed a hundred and thirty men. Such are the pensioners of King Otho, and such the people he employs to deliver the Christian subjects of the Porte.

June 25.—To-day had a visit from a certain Boudouri, formerly President of the Chamber of Deputies, who had been quietly put in prison for about three weeks during the Nauplia movement, no charge having ever been brought against him. When arrested he was going to dine with Mavrocordato, but, on saying he did not want to go to prison on an empty stomach, the functionary politely said that he would wait till after dinner, as he wished to treat him with respect, as some day no doubt he would be a Minister.

June 26.—This afternoon I got the despatches announcing Scarlett's appointment and my orders to come home.

July 1.—For the last two days I have been employed at my old trade of King lecturing, but hope I have now done with it for a time.

On Saturday I had an audience of leave of His Majesty, who received me alone, when, in the most

insinuating manner, I said some things which it required a little brass to bring out. I began by congratulating him on the improvement which had taken place in public sentiment since the change of Government and the announcement of the commencement of a really parliamentary system, and which would soon be greater when it was found that acts followed the words, of which people were still slow to be convinced. He repeated that he had quite made up his mind upon the subject, and he meant to govern according to the Ministerial programme, and declared that he had never had any object in view except the good of his people.

I answered, in the civillest way in the world, that I had never thought of calling his intentions into question, though I had been obliged to deny their success. I then took the opportunity of remarking that, while one person preferred a despotic government and another liked a democratic form, everyone was agreed that of all possible systems none was so utterly bad as a nominal Constitution habitually set at naught.

Talking of Turkey, the King, having made numerous protestations of his determination not to disturb the neighbouring provinces, said he hoped that *if* the Turkish Empire should fall to pieces he might count upon England's showing some affection for Greece in the new arrangements that must be made; upon which I answered that this would entirely depend upon the way in which Greece managed her own domestic economy; that, if Greece had developed her resources, had advanced her material prosperity to a high pitch, and could show an example of good government and happiness, our sympathies would certainly be on her side; but if, on the contrary, she was ill administered, her resources left undeveloped and her interests neglected, His Majesty might be sure that, whatever happened to Turkey, no one in England would wish

to see another province added to a Greece such as I had just described. I asked His Majesty to forgive my frankness, to which he answered by an uncomfortable grin.

However, I seem to be one of those gifted individuals out of whose mouths the most unpleasant truths have a charm, for the King's last words, not at this private audience be it understood, but after a dinner at the Palace two days later and before the whole Court, were:

“Adieu; j'espère que M. Scarlett vous ressemble!” His Majesty also said how pleased he would have been to have given me the Grand Cordon of the Redeemer of Greece, and was much distressed that our regulations did not permit me to accept it. Thus an ungrateful country prevents a faithful servant from having this great honour, as he had before been prevented from accepting the St. Januarius of Naples—two desperate disappointments!

On Monday I had an audience of leave of the Queen, just before dinner at the Palace. She was very gracious, but did not touch upon politics till for fun I told her of a report I had just heard—false, of course—of the Servians having captured the Citadel of Belgrade by sudden assault. Her whole face, neck, shoulders, etc., flushed with delight, and she said at once that she was always on the side of the Christians, and did not at all agree when I said that no country was more interested than Greece in the tranquillity of the Turkish frontiers.

I sat next to her at dinner, when she became very political, and I was rather confirmed in the belief that the Court really see that sooner or later things will go ill with them if they do not take care.

After dinner the King, who is as deaf as a post, came up to me, and in the hearing of several people asked me what was the character of the ex-King Francis of

Naples ! I was rather surprised, but the chance was too good a one to be lost, and as it is civil to raise one's voice sufficiently to overcome His Majesty's dulness of hearing, I took especial care to do so on this occasion, and said that with a very ordinary intellect, the King had had no education, and was incapable of seeing the necessity for following good advice, and had fallen in consequence. He then asked me what that advice had been, and I told him it had been to grant his people those constitutional reforms that the whole country was calling for. Upon which His Majesty observed that the King of Naples had at last given a Constitution. "So he did, Sire," was my answer, "but he put it off till it was too late, when it was powerless to stop a revolution already begun, though everybody who knew anything of Naples was convinced that he might have saved himself if he had adopted it sooner," and that, moreover, I knew that King Francis himself now admits that if he had listened to us he would at the present moment have been still on his throne.

There can be no doubt that King Otho's question to me was dictated by a feeling that he was in a position not very unlike that of King Francis, and by an uneasy dread that, as the same doctor was prescribing the same remedy, a neglect of it might be followed by a catastrophe in his own case, as it had been in that of his royal brother.

It was an odd conversation for a King to choose to begin in the presence of a good many people, which makes it look all the more as if it had been weighing on his mind.

July 2.—A hot day, uncomfortably spent in saying good-bye to people—Wendlandt, the King's private secretary, among others, almost boisterously constitutional. The sly fox; I can't quite make him out, but he is not the man in whom I should be disposed to place implicit trust.

I can't help regretting being at the last day of this place, for there is something very captivating about the look of it, arid and dry as it now all is; and the buildings and ruins one becomes more and more attached to, and less indulgent to those who have done them more damage than the two thousand years of natural decay -- that is to say, the Turks and Venetians.

We left Athens by the Marseilles steamer on the 4th, and arrived in London on the 12th July, 1862.

CHAPTER VI

GREECE—II., 1863

[The frequent mention of the Ionian Islands and their cession to Greece on the accession of Prince William of Denmark (King George I.) to the throne makes it desirable to recall to the reader's mind something of the history of these Islands. After the fall of the Emperor Napoleon I. they were in 1815 constituted into the “United State of the Ionian Islands” under the Protectorate of Great Britain; they were governed by two Assemblies and a Lord High Commissioner, the representative of Great Britain; their material prosperity greatly increased under British rule, but friction was constant, and a strong demand for annexation to Greece arose. The cession of the Islands to Greece has been blamed by some in view of their value as a Naval Station, but there can be little doubt that it was a wise and politic step and fully justified by results.]

THE inevitable catastrophe overtook King Otho even sooner than I had anticipated, for within four months from the time of my leaving Athens he was overthrown by a bloodless revolution, in which not a single hand was raised in his favour, and his deposition was pronounced by a unanimous vote of the Chamber.

No one who knew anything of the state of things in Greece could be surprised at what had occurred, and still less could anyone who took an interest in her regret the departure of a Sovereign who, during a reign of thirty years, had done absolutely nothing for the development of his country, or to improve its position; but the question of finding a suitable successor to him was likely to be attended with difficulty, as it was necessary that he should be acceptable to the three Protecting Powers—England, France, and Russia—

each of which might wish to favour a candidate over whom it could hope to be able to exert influence.

During nearly the whole of Otho's reign there had been in Greece what were called an English, a French, and a Russian party, struggling for ascendancy, sometimes one and sometimes another getting the upper hand; but at the time of Otho's fall the object upon which the Greeks had set their hearts was the establishment of a free constitutional government, and, believing that it was to us they must look for support in obtaining it, they were seized with a passionate love for England, which made our influence overwhelming.

As Campbell Scarlett had been appointed Minister in Greece, and was at Athens when the revolution occurred, I was not a little surprised to receive an intimation that the Government wished me at once to return there on another special mission, which promised to be both important and interesting; and this certainly proved to be the case, for, upon arriving in London after receiving Lord Russell's summons, I found that there was to be more in my mission than merely to guide the Greeks in the choice of a Sovereign. I was to announce that, if they selected a King likely to remain in friendly relations with Turkey, we would be willing to make over to them the Ionian Islands; and as there was an obvious risk in establishing the Greeks in a position within gunshot of the Turkish shore, I was told that our Government hoped to remove the objection by inducing the Sultan to abandon the provinces of Thessaly and Epirus to Greece; and that, if I saw any prospect of success for this scheme, I was to go on to Constantinople to arrange with the Porte about the cession.

As all this was to be kept entirely secret, it was not obvious how, at Athens, I was to ascertain the prospects of success—for the difficulties to be expected would certainly not come from Greece but from

Turkey; and moreover, when I asked Lord Palmerston whether there was any reason for believing the Turks to be ready to make this voluntary sacrifice of territory to not over-friendly neighbours, as he only answered in his jaunty off-hand way, "Oh, they will do it if we advise it," I saw that the ground had not been felt; but I took it for granted that the official instructions which I was to take with me would contain something more definite for my guidance. Great, therefore, was my surprise when, just as I was leaving London, these instructions were put into my hands, and I found nothing more in them than a vague intimation that "it was desirable to improve the relations of Greece and Turkey," and that if I saw any probability of being able to accomplish this I was to proceed to Constantinople with that object. This was not altogether satisfactory, for the paragraph was intended to convey even more than Burleigh's famous nod of his head; and, though I never was afraid of responsibility, I did not quite like to see that, if I moved in the matter and difficulties of any kind ensued, I should not be able to point to a word in my instructions that seemed to justify my action.

A wilder project was never conceived or attempted to be so lightly carried out, but the Government was so enamoured of it, and apparently so confident of success, that they at once took the Greek Charge d'Affaires into their confidence, with the inevitable result that, before I reached Greece, this dead secret was known not only at Athens but at Constantinople, where the dismay and consternation it produced quickly put an end to it, and the matter was quietly dropped.

The selection of a new Sovereign for Greece did not promise to be an easy affair; for, while the English and Russian Governments had signed a protocol excluding members of the royal and imperial families, the Greeks had almost unanimously determined

that they would have no King but Prince Alfred, the Duke of Edinburgh, on whom they had fixed their choice before the deposition of Otho, and who afterwards, in spite of our formal declaration that he could not accept the crown, was elected King by a national vote, and saluted as such with 101 guns.

Moreover, as soon as the protocol was signed the Russians pretended that it did not exclude the Duke of Leuchtenberg from the candidature, denying that he was a member of the imperial family, although, on his father's marriage with a daughter of the Emperor Nicholas, he and his descendants had been officially recognised as belonging to it, and they only consented to his exclusion upon being given to understand by our Government that, if he was not excluded, neither should Prince Alfred be.

The anxiety of the Greeks to have Prince Alfred, and the refusal of our Government to allow him to accept the Crown, almost imposed upon them the duty of taking the lead in making another arrangement, and it was by no means easy to find an eligible Prince who would not be distasteful to one or other of the Protecting Powers.

Among those favourably thought of by Her Majesty's Government were King Ferdinand of Portugal, Ernest Duke of Saxe-Coburg, Prince Leiningen, Prince Hohenlohe, Prince Waldemar of Holstein, and the Archduke Maximilian of Austria. The Russian party in Greece would have preferred Prince William of Baden, who was about to marry a Russian Grand Duchess. The partisans of France turned their eyes towards the Duc d'Aumale. Others were ready to elect Lord Derby or any rich English nobleman, and the Royal Family of Bavaria had not withdrawn their claims; but the throne of Greece was at that time looked upon as a very unstable seat, which few were disposed to occupy.

The first to whom our Government made the offer was

King Ferdinand of Portugal, a member of the Roman Catholic Kohary branch of the Coburgs, and the father of the young King, but he steadily refused to allow himself to be nominated, not much to the regret of the Greeks, who had no wish to take as their King another Catholic, a childless widower without private fortune. The negotiation with him lasted some time, and on his final refusal communications were opened with the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, who intimated his willingness to accept the crown upon conditions which the Greeks were ready to agree to, but afterwards, without giving any good reason, suddenly changed his mind and declined. Then Prince Walde-mar of Holstein was appealed to, and when he also declined Her Majesty's Government unaccountably turned their thoughts to the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, the unfortunate Emperor of Mexico. As far as personal qualifications were concerned the *Gotha Almanac* did not probably contain the name of a Prince more likely to prove a good and enlightened Sovereign, but at Athens the Austrians were scarcely less unpopular than the Bavarians, and the whole nation would have scouted with indignation a proposal to elect him King. However, this strange notion was quickly dropped, and the Greeks never knew that it had been entertained.

King Ferdinand, during the minority of his son, had shown so much wisdom while acting as Regent of Portugal that when I left England our Government was making every effort to secure him for the throne of Greece, but if he could not be tempted to quit his retirement Lord Russell's next choice would have been Prince Leiningen, with the reversion to his brother and his brother's children; and if the Greeks were to propose either him or Prince Hohenlohe I was not to discourage the idea, though I was not to suggest it; in point of fact, neither of their names was ever seriously brought forward.

At Paris I saw Drouyn de Lhuys,* just made Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was extremely friendly, and who quite disagreed with Bourée, the French Minister at Athens, who advocated the occupation of Greece by a corps of allied troops to prevent disorder. He spoke of a report from Athens that the name of the Duc d'Aumale was to be brought forward, and, without saying much, he showed that it would be very distasteful to him; but although Drouyn de Lhuys was cordial and friendly, on arriving at Athens I found his Minister in a very different frame of mind, for he was so much enraged at seeing the Greeks throw themselves into our arms that he completely lost his balance, and thought of nothing but how to get up an opposition to us, and, though he entirely failed, his intrigues gave much trouble.

EXTRACTS FROM JOURNAL AND PRIVATE LETTERS.

Athens, December 23, 1862.—Arrived at the Piræus this morning in the frigate *Liffey*, Captain George Parker.

Scarlett sent to invite us—*i.e.*, self and Charlie†—to a diplomatic dinner. Found there almost all the old colleagues—viz., Bourée and Madame (French), Testa and Madame (Austrian), Photiades and Madame (Turkish), Bludow and Madame (Russian).

Bourée declares that no king will be able to keep things going without not only the moral but the material support of one or more of the Great Powers.

Told him that material support seemed to me quite out of the question, which was also the opinion of

* B. 1805, d. 1886. French Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1863 to 1866.

† The Hon. Charles Elliot, afterwards Admiral of the Fleet.

Drouyn de Lhuys. He said Drouyn was quite wrong.

I asked about the name of the Duc d'Aumale having been put forward. He said he had heard that it was talked of here, and that he had telegraphed as much to Paris, and had declared on all sides that such an election would be regarded by the Emperor as personally offensive to himself. He had received a telegram from Paris with strong injunctions not to favour the election of the Duke. In the course of conversation he said he had heard that I had come to get Thessaly and Epirus for the Greeks. Photiades also told me that Bourée had been to him in great excitement about Thessaly and Epirus. To him I plainly said that my Government thought it would be advisable for Turkey to give up those provinces, but, in reply to a question whether I was going to Constantinople to urge it, I told him that I should not do so unless I saw a fair chance of success. We talked the thing over, and it ended by his saying that if it depended upon him he would consent to the measure. He feels that Corfu, when once given up to Greece, must become a centre of Greek propaganda, and that the neighbouring Turkish provinces could only be kept at a ruinous expenditure; but he did not give me much reason to expect that the suggestion will be well received by his Government. Mamiami, the Italian, and Hompesch, the Bavarian Minister, were the only ones not at Scarlett's dinner. I sat next Madame Bludow, who not very unnaturally seems to resent having such a colleague as Madame Mamiami, but is, I think, ignorant of her former calling as a painter's model. The poor woman is decently draped now, and I did not uncover her.

December 26.—The force and unanimity of the enthusiasm for Prince Alfred have certainly not been exaggerated by the newspapers. It prevails everywhere, and even now the people will not hear of any

alternative. It is ten days since the official note was sent in by which the Duke of Leuchtenberg and Prince Alfred were both formally declared to be ineligible, but it seems to make no difference, and the Greeks still declare themselves determined to have him, whether we like it or not.

Yesterday a deputation from the club, "National Opinion," called upon me to express the unanimous wish of the nation for Prince Alfred. It gave me the opportunity of asking them to make it known that, however much we might be flattered by the constancy of their affection, they were trying for what was unattainable, and that they had better be good boys and leave off crying for the moon, and be satisfied with something more within their reach. I said I had heard that some people declared, if they could not get Prince Alfred, that they would have a Republic, though I could not believe they would do anything so foolish, as they must be aware that they would injure themselves far more than they would punish us, and that, moreover, in such a case the intention of giving them the Ionian Islands would certainly not be carried out.

It seems that Bourée had encouraged the bringing forward of Aumale's name for a day or two, till his Government told him to be quiet, which is exactly what he never can be; but he is so wild against Prince Alfred that he would have been ready to run Nana Sahib against him.

December 29.—Yesterday I had two demonstrations in honour of Prince Alfred. The first was from the National Guard, who came in numbers below the windows and sent up a numerous deputation, headed by their late chief, Coroneos, who read an address to the effect that the Greeks were determined to persist to the death in getting Prince Alfred, and reminding me that the *vox populi* was *vox Dei*, and what right had anyone to resist the voice of God? They

were aware that a mere human instrument, called a protocol, was against them, but how could that oppose the voice of the Almighty ? I was very civil, very much flattered, but said that we had quite made up our minds that they could not have the Prince.

So ended demonstration number one. The next was a monster demonstration of many thousand persons, mostly respectable-looking, well-dressed people, and as quiet and orderly as possible. They gathered gradually under the windows till there was a perfect forest of heads up and down the street and in the open space in front of the house. They had a flag with two angels—or perhaps modern Greeks—crowning Prince Alfred, which excited immense enthusiasm and was loudly cheered. They also sent up a deputation, which informed me that nothing but death could affect their determination to have King Alfred.

I answered, of course, very much as before, and the deputation went down and explained what I had said to the people outside, who dispersed in the most perfect order. It was certainly an extraordinary exhibition, for there must have been fully half of the adult male population of Athens under my windows, and there was neither noise nor confusion of any sort, the whole of them being evidently in earnest.

January 2, 1863.—Erskine, Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, telegraphs that the hints about Thessaly and Epirus have frightened the Turkish Ministers out of their senses, and that they will not even mention it to the Sultan.

Photiades has had a telegram to the same effect, saying that it would lead to the immediate dismemberment of the Empire, and that the suggestion had been received with profound grief. I told him that his Government need not make themselves unhappy, as I should certainly not go to Constantinople to make a suggestion which seemed so unpalatable, and

that nothing had been done on our side beyond the simple expression of an opinion on the best course to be pursued.

January 5.—Hugh MacDonell arrived from Constantinople with a letter from Erskine to explain to me the panic that had been caused among the Turkish Ministers by Photiades' despatch. According to him, the Turks seem completely overwhelmed at the idea of such a proposal having been hinted at by England, and they ask what worse could Russia or France ask them to do. In addition to this, the Sultan is mad, and they don't know what extravagances he may be guilty of. He has been distributing enormous sums among the soldiers, and MacDonell says that there is an expectation of another massacre like that of the Janissaries. All this, combined with the account of the object of my projected mission, has put the Divan into a state of black despair.

Aali Pasha has begged that Sir H. Bulwer might be got back, and Erskine has telegraphed for him both to London and Alexandria.

My temper is sorely tried in speaking to the Greek Ministers about the candidates. I certainly have expressed myself on all occasions in a way to make it impossible that there should be any misunderstanding about the fact of Prince Alfred's refusal being absolute and final, but to-day Boulgaris, the President, again met me with, "Ainsi vous pensez que nous ne devons plus espérer d'avoir le prince Alfred," and I am convinced I shall have to say the same thing over again the next time I see him.

January 8.—In talking to Diamandopoulos, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I found him decidedly opposed to the idea of electing King Ferdinand, and he seriously hinted that an English lord belonging to one of our old "familles principales," such as Stanley or Seymour, would be preferable. He did not seem to care whether it was King Derby or King Hertford,

provided it was someone who had plenty of money, for one of his chief objections to Ferdinand is that he is poor. I asked if it was not rather humiliating to suggest that Greece would not support her own King, to which he replied that "Of course we would vote him an allowance, but we think it would be well that he should decline to receive it!"

January 9.—I have again been assured that Bourée is trying to re-establish the French influence by encouraging the "Grande Idée": the chief of this new party is to be Coundourioti, Minister for Foreign Affairs under King Otho when I arrived here last May.

January 19.—Yesterday I got two telegrams answering some questions I had sent home. I had asked the opinion of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, Prince Louis of Hesse, Prince Leiningen, and Prince of Hohenlohe. I had also said that a party here was putting forward the Duc d'Aumale, and that if we did not put someone else in the ranks we should find ourselves with ground to make up, as Boulgaris, the head of the Government, among other people, inclines to him. I said that the Duke of Coburg would, I believed, be the most popular candidate that could be suggested. The telegram informs me that General Grey had been sent to Brussels to ascertain the Duke's sentiments, and Lord John added that he thought he would accept. I was also told that the Duc d'Aumale would not suit Her Majesty's Government, so upon these two points I shall be able to speak more plainly than I have hitherto ventured to do. Lord Russell had before said: "I personally should have no objection to d'Aumale—quite the contrary." So I was rather left to infer that the objection was the Emperor's supposed dislike of him. Next to the Duke of Coburg Her Majesty's Government place Prince Leiningen; the rest of my list are "nowhere"—not placed or mentioned.

That Bourée does underhand push Aumale I hear from so many quarters that I can hardly doubt it. If he were elected he would have to acknowledge the Emperor, which would, I should think, be quite sufficient reason to prevent him from accepting.

Bludow spoke to me to-day about the Duke of Coburg, and was indignant at the notion, intimating that his Government would be entirely opposed, and that he was as closely allied to England as Leuchtenberg to Russia. If we have to fall back on Leiningen it will be harder work. There will be as much opposition from other Powers, and a weaker man to support.

A few days ago Count Mamiami came and asked if it was true that I had announced that Her Majesty's Government would oppose an Italian Prince. I owned the soft impeachment, and said that they would not see in an Italian Prince the guarantee for the good relations with the neighbouring States which they hoped for.

He then made a curious avowal, and said that latterly the Eastern policy of his Government had entirely changed: that some time ago, "instigated by France," which, he said, had two years ago sent large supplies of arms to Servia, they looked for the early downfall of Turkey. But now it was different, as they believe Turkey to be strong enough to stand against her weak Christian subjects, and they see that these must not be trusted to. That with regard to Hungary, however, the case was different, and if it "became necessary" for Italy to attack Austria she would certainly make use of the Hungarians.

Altogether it was an open admission of complicity in the intrigues that have been going on in these parts, but I think it must have been in Rattazzi's time, and perhaps the present Italian Government may have disconcerted them. Boulgaris told me distinctly that, shortly after Otho's departure, the Provisional

Government had been offered 20,000 stand of arms, and volunteers besides, by an Italian agent; and, when I pressed him, he said that the arms were not to come from the clubs, but from the Italian Government.

January 26.—The Duc d'Aumale has gained much ground, pushed on by Bourée. Bludow continues to announce his Government as being strongly opposed to the Duke of Coburg, and Bourée says that his Government do not like it at all. My private opinion (though probably Her Majesty's Government would not agree with it) is that, if any hitch takes place about the Duke of Coburg, we had better ourselves propose Prince William of Baden, as the only candidate likely to unite the suffrages of the three Powers and to secure unanimity here. The fact of his being about to marry a Leuchtenberg is not a sufficient drawback to counter-balance the advantage of preventing this country from being pulled to pieces by the factions of the three Powers.

January 27.—At last the National Assembly has finished the verification of the elections, which, on the Government side, were so illegally conducted that it was impossible they should not be annulled, and the whole of the Mavromichalis family, of which ten or twelve had seats, have been turned out. At Sparta, out of a population of 37,000 men, women, and children, 39,000 votes were announced as having been recorded for the successful candidate, the total number of qualified electors being about 8,000.

It is said that old Mavromichalis's wife, a regular old Spartan dame, when her husband came back from the Chamber and told her that he had been turned out, fairly boxed his ears, and, leaving his house, went off to the Piræus, declaring that she would have nothing more to do with a Mavromichalis who proved himself such a spoon as to allow himself to be treated in this way. His brother is the Minister of War, under whom

the army has become the most disgraceful military rabble ever seen in any country, or at any time. He continues the promotion of soldiers, till in an army of at most 5,000 men there are supposed to be at least 2,000 officers.

January 28.—To-day I got a telegram desiring me formally to decline the Crown for Prince Alfred and to recommend the Duke of Coburg, which choice is cordially approved by the Emperor of the French; that Russia makes difficulties about the succession, which will be removed by the Duke and the Greek Parliament at once naming a successor who shall adopt the Greek religion, according to the Constitution.

Bourée seems delighted that we should be pulling together again, though I cannot help having some little doubt about the cordiality of the French support which is announced.

January 29.—This morning I made my communication about the Duke of Coburg to the Provisional Government, which received it excellently. They see no difficulty in his proposal that he should retain his German Duchies, nor as to his successor.

Diamandopoulos, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, came to me and was enthusiastic about the Duke, and went on to ask if it was true, as stated in a Trieste paper, that the English Government meant to give him 80,000L. a year! Of course I said it was absurd to suppose that we should give anything, and that I thought that the Ionian Islands might be accepted as a very tidy “dot.”

To this his answer was: “To be sure, the Ionian Islands are all very well, but then I thought that, as by giving them up you will save some thousands a year, you might think it right to divide some of the saving with us.” This is literally true, just as I have written it down.

January 30.—There is some mystery about the

French support of the Duke of Coburg, as Bourée's despatches received this morning show no evidence of a wish on the part of France to approve. The Assembly have named a commission to count up the numbers of the national vote that were given for the election of Prince Alfred.

February 2.—The name of the Duke of Coburg has been capitally received, and from the provinces the accounts are equally favourable; but the Russians here seem furious, and Bludow, who kept pretty calm during the Alfred demonstrations, is now very hot and indignant. Bourée has put himself into a ridiculous position by it being impossible for him ever to consent to play second fiddle. After I told him of my telegram announcing that the Emperor cordially approved of the Duke of Coburg's candidature, he went to Stavros, of the Bank, where, in the presence of half a dozen people, he gave out that *he* had got a telegram showing that everything was now agreed upon between France and England, and that his Emperor had especially insisted upon the adoption of the Greek religion by the Duke's successor. He did this in the full conviction that the steamer next day would bring him the confirmation of my despatch; but, when his messenger arrived without anything of the kind, he felt that he had committed himself a good deal further than he likes, and he is now by no means easy. It is very amusing, and serves him very right.

February 3.—To-day the Chambers voted the *déchéance* of King Otho and the Bavarian dynasty, or rather extended to the dynasty the vote which had pronounced the King's expulsion. After that the commission appointed to examine the votes for Prince Alfred announced that, out of 241,000 votes given for a constitutional monarch, Prince Alfred had received 230,000. Upon this the assembly, by acclamation, passed a decree declaring Prince Alfred to be King of Greece by the free election of the people, all the

members, except some of the Mountain (republicans and sinners) standing up uncovered. It has, of course, for the moment revived the Alfred fever, and the town to-night is illuminated, His Majesty's accession having been saluted with 101 guns.

The Russians are moving heaven and earth—or, what is more to the purpose here, silver and gold—to get up a feeling or a party against us, and some of our friends are getting anxious. If Bourée had only received instructions to support the Duke of Coburg all would be plain sailing.

February 4.—I have received some telegrams showing, as I expected, that the cordial support of France for the Duke is somewhat doubtful, but my course is made clear, and I am to shove him along—with France or without her—and quite right too. I therefore got hold of Boulgaris, the President, and pressed him hard to lose no time.

February 5.—Yesterday the Provisional Government waited on me and made the formal communication of the decree of the National Assembly declaring Prince Alfred elected King of Greece, to which I returned a no less formal renunciation on behalf of the Queen.

Poor Otho ! The list of the votes by universal suffrage has just been published, and is really curious, the last name on it being that of his unfortunate ex-Majesty, who received one vote. It is positively melancholy, and puts one in mind of the one garland on Nero's tomb.

Prince Alfred got 230,000 votes; the Duke of Leuchtenberg, 2,400; Alexander and Nicholas of Russia, each 1,800; a "Sovereign of any kind," 1,700; "Long live the three Powers" got 480; a Republic, 93; Garibaldi, 3; d'Aumale, 3; Napoleon the Great, 2; and Otho, 1. I have fairly frightened Bourée about the Duc d'Aumale. I told him to-day that all the copies of Aumale's *Life of Condé* had just been seized by the

police at Paris, and added, "And that is the man your Emperor is asserted to be favouring." He had not heard of it, and positively jumped off his chair when I mentioned it, saying that he now felt sure that if the Duke had been elected he, Bourée, would have been a ruined man and never forgiven. In fact, he is completely puzzled, and does not know what his Government really wants.

Sunday, February 8.—I generally get telegrams on Sunday morning to distract my attention from Dr. Hill's sermon, and the one that arrived this morning was nothing less than the Duke of Coburg's final refusal.

He certainly might have known his own mind a little sooner. His own proposals had been officially communicated here, and no objections whatever were made to them. He is in the most formal manner recommended to the Greeks for election, and then after all he changes his mind; and that apparently not upon any freshly discovered difficulties, but for reasons which existed just as strongly from the beginning.

One reason he gives is that the Bavarians have not yet given up their rights, but he knew that he was accepting a revolutionary throne from which King Otho had been driven by the will of the people, and he had no right to expect that Otho would kindly help to lift him into it.

It is impossible to say what may now occur here.

February 9.—This breakdown is most unfortunate, and to-day the town seems to be in black despair. Bourée pretends to me to be very sorry—other people tell me he is beaming with joy, telling them it is their own fault for listening to a single Power. Bludow makes no pretence of regret—which is better. I have telegraphed home that the failure of a second candidate has so far affected English influence that it would not now do to try to carry a third without the real support of France.

February 11.—I have had a very clever and very amusing letter from Sir H. Bulwer* about the proposal for the cession by Turkey of Thessaly and Epirus, and knocking about my ears the arguments in its favour which I had written to Erskine at the time it was discussed.

I have been obliged to answer that I at least three parts agree in all he says, but that I had advanced the best reasons I could in favour of the object I was ordered to carry out; and that when I was first spoken to in London about it I had asked what arguments I was to use to persuade the Turks, as I confessed that they did not readily suggest themselves to my mind.

Sir H. Bulwer declares that if Turkey had followed the advice the whole fabric would have fallen about our terrified heads.

February 12.—I hear through Stavros that the *backers of Aumale are again busy, and it is asserted that the Duke has written to Piscatory, formerly French Minister here, that if the Greeks elect him he is ready to try his hand. Besides this, it is said that Riza Palamedes, who has generally upheld the French, has suddenly, without having a shilling of his own, found means to pay off a considerable amount of debt. He can command some thirty-five votes in the Assembly, and is therefore quite worth buying; and if the Duc d'Aumale seriously wishes to stand, and is ready to pay handsomely, he will be able to make such a start before we offer anyone that he may probably succeed. It might not suit us, but, as far as Greece is concerned, she may very easily go further and fare worse.

Her Majesty's Government would not like him; but the only arguments they have used to me on the subject were based on the fact of his being a Catholic, and therefore likely to exalt that Church at the expense

* Sir Henry Bulwer, afterwards First Lord Dalling, British Ambassador at Constantinople 1858–65.

of the Greek. They seem to forget that the first candidate they proposed was King Ferdinand of Portugal, to whom the same objection equally applied; but, as I happen to recollect it, I am afraid I shall not have effrontery sufficient to use the argument with much effect.

February 16.—Among the people who came to see me to-day was Kostaki. He is a useful man and particularly well informed. He told me that, when he was Under-Secretary in 1854, he had by desire of General Kalergi, the Minister of War, written to Lord Palmerston to say that the General was quite prepared to bring about the dethronement of King Otho without a chance of bloodshed, if Lord Palmerston would give the slightest sign of encouragement. He added that he had never received any answer to his letter, which is not surprising; but what is surprising is that he told me this story in the presence of another Greek, and that neither of them seemed to have the slightest suspicion that the Minister of War or the Under-Secretary had done anything questionable in proposing to dethrone the Sovereign they were serving.

Bourée tells me he has written to Drouyn de Lhuys that he sees all the objections to the Duc d'Aumale, and that he sees all that can be said in his favour, but that he cannot for the life of him understand how his Government can be *indifferent* upon the question. He thinks they must either like it or hate it.

February 18.—The only thing that is causing much talk at this moment is Otho's correspondence—that is to say, the letters belonging to him that he left behind. They were sealed up by the Provisional Government, and now there is a strong desire to examine and publish them. The Russians are much disturbed at the thought of any of these papers seeing the light, and some of the Greeks seem so marvellously scrupulous as to give one a pretty good guess that they know

their own names may possibly appear in a way they are not ambitious of.

February 20.—I wish to goodness now that I had never come on this confounded mission. I yesterday got a letter from Lord Russell saying he had proposed to France that they should suggest the Archduke Maximilian of Austria to the Greeks for election; and, from a letter of Lord Cowley's of the 12th, Drouyn appears to be quite agreeable, but the Emperor had not yet been consulted. He is not likely to make any objection, and therefore our only hope—fortunately a great one—is that it is hardly possible to suppose that an Austrian Prince would become a candidate for a throne which its Bavarian possessors have not declared themselves ready to abandon. If it were not for this I should be in despair, as I can conceive no more fatal proposal than this if it should come to be formally made. It will be absolutely and immediately destructive of our old popularity in Greece, where, in return for the proofs of regard they have been showing us, we shall be believed to have turned round and betrayed the liberties of the country. Austria is not a fraction less unpopular than Bavaria, and the election of the Archduke would be looked upon very nearly in the light of a restoration of the Bavarians.

I shall expect to be hooted in the streets, and I feel that I shall deserve it, not in my private capacity certainly, but as becoming the organ to propose what must revolt the whole liberal feelings of Greece. In fact, it will be impossible for me to remain here to carry out the suggestion, and I have sent home a letter to ask Lord Russell to let me have by telegraph permission to come away; but in order to prevent appearing to be in a fuss about what I believe will never take place, I have enclosed it to George,* only to be given to Lord Russell if Maximilian is really to be proposed.

* Hon. George Elliot, private secretary to Lord Russell.

I believe Maximilian to be a liberal and enlightened man, but that is not enough to counterbalance the drawbacks; and I have told Lord Russell that his chance of success in governing here will be about as great as it would be if he were put on the throne of Naples. Her Majesty's Government have not thought it necessary to ascertain what prospects the Archduke would have of being elected, even if we and France throw our whole united weight into the scale, but my own impression is that his success would be extremely doubtful.

The National Assembly has to-day been a perfect bear-garden. Ministers have resigned, and a new Ministry is chosen. Parties are running strong, and will get things into a mess before long if a King is not found. Placards in favour of the Duc d'Aumale have been posted up.

February 21.—The parties of Boulgaris and Kanaris have come to blows, and some few people have been killed. Fighting took place in the early morning under Vice-Consul Merlin's windows, where one officer was killed and some soldiers wounded. Casks of wine suddenly appeared at some of the guard-houses, from which the soldiers sallied shouting for Grivas. This morning Ruffos sent in his resignation as member of the Provisional Government, whereupon the Assembly decided that the Government should be placed temporarily in the hands of a President and five counsellors, naming their own President, Balbi, President. A perfect panic in the town, and not a door or a shutter open.

February 22.—The Assembly to-day has been busy upsetting its own resolutions, and has decided that the Government is to consist of a single President and a Ministry named by the Assembly. Moraitini, a good respectable man with little or no influence, is named President.

February 24.—The new Ministers, Balbi, Demetrius,

Mavrocordato (Foreign Affairs), Boudouris, and Smolensk, were sworn in yesterday in the Assembly before the Metropolitan, who made a charming speech, ending, “As Hercules conquered the Lernœan Hydra by the aid of the faithful Ioläus, so may you gentlemen triumph through the aid of your virtues and patriotism.” An archbishop going to Hercules for an example is delicious.

The reports of large sums of money being sent to get up an agitation for the Bavarians have acquired such consistency that it is scarcely possible to disbelieve them entirely. There is strong reason for believing that the Bavarian Consul has received 900,000 zwanzigers for this purpose, and money is certainly being spent in the south of the Peloponnesus, in Maina and Laconia.

February 25.—Mavrocordato, Minister for Foreign Affairs, told me this morning that he had ascertained the truth about the Bavarian Consul beyond the possibility of mistake; and Boudouris, Minister of Marine, told me the same thing, and that they had determined to pack him off.

February 27.—Near Navarino the country is in the hands of the brigands. The Mavromichalis family are there all-powerful, and there are grounds for suspecting that, if paid, they might be ready to do a stroke of business for the Bavarians; and the Government assure us that they have traces of a conspiracy to march large bodies of armed men upon Athens for the purpose of restoring that dynasty.

Yesterday, in the Assembly, the Minister of Finance announced that he had just one hundred drachmas in the Treasury, on which a loan was authorised.

March 1.—Yesterday some arrests were made of officers said to have been bought by Bernau, the Bavarian Consul, who has also been arrested and put in prison. This morning I had a visit from his wife and daughter, who asked me to do what I could

for him. Neither of them said a word about his being innocent, and to others they have said that it was very hard he should suffer, as he had only continued to do what Hompesch, the Minister, had been doing before he went away, and what he would have done if he had been here. Being left by Hompesch in charge of the Legation, he had taken it into his head that diplomatic privilege would bear him harmless whatever he did, though it is clear that he is not entitled to any privilege whatever.

March 4.—I got a private letter from Lord Russell, asking if Prince Waldemar, of Holstein Augustenberg, would be well received—unmarried, heirless, and fifty-two! What could I say? That his name had never been heard in Athens, but that any Prince recommended by England for his personal qualifications would be favourably considered, and, if supported by France, also certain to be elected.

March 6.—It is wonderful how much good is discovered in one, when one happens for the moment to be popular. The Greeks have quite made up their minds that it was through my instrumentality that the Bernau affair was brought to light, and the country saved from a great danger? The poor Austrians, on the other hand, are suspected of every iniquity, and it is useless to try to say a word in their defence. The French are supposed, I believe truly, to be sulky.

In the Assembly a member proposed the election of a private Englishman, even if he should not belong to one of the “Princely Families.” I suppose he meant Mr. Gladstone.

March 8.—The Government say that the more they enquire, the stronger they find the proofs of the Bavarian plot, and there have been some more arrests—among others, that of General Hadjipetros.

March 11.—A few more arrests, a bishop or two being in the last batch. There is not a shadow of doubt that money has been spent freely.

The French are evidently very sulky, and Kalergi, Greek Minister at Paris, writes that Drouyn says he is disgusted with Greece; and Bourée says, that at all events disgust is the only word that expresses the feeling of the Emperor's Minister at Athens; and, as this feeling is perfectly well known, it is not surprising that neither he nor his master should be in high favour here. On the other hand, the confidence in England has been very striking; but it must break down if in the next few days I have nothing to communicate.

March 13.—I have got a letter saying that if Prince Waldemar fails, Lord Russell does not think Her Majesty's Government would make any objection to Prince William of Baden. I am glad they have come to this decision, and I confess that the country choosing a King for itself will have a great merit in my eyes.

March 15.—The canvass for Prince William is making such progress that if I now receive orders to propose an utterly unknown man like Prince Waldemar it is impossible to foretell how matters may go.

March 17.—No telegrams, no nothing; but I declare right and left that I have no longer a doubt that before the week is out I am certain of having something to say.

I have had so many "last nights" and "very last nights" that I have got to my "absolutely last night," after which the house must positively be closed. How they go on believing me is a marvel. In the meantime, here is Aumale again making strong running, with the appearance of being very vigorously jockeyed. He has been sounded, and his answer is represented as an intimation that he would not be unwilling. This evening the Minister for Foreign Affairs came, with the old question: "Sister Anne, sister Anne, do you see anybody coming?" and

sister Anne had, as usual, to return a disconsolate answer.

March 18.—The telegram I have been so anxiously waiting for has come at last, and is enough to provoke a much greater saint than myself. The last one I had showed a disposition to accept Prince William of Baden if Waldemar broke down, and now I am simply told that Her Majesty's Government have no candidate who would accept; without a single word about Prince William, although they must have got my telegram plainly asking whether I was to continue to oppose him or not.

The telegram goes on to tell me that the Greeks were speaking of Prince William of Denmark, as if I did not know that! I had told Lord Russell long ago that his name would be well received, and in their present despair the Greeks would now receive it with enthusiasm; and if they would only ascertain in London that he would accept, and leave me to do the rest here, it would be simple enough. But what can I do upon such a telegram as I have just got, and how am I to answer the hundred and one people who come daily to ask about William of Baden?

March 19.—The son of a future King of Denmark, and brother of a future Queen of England, offers great attractions to the nation. A report was current that I had been ordered to recommend him, and the bare rumour certainly gave great satisfaction. In the provinces there is no doubt it would be warmly received, though at Athens some persons look grave at the prospect of a regency.

March 20.—This morning one of the Greek newspapers issued a supplement declaring that, upon the invitation of England, the French and English Governments had agreed to recommend the Greeks to elect Prince Louis of Bavaria. A great number of letters have been written from Paris in this sense, and one, which Boudouris told me he had seen, declared the

writer to have seen the instructions to Bourée which announce this. About breakfast-time I got a note from the editor of another newspaper telling me of this announcement, and asking if I could authorise him to contradict it, which, of course, I told him he might do in the most positive manner, and I understand that a few minutes later he published and circulated my answer all over the town. The people, however, were not to be easily satisfied, and they went to the printing office of the offending paper and broke the presses to pieces. Fortunately, they could not find the supposed authors of the article, for if they had been caught matters would have gone very hardly with them. The violent irritation produced this by report ought to help to make the Bavarians understand that it would be impossible to thrust them upon the Greeks by any means short of brute force.

March 23.—Have just got a telegram which would have raised my hopes high if I had not learned by experience not to give way too much to such feelings in this matter. It tells me that Her Majesty's Government hope to obtain the consent to the nomination of Prince William of Denmark from Prince and Princess Christian, with whom they are in communication. I am to state this to the Greek Government. I have told Mavrocordato, so that there will be an end to all secrecy about the matter. It is much better that there should be none, for, unless I am mistaken, as soon as it is known it will stop for a time all the intrigues that are going on.

March 24.—If it were not that *chien échaudé craint eau tiède* I should be cheery enough just now, for the name of the Prince has been admirably received. People began to come to see me before I had done breakfast, and at luncheon-time I had not five minutes without a visitor. One and all gave me the same story of the extreme satisfaction exhibited on almost

all sides. One of the newspapers had stupidly announced that Prince William is also supported by France, and I was, therefore, prepared to find Bourée in a state of agitation about it, but I did not expect him to be quite in the excitement in which he was when I called, and it would not surprise me to be told at any moment that he was out of his mind. This article in an unofficial paper where the Press is as free as it is in England is an offence that he cannot get over. What is to be thought of a country where the Government have no official paper in which such abominations can be contradicted ? He had called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs to deny the thing formally in the Assembly; but the Greeks were mad, absolutely mad—their whole proceedings about Prince Alfred showed that they were only fit for Bedlam. These and such-like were the ravings he poured out to me in the presence of others, but in spite of all provocation I did what I could to soothe him, and told him he would only succeed in giving an undue importance to the papers. He has not heard a word from his Government about either William of Baden or William of Denmark, but he will nevertheless work to the very utmost of his power against our man. He gives his own personal opinion strongly in favour of Baden, and tells people he cannot believe the Greeks will be such fools as to throw themselves into the arms of England, and at her bidding elect a “ child of fourteen.”

The Prince is in his eighteenth year.

March 25.—I have got a telegram very hostile to William of Baden, to whom Her Majesty's Government say the Ionian Islands could not be given up. I have told Bourée that Lord Cowley telegraphs that the Emperor cordially supported the Dane. As he had sent his people all over the town to deny the fact he will look rather foolish in having to acknowledge its truth. He pretends that I have no right to say a word

about the French, and that if Lord Cowley writes anything I am not to allude to it till he, Bourée, has a confirmation of it. I am afraid he must make up his mind to my telling just as much or as little of my despatches as I think proper, though, of course, he need not be guided by them.

March 27.—A newspaper of Russian tendencies was said to be inclined to make opposition to our Hamlet, upon which it was intimated to the editor that, if he did so, his house would certainly be pulled about his ears, and I believe the argument proved convincing. Such proceedings are not strictly correct, but they prove that the current is setting in the right way.

March 29.—The telegrams show an amusing unconsciousness at home of the state we are living in here. One of them tells me to communicate *confidentially* to the French and Russian Ministers that we think Prince William of Denmark a very good man for the throne.

Confidentially! when we have been talking of nothing else for the last five or six days. About half an hour after I had communicated it, by order, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs there were not ten people in Athens who did not know it; and it was well that it was known, as nothing else would have stopped the agents of Aumale, Baden, Anarchy and Company, all of whom were very busy for their respective objects. In a telegram to-day I am told that Aumale would not accept unless supported by Her Majesty's Government, and it has been intimated to him that Her Majesty's Government would strongly object to him.

March 30.—This has been a great day. At breakfast-time I received the telegram announcing the King of Denmark's consent. At eleven I communicated the news to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and before two Prince William was, by the unanimous acclamation of the Assembly, elected King of Greece under the name of George the First. When I saw Mavrocordato

I told him of the nature of the telegrams and what were the steps Her Majesty's Government thought it would be best to take, and I said that in three days the messenger would bring me written instructions, which would enable us better to see the way; for that at present we knew nothing beyond the fact that the King of Denmark had given his consent.

Mavrocordato went away from me with the intention of communicating this to his colleagues, and of preparing to have the election as soon as the messenger came in.

From me he went to the Council, to which he made known what I had received. The Council then desired their old President, Balbi, to communicate this information to the Assembly, which he did, but, when he had done so, he added: "Now, gentlemen, I have hitherto spoken as Minister, but you will allow me to add a few words as a simple member of the Assembly, and as an old man who has the good of his country at heart. As in one day we got rid of King Otho, why, in one day, should we not accomplish the election of his successor? An admirable choice has been suggested to us, and I propose that we should at once adopt him and elect him King." Hereupon there was an unanimous expression of assent; and in two minutes the thing was done. The Assembly passed a decree in three articles—the first declaring Prince Christian William Ferdinand Adolphus George King of the Greeks, under the title of George the First—the reason for this being that William is not a Greek name and is not to be found in the calendar; the second article laid down that his children are to be brought up in the Orthodox Greek Church; the third, that a deputation should be sent to offer him the Crown.

After that came orders for a thanksgiving in the cathedral, illuminations, etc., etc. The thing may, perhaps, have the appearance of having been done

lightly, but, when the ball was once set rolling, the public impatience was such that nothing could withstand it. When they went into the Assembly the Ministers had not the slightest idea that the election was going to be carried out then; but there was probably not a man in Athens who had not made up his mind that Prince William was to be elected, and, that being so, they all jumped to the conclusion that the sooner it was done the better. The wish to finish the matter quickly was increased by the knowledge of the tricks that were being played by various parties, and by Bourée among the number.

On Saturday evening Grivas went to him with several of his followers and told him they wished to know what he thought of the Danish candidateship, as they wanted to regulate their conduct accordingly. To this he replied that he had received instructions, conceived in very cold terms, informing him that the Emperor was favourable to it, and that, as Minister of France, he could not, of course, hold any other language; but that, as an individual and plain M. Bourée, he had no hesitation in saying he thought the choice most unfortunate, and that the Greeks who had the good of their country at heart ought with the utmost vigour to push forward Prince William of Baden, whose election the Emperor would certainly not object to. This was, of course, taken to imply that the Emperor had given a mere nominal approval, and really wished Baden pushed on, and the French party acted accordingly. The next day came his instructions to *support* the Dane, and as he was obliged to announce this publicly, the people he has been misleading are indignant with him, while he is the laughing-stock of the rest.

April 1.—I have this evening got a telegram from London in answer to the announcement of the election of the King. Her Majesty's Government are delighted, and Lord Russell says that my special mission

may now be considered terminated, and I may make my preparations for leaving Athens.

April 2.—Was there ever such a diplomatic shuttlecock as I am? This morning came a telegram saying it would be very useful that I should see Prince Christian, the new King's father, and asking if I could go to Copenhagen. Of course, I have answered that I am quite ready, and must rush away to the extreme north.

April 7.—My plans are again changed by another telegram from the Foreign Office telling me to come on to Paris by Turin as soon as I can. I am glad to go that way, but I don't like the hurried summons to Paris, which looks as if there were some hitch.

April 9.—My last day at Athens.

Corfu, April 12.—The letters brought by the messenger were not encouraging, and Lord Cowley* fairly says that he thinks we shall break down. It seems that the Danes insist on the abdication of King Otho as a necessary preliminary. At New Corinth the inhabitants turned out to do me honour, and a spokesman in French thanked England, and myself in particular, for all we had been doing for Greece. I received this flattering homage in an omnibus, screwing myself gracefully round to face the people, and then I thanked them in a dignified speech out of my omnibus window.

Paris, April 22.—Heard nothing about our Greek affairs till I got here four days ago, by which time things had begun to take a more cheerful look than they had before been doing; but it is plain that the whole thing had been within an ace of breaking down. The Danes seem to have put forward all kinds of absurd conditions.

The questions to be arranged are now reduced to one of pounds, shillings and pence, about which there

* Second Lord, afterwards the First Earl Cowley, then British Ambassador at Paris.

cannot be much difficulty; unless, indeed, the Royal Dane persists in requiring that a good revenue should be secured to him in the event of the Greeks getting tired of him as they did of Otho. To provide a retiring pension is a new feature in a Civil List.

When I saw Drouyn he betrayed a good deal of soreness and jealousy still remaining against the Greeks; and if the new King were to appoint an English Administration (which the Greeks were anxious for when I left Athens) it would excite great sensitiveness here.

I had had an interesting time at Athens, and not always an easy part to play, but it all ended well, and we have the satisfaction of knowing that the King, elected after so many difficulties and in such a strange manner, has not disappointed the hopes that were entertained of him.

CHAPTER VII

TURIN, 1863-1865

[In 1863 when Mr. Elliot reached Turin the state of Italy was still far from settled; Cavour had died in June 1861 worn out by the long strain, and although so much had been achieved patriotic Italians felt acute disappointment at their failure to complete the unification of Italy and proclaim Rome as the capital of the Kingdom. This failure was the source of considerable difficulties with regard to the choice of a capital. Turin was unsuitable for many reasons, racial as well as geographical, the sterner, sturdier northern Italians not being looked upon with much sympathy by their southern brethren. Florence was ultimately chosen as the most suitable capital for the newly constituted Kingdom, but, as was to be expected, the Piedmontese felt bitterly aggrieved at the loss of the Court, while the Florentines exhibited no enthusiasm at an honour which they realised would be only temporary.

After relating the events which took place at Turin on the transfer of the capital Mr. Elliot makes no allusion to the move to Florence, where in 1865 he installed the Legation in the Palazzo Boutourlin, a fine house in the Via dei Servi. He remained there throughout the summer of 1866, and witnessed the liberation of Venetia which, as he remarks, was secured to Italy by the success of her Prussian ally at Königgrätz, in spite of her own defeats at Custozza and Lissa.]

IN October 1863, about six months after my return from Greece, I was appointed Minister at Turin, which was at that time the seat of the Italian Government, and I found everything very quiet till about six months later, when there was an agitation that led to great results; for the Pope, Pius IX., fell into a state of health which led to the belief that his death would not long be delayed, when an attempt would certainly be made to assert the right of the Italians to Rome as

their capital; and as Rome was still occupied by a French Army, under an Emperor whose designs were always inscrutable, the Italian Government would find itself in a serious dilemma.

Moreover, although Italy had hitherto acquiesced in Turin provisionally remaining the capital, it had already caused so much discontent that a change of the seat of Government at no distant date was evidently indispensable, even if Rome was untenable.

In June 1864 I find myself writing that the question of the capital would set us all by the ears: "that Florence did not want to be capital even if the other parts of the country would agree to it; that Turin would not consent to Naples, and that Naples would never make up its mind to accept Turin as a permanency." Two months later I wrote that "everyone of any weight recognises that the country cannot go on indefinitely, or even long, in its present unsettled state, and what are the chances of getting out of it as long as France sets her face against it? The French agents everywhere declare themselves certain that the kingdom of Italy must break up, for they know as well as their master that he has only doggedly to persist in holding his present position in Rome in order to secure this result, unless, indeed, he were to fall out with Austria and help Italy to walk into Venetia, which would keep things quiet for a time, and then only for a time."

"The question of the capital will certainly become a very serious one before long. The Sicilians and Neapolitans will not continue to put up with Turin, and Turin is now every day growing so fast and creating such immense interests about the town that the Piedmontese party, which already does not like the thoughts of moving, becomes daily more and more persuaded that the present capital does very well and may continue to do so for ever."

I saw that the case was very urgent, but had no expectation that within a month we should see the conclusion of the famous Convention, which was not only to determine the removal of the capital from Turin that was so imperatively called for, but was to fix a term for the French occupation of Rome.

On September 16 I called upon Minghetti,* the Prime Minister, who at once began by saying that he had something of importance to communicate. He then told me that a Convention about Rome was on the point of being signed at Paris. That, as I was aware, negotiations had been going on, at first through the Marquis Pepoli, and afterwards through General Menabrea, Minister of Public Works, and that these had resulted in an agreement on the part of the Emperor to withdraw his troops from Rome in two years at furthest; while the King of Italy engages himself to respect the Papal territory, and neither to attack his Holiness nor to permit him to be attacked by bands of volunteers. He agrees to take upon the kingdom the portion of the Papal debt which may be calculated as belonging to those parts of the Papal States already annexed, and finally he declares that he will remove his capital from Turin to Florence.

When there had seemed to be an opening for recommencing a negotiation with regard to Rome, Minghetti determined, he said, to re-open it upon the same basis as that of the last proposals of Count Cavour, which were the same as those now obtained with the exception of the change of capital; but the Emperor, while showing every inclination to come to an agreement, said it was impossible for him now to accept the identical proposal he had refused to Count Cavour, and it was therefore necessary to find some means of appeasing the public opinion of France,

* Marco Minghetti, *b.* 1818, *d.* 1886, was the most distinguished of Cavour's followers and successors. Widely esteemed as a scholar as well as a courageous and successful statesman.

which is so strongly averse to the unconditional abandonment of the Pope. The Emperor first proposed that the French troops should leave Rome, keeping only an insignificant garrison at Civita Vecchia; but this Minghetti would not listen to, saying it made little difference to him whether the occupying troops consisted of a whole *corps d'armée*, or of a corporal's guard, for either of them represented the whole French army and nation. So that suggestion would not do. The next suggestion of the Emperor was that the King of Italy should solemnly bind himself to renounce for ever all intention of obtaining Rome as his capital. This again Minghetti would not consent to, but he then determined to endeavour to persuade the King to express his willingness to change his capital to Florence, if that would obtain the withdrawal of the French troops.

I am not, however, so sure when the King's assent was given, and do not feel clear that the question was submitted to him till it had been ascertained that on those conditions the Emperor would bind himself to withdraw his troops; but, however that may be, it cost the King an immense effort to consent to what is to him a very heavy sacrifice, and Minghetti spoke highly of the manner in which he made it.

He wished to put off the evil day as long as possible, and General Menabrea had been sent a second time to Paris to try to obtain the Emperor's consent to the transfer of the capital not taking place till two years after the withdrawal of the French troops; but this the Emperor would not agree to, and the Convention was finally settled as had been proposed.

The matter had been kept extraordinarily secret, and it was intended that it should remain so till the meeting of the Chambers, which were at once to be summoned. Indeed, I believe that Drouyn de Lhuys knew nothing about it till it was all cut and dry and the Convention nearly ready for his signature; and

it is certain that Malaret, the French Minister here, had heard nothing of it for two days after it was actually signed, and after I had announced it to my Government.

Minghetti did not disguise from himself the gravity of the act, but he is satisfied with himself and fully calculated on the approval of Lord Russell, who had lately nearly frightened Maffei (Italian Chargé d'Affaires in London) out of his propriety by saying to him that the best thing Italy could do would be to go to Florence, as it cannot get to Rome. I congratulated Minghetti heartily, feeling that a great step had been made in consolidating the Kingdom of Italy.


So far everything had been admirably conducted, but from this point there was mismanagement and a series of blunders.

It was not to be expected that the secret would remain long without oozing out, and it might have been foreseen that it would produce among the people of Turin an outburst of indignation against which precautionary measures were required; but none whatever were taken.

Strangely enough, the news was given by the semi-official newspaper *Opinione*, and, though for two days there was violent excitement and noisy demonstrations, still no steps were taken to have the means of preventing the further disturbances that seemed probable; and the whole force, in addition to the ordinary police, that the Government had to rely upon for keeping order consisted of three companies of the Line and a corps of "Elèves Carabiniers," a set of quite young men, almost boys, making between them a total of 1,300 men, the ordinary garrison being left at the manœuvres of S. Maurice.

Noisy mobs continued to parade through the streets without anything serious occurring till the evening of the third day, when the gendarmes, almost without provocation, and as was said without orders, fired upon

them and killed several, including some harmless spectators and women. This naturally increased the anger of the people, and the next day the demonstrations became more threatening, and, though the better classes did not actually take part in them, all nobles, manufacturers, and shopkeepers made no secret of their sympathies, but paid their workmen their wages and gave them a holiday that they might go into the streets. However, as by this time 18,000 troops had been brought into the town, there was ample means of



preventing any outbreak; but they were under the command of General Della Rocco, a Piedmontese by birth and in sympathy, who showed that he shared the discontent of his countrymen by never once appearing in the streets with his men; and he must be held responsible for the loss of life that occurred in the Piazza San Carlo on the evening of the 22nd, through the idiotic way in which the men were posted on three sides of the square, in the centre of which a disorderly crowd was making a hostile demonstration against the Questura, in front of which were posted the gendarmes,

who, without waiting to be attacked, fired upon the people; and as, of course, their bullets fell among the soldiers along one of the sides, these, fancying themselves attacked, returned the fire and killed, in addition to rioters in the centre, several of their comrades posted opposite.

I was on the spot a very few minutes later and before the dead had been removed, but I could never learn the number killed, though there certainly were a good many, and not one of them by the people, who did not use firearms, or, indeed, any arms at all. It was a thoroughly disgraceful business, but there was no more serious disturbance.

The next day Minghetti told me that the King had just dismissed him and his colleagues. His Majesty had hinted that he would like them to resign; but this Minghetti positively refused to do, saying he was quite ready to carry through what he had begun, and that it should not be said that he ran away before difficulties which he felt perfectly confident of meeting; that if His Majesty chose to exercise his constitutional right of dismissing his Ministers, he could, of course, do so, but the act must be his own. Thereupon the King asked for the seals, and General Lamarmora, who, though a Piedmontese was favourable to the Convention, was appointed. He endeavoured to get Ricasoli to join his Government, but the great Florentine baron would not do so, although he entirely approved of the Convention and of the transfer of the capital; regretting it, however, for the sake of Florence, which will have to go through the same fate as Turin when it is ultimately moved to Rome. Ricasoli also called the late events at Turin "Providential," as being all that was required to render all Italy unanimously favourable to the Convention.

The ill-humour of the Turinese did not pass quickly over, and for many months afterwards they did not

scruple to exhibit their resentment against the King and the French for the Convention they had signed, in which their interests had been subordinated to those of the rest of Italy; and in the course of the winter they had an opportunity of showing how general this feeling was from among the highest nobility down to the lowest of the working classes. During the Carnival, on the occasion of a ball given by the King an immense crowd collected near the Palace with the object of deterring people from going to it. They did not interfere with us, and when our coachman driving a pair of spirited English horses drove smartly on, the crowd opened and we had no difficulty; but the carriage of the French Minister and his wife had the windows smashed before they got through. The great ball-room was a curious sight, for it was nearly empty, and all the places at the upper end reserved for the great people were vacant; and, to prevent the part where the King was to be from being entirely deserted, persons from among the few who were at the lower end of the room, and who had no social standing, had to be brought up to make a show. Excepting those obliged by their official position, there were literally none of the good Turinese families.

Another demonstration of the same kind was made at a ball given at the French Legation, at which also no one attended; and, to make the abstention more marked, at a ball we gave a few days later there was hardly a person invited who did not put in an appearance. The intention of being offensive to our French colleague was so marked that we did not choose that it should be repeated, and found some pretext for putting off a second ball for which the invitations were already out; but, although the ill-humour of the Turinese continued undiminished, they allowed the transfer of the capital to be carried out during the summer without any further disturbance.

In June of the following year, 1866, the war of Prussia and Italy against Austria broke out, and in very few weeks ended with vast results to both of the allies, although with little glory to the Italians. At Custoza the Austrians obtained a complete victory over their army under Cialdini, while off Lissa,* Admiral Tegethoff, with his wooden ships, inflicted a shameful defeat upon their ironclads commanded by Persano, who, by a well-merited though mild sentence of a court-martial, was dismissed from the Service and deprived of his decorations. But the success of her Prussian ally at Königgrätz secured for Italy all she could have hoped for from the most brilliant victory of her own, for it obliged the Austrians to withdraw their troops from Venetia, which they made over to the Emperor Napoleon, who passed it on to King Victor Emmanuel, whose kingdom then comprised the whole of Italy with the sole exception of Rome and the small portion of the Papal States that had been left to the Pope.

* July 20, 1866.

CHAPTER VIII

TURKEY—I., 1867–1876

[When Mr. Elliot succeeded Lord Lyons at Constantinople in 1867 the condition of Turkey was apparently prosperous. Quiet reigned in the provinces, with the exception of Crete, where a serious rebellion had broken out; the hardy independent islanders had never been fully conquered by the Turks, and secret assistance from Greece enabled them to hold out until the blockade of the island by the Turkish fleet allowed Omar Pasha to subdue them for the time being. Under the enlightened rule of Aali, Fuad* and Midhat† Pashas Turkey had made substantial progress since the Crimean War, progress far less rapid than that of Western Europe, but yet sufficient to justify the hope that the country had entered on the upward path. How these hopes came to be disappointed will be shown in the following pages, but attention may at once be drawn to two points which certainly contributed materially to the rapid disintegration of the Empire.

The first in order of events was the emancipation of the Bulgarian Church from the authority of the Greek Patriarch. To most readers this will probably appear a purely theological question, but it is not so, doctrine has nothing to do with it. The status of the Greek Patriarch at the Porte was a recognised and a high one, he was consulted on points touching his community and his power over his flock was considerable. Advantage of this position was taken by the Patriarchs, who were mostly of Greek birth, to introduce the Greek language into the Bulgarian liturgy. Greek priests received promotion, and Greek culture began to supersede Slavonic ideas and literature. The bitterness engendered by these usurpations of power on the part of the Patriarchate was so intense that a section of the Bulgarian Christians even contemplated union with Rome as a method of emancipation from the rule of the Phanar.‡ At length the Porte interfered in the quarrel, and

* See note, p. 184.

† See note, p. 227.

‡ The name of the Greek quarter on the Stamboul side of the Golden Horn, specially allotted after the fall of Constantinople.

in 1870 issued a firman establishing an Exarchate in Bulgaria, though the election of the first Exarch did not take place until 1872. Nationalist feeling in Bulgaria received an immense stimulus from this triumph of the Slavonic over the Greek element in the Church, and General Ignatiew, who had throughout encouraged the disaffection of the Bulgarians towards the Greek influence in their Church, was not slow to take advantage of the situation. Henceforth Slavonic rather than Greek culture became the rule, and an undercurrent of unrest disturbed the otherwise prosperous province.

The second point to which allusion has been made is that of the repudiation of the Turkish Debt. This discreditable transaction was brought about in 1875 by the Grand Vizier Mahmoud Nedim Pasha, a man so completely dominated by General Ignatiew that he was known in Turkish circles as "Mahmoudoff." There can be little doubt that the dishonest repudiation of her debts contributed to alienate all sympathy from Turkey, and added to the violence of the outcry occasioned by the "Bulgarian Atrocities."

The Russian point of view in regard to the state of the Balkans in 1875 is well summed up by M. Nekludoff in his *Diplomatic Reminiscences*, p. 40. "Balkan troubles begin in 1875 with the Herzegovinian insurrection, secretly supported, if not actually fomented, by Austria. The Emperor Alexander II. and Russian public opinion wish to obliterate completely the recollection of the Crimean campaign, to cover the Russian arms with new glory, and especially to resume the illustrious part of Defenders of the Christian Faith in the East. The influence of the aged Prince Gortchakoff, who opposes these projects, is definitely on the wane, and the Emperor frames his own policy—allowing for that of his Chancellor—with his Ambassadors, Ignatiew in Constantinople, Count Peter Schuvaloff in London, and M. Novikoff in Vienna. Disorders break out in Bulgaria followed by massacres, horrible as ever, but this time exaggerated rather than suppressed by the Press and European diplomacy. A palace revolution in Constantinople and a heated struggle for in-

The Patriarchate and the residences of the principal Greek families were situated there, and although by the middle of the nineteenth century most of the wealthy Greeks had migrated to Pera, where the Embassies and the abodes of foreign residents are situated, the name *Phanariote* continued in use to designate the descendants of the Byzantine families in distinction from later immigrants.

fluence between the Embassies of Russia and Great Britain. Serbo-Turkish war and enormous enthusiasm in Russia for the Serbian cause, which is completely mistaken for the whole Slav cause. Conference at Reichstadt, at which, in order to guarantee the neutrality, or even under certain conditions the co-operation of Austria in a war in the East which we feel to be imminent, we consent beforehand to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and even the Sanjak of Novibazar; in other words, we leave Serbia herself within the sphere of Austro-Hungarian influence. Hence the absolute necessity for our policy to found a new autonomous Slav State in the Balkans which would constitute a sphere for Russian influence."

That the Principalities of Servia and Roumania were practically independent was hardly realized in 1875 by the general public in England. Autonomy had been granted to Servia in 1830, the Turks still retaining garrisons in the fortresses. In March 1867, these garrisons were withdrawn on the advice of England, and as regards the internal affairs of the country independence under the Obrenovich dynasty was complete. The risings in Herzegovina and Bosnia, the war with Montenegro, and the revolt in Bulgaria, as well as the secret promptings from Russia, brought about the Servian declaration of war against Turkey in 1875, and the unexpected victories gained by the Turks entailed the ultimate declaration of war by Russia after the abortive Conference at Constantinople.

The case of Roumania was somewhat different. The Voivodes and Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia had been alternately friends and foes of Turkey, often furnishing contingents to the Ottoman forces in their invasions of Hungary, and these provinces were never completely dominated. In 1829 at the Peace of Adrianople, the Turks undertook to refrain from erecting any fortifications on the Wallachian side of the Danube, and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 guaranteed all the existing privileges and the complete independence of the country with regard to internal administration, though a nominal suzerainty was maintained by the Sultan. So nominal was this suzerainty that good friends of Turkey repeatedly urged the Porte to grant the Prince of Roumania complete independent sovereignty before war was declared by Russia, who would in that case be forced to violate the territory of a neutral country in order to invade Turkey in Europe by land, while any pretext for Roumania to enter the lists would be removed.]

I WAS made Ambassador to Turkey in 1867, just before the Sultan Abdul Aziz's visit to France and England, which was memorable as being the first that a Turkish Sultan had ever paid to a foreign Sovereign.

He was well satisfied with his reception in London, but very indignant at the manner he had been treated by the Emperor Napoleon at Paris, where the Great Exhibition was being held, which was given out as the chief inducement for his visit to Europe. He was accompanied by Fuad Pasha,* his Minister for Foreign Affairs, an exceptionally able man and astute statesman, who officiated as his principal interpreter.

A formidable insurrection in Crete was then at its height, and one fine day the Emperor in a conversation with the Sultan, suddenly and without preamble, suggested to him that the best thing he could do would be to make over the island to the Greeks, by whom the insurrection had been fomented and was kept alive, and the wrath that this proposal produced in the Sultan's mind can easily be imagined; but he smothered his indignation for the moment, only desiring Fuad Pasha to make a suitable reply, which the latter did by telling the Emperor that the Sultan said that his subjects would not understand it if they found that their Sovereign, after going to Paris to see all the marvellous inventions in the Exhibition, returned to Constantinople with an instrument for lopping off one of his own provinces.

When the interview between the two Sovereigns was over, however, and the Sultan had got back to his apartment, his rage broke out with fury: he would not stay a day in Paris after being subjected to such an

* B. 1815. Began life as an Army surgeon; entered the civil service in 1836, and served at various diplomatic posts; attended the Paris Conference in 1856, and was five times Minister for Foreign Affairs. Accompanied Sultan Abdul Aziz to Paris and London, but was disgraced on his return to Turkey, and died in 1869. Was noted for his wit and readiness in repartee, and for his liberal and pro-English sentiments.

insult; it was impossible for him to suppose that the Emperor could have made such a proposal without some encouragement from Fuad Pasha, who was a traitor and must be instantly dismissed, and he telegraphed to this effect to Aali Pasha,* the Grand Vizier at Constantinople.

Aali in reply entreated his Imperial Master not to do anything to cause a public scandal likely to create a misunderstanding with France, but when he got back to Constantinople he could deal with Fuad as he thought proper; and the Sultan allowed the affair to blow over, not even dismissing Fuad on his return to Turkey, though he never afterwards regarded him with favour.

When I arrived in Turkey in the autumn of 1867, the insurrection in Crete had been going on for a year and a half, kept alive, as I have said, by the assistance received by the insurgents from Greece, and also from the Russian man-of-war cruisers. The Greek Government openly encouraged the enrolment of large bodies of volunteers from all parts of Greece, who were equipped, armed, and furnished with supplies of all kinds, and conveyed to Crete in fast steamers, which ran the Turkish blockade, and one of these blockade-runners even belonged to the Greek Government. The prison doors were opened to the brigands and other criminals confined in them on condition of their going to Crete to join the insurgents; and then it was that the Greek Minister, on being reproached for having liberated some notorious malefactors, excused himself by the famous declaration that it was sometimes "difficult to distinguish between the brigands and patriots," and it was some of the "patriots" thus

* B. 1815. Was five times Grand Vizier; Regent of Turkey in 1867 during the Sultan's visit to France and England. A zealous reformer, he was disgraced in 1870 through the influence of General Ignatiew and replaced by the venal and retrograde Mahmoud Nedim. He died in 1871.

released who perpetrated the murder of Herbert, Vyner, and their companions at Marathon.

The insurgents had been driven to mountain fastnesses, from which it was difficult to dislodge them, but where they could not long have maintained themselves if provisions had not been sent to them from abroad. Even as it was they were hardly pressed for food, and would have had to give in if the Russian ships of war had not come to their help, both secretly by furnishing them with supplies and openly by reducing the number of mouths to be fed, by carrying away the women and children, the old men and other non-combatants, who, to the number of some thousands, were maintained near Athens at the public cost.

In the course of a conversation one day with Aali Pasha, the Grand Vizier, when he had been expatiating on the perfectly open and undisguised assistance the Greek Government were giving to the insurgents, I let drop the remark that I wondered he continued to tolerate it.

He fixed his wonderfully expressive great eyes upon me for a moment, and then asked me what my Government would say if he took steps to recall the Greeks to their international obligations; and my answer was that I did not know what my Government might say, but I did know that their Ambassador would tell them that, in his opinion, the Porte was fully justified in adopting measures to put a stop to what was going on.

Nothing more was then said, but in a few days it was announced that, unless the Greek Government promised to behave better, their Minister at Constantinople would have his passports sent to him, and all the Greeks in Turkey told to leave the country; at the same time Admiral Hobart Pasha* was to go to

* The Hon. Augustus Charles Hobart Hampden, third son of the sixth Earl of Buckinghamshire, *b.* 1822, *d.* 1886. Author of

Crete with a strong squadron to see that the Greek cruisers observed a proper neutrality.

This led to the first of my passages of arms with General Ignatiew,* of which we had afterwards so many; the Greek Minister (Delyanni) came to me to ask my advice, saying that the Russian Ambassador was recommending him to disregard the menace of the Turkish Government, which was a mere piece of bluster that need not disturb him: what did I think about it?

I said that my opinion differed entirely from that of the General; that I was convinced the Porte would act as it said, and, if he did not wish to see the threatened measures carried out, he would do well to lose no time in advising his Government to observe the neutrality they were at present so openly violating.

Unluckily for him and for the Greeks, he took General Ignatiew's advice, and when his passports were sent to him he came to me complaining bitterly of having been so much deluded by the General, and by finding that the Porte was so universally considered

Never Caught, an autobiographical story of blockade running in the American Civil War. Entered the Royal Navy in 1836, and eventually the Turkish Navy. Was raised to the rank of Pasha and made Admiral of the Turkish fleet for his services during the Cretan rising; his name was then removed from the British Navy List, but was afterwards restored. He commanded the Ottoman fleet against Russia in 1878, when his name was again struck off by the British Admiralty only to be replaced a second time.

* Nicolaus Pavlovitch Ignatiew, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, was born in 1832; first distinguished himself in China during the unquiet years between 1856 and 1864, and succeeded in obtaining from China many concessions to Russia. Was appointed to Constantinople in 1864, and remained there until the break-up of the Conference in December 1876. By his thorough knowledge of Orientals, combined with remarkable ability and unscrupulousness, he gained great influence at the Porte, though known by the public as the "Father of Lies," and greatly disliked by the Liberal elements in both Turkish and Greek circles. In 1881 he succeeded Loris Melikoff as Minister of the Interior, but failing signally in that capacity, was dismissed by the Czar and died in obscurity.

justified in the course it was adopting that not a single Government raised a voice to protest against it. General Ignatiew, however, did his best to prevent the departure of Admiral Hobart Pasha to the Turkish squadron at Crete, but was amusingly baffled by the Admiral.

Hobart, who had been a successful blockade-runner under the name of Captain Roberts in the American Secession War, and had published an account of his adventures in a little volume with the title of *Never Caught*; he had made a good deal of money by his venture, and took it to St. Petersburg, where he put his gains into some Russian speculation which turned out so disastrously that he had to make a hurried retreat from the country, leaving, it was said, large debts behind him; and he then came to Constantinople, where he contrived to get himself appointed to command the Turkish fleet.

Ignatiew, hearing that he was about to start to watch the Greek cruisers, and being anxious to hinder him, bethought himself of the Russian debts, and an application to detain him to answer for them was made to our Consulate; but Hobart, getting wind of it, immediately sailed, after leaving a card on the Russian Ambassador along with a copy of his *Never Caught*. So at least ran the story, which, whether true or imaginary, was universally believed and caused much amusement.

The effect of the sudden energy of the Porte was instantaneous and complete. The Greek Government became convinced that the patience of the Porte was exhausted, and that it could no longer be trifled with, and also that no other Government was inclined to take their part in a quarrel in which they were so manifestly in the wrong. The assistance from outside being cut off, the insurgents at once threw up the game: the native Cretans went back to their usual occupations, and the foreign volunteers left the island, which within a fortnight was restored to perfect tranquillity.

An insurrection that without foreign assistance could not possibly lead to anything but suffering and loss of life, which had lasted above a year, subsided at once when it was found that the European Governments would keep their "hands off"; and the lesson the Greeks had got led to the establishment of better relations between them and Turkey than had prevailed for many years, to the very great chagrin of General Ignatiew, who was never happy except when trouble was brewing which he could put his finger into; and he had to wait eight years before the time came in which he could distinguish himself in the field of intrigue in which he delighted and for which he was so admirably fitted.

In the autumn of 1869 I was sent to Egypt for the solemn opening of the Suez Canal, at which many countries had more exalted representatives, such as the Empress Eugénie for France, the Emperor Francis Joseph for Austria-Hungary, and Prince Henry of the Netherlands for Holland.

The canal, which has proved of so vast a benefit to England, had been conceived by Lesseps under the conviction that it would deal a fatal blow to our carrying trade with India and China, and that Marseilles would replace London as the *entrepôt* of the world for all Eastern produce. He went about France enlarging upon this theme, and the subscriptions he got from his countrymen were given under the impression of the injury the canal would do to a rival whom many of them hated, and of whom all of them were jealous.

Lord Palmerston's ill-judged opposition to the scheme only stimulated the anxiety of the French to carry it out. When it was completed, they and Lesseps in particular had a right to exult in the triumph over what was universally considered the selfish policy of England in opposing a magnificent work for advancing the commerce of the world.

The Khedive Ismail Pasha had always relied upon the French in his efforts to shake off the authority of the Porte, which, under existing arrangements, had in some degree restricted his extravagance by limiting the amount of his military and naval forces, and by denying him the right of contracting foreign loans without the sanction of the Sultan; and with the encouragement of France—to his own ultimate ruin, as was afterwards proved—he succeeded in getting many of the restrictions removed. When he found himself free to contract loans as he thought proper there was no limit to his extravagance, and the public debt, which was to a large extent held in France, increased so rapidly that the clamour of the French bondholders, who found their investments imperilled by the inability of Egypt to pay their dividends, brought about the interference of their Government, which culminated in June 1879 in the deposition of the Khedive, their former spoilt child.

He knew that he could not achieve the independence of the Sultan at which he was aiming without the countenance of France, and he expended fabulous sums in order to secure it. There was hardly a newspaper in Paris that was not largely subsidised, and all the men such as De Morny, Fleury, and others who were supposed to possess the ear of the Emperor received enormous and regularly paid stipends, of which after the fall of the Empire I obtained the details from the Khedive's own Ministers; but, large as these sums were, they sank into insignificance when compared with what he was induced to give for the furtherance of the pet French scheme of the Suez Canal.

He was far too acute not to be aware that it could be of no possible utility to Egypt, and was likely to prove very much the reverse; for while it opened no new outlet for the trade of the country, which already passed to and from Europe by Alexandria, and to and

from India and China by Suez, all that Egypt gained by the transit trade would be inevitably lost.

Before the canal was made the steamers brought their passengers and cargoes to Alexandria and Suez, which had to pass thence by rail through Egypt for transhipment, to the great benefit of the country; and our troops to and from India were conveyed by large troop-ships, which remained long and spent much in the Egyptian ports, while the men were forwarded by rail. But when the canal was made all this came to an end. The transit trade no doubt increased enormously, but all benefit from it to Egypt ceased, for it passed through the canal without discharging passengers or goods and without the employment of an Egyptian workman.

Ismail Pasha must have foreseen all this, but he was ready to pay anything to realise his dream of independence, which he could not hope for without the support of France; and this he endeavoured to purchase by lavish contributions to the canal scheme.

A pamphlet published soon after the opening, under the title of *Ce que coûte à l'Egypte le Canal de Suez*, went into an elaborate calculation of what the cost of it had been, placing it at four hundred millions of francs, to which must be added some forty or fifty millions more expended on the opening ceremonies, the whole amounting to a sum which largely contributed to the bankruptcy and consequent deposition of Ismail Pasha.

Those who witnessed the scale of the Oriental magnificence with which these opening ceremonies were conducted could feel no surprise on learning what the cost of them had been. Many thousand guests from all parts of the world were invited and entertained at the Khedive's expense; large steamers were chartered to convey them through the canal; houses and lodgings were hired for them at Cairo, where they lived luxuriously at free quarters; a huge

palace was erected in the desert near the Bitter Lakes, and balls and festivities given in it; the best orchestras, singers, and actors were brought from the European theatres at enormous salaries, and the dresses supplied not only to the leading stars but to everyone who figured in the pieces were of the finest possible material without the slightest regard to cost, and the representations were in all respects more perfect than I have ever seen elsewhere. The newspaper correspondents were there in shoals, and they, as well as the innumerable private visitors who were the recipients of this splendid hospitality, returned to their own countries proclaiming Ismail Pasha the most enlightened of rulers, and declaring that if he could be made Sultan at Constantinople it would be the salvation of the Turkish Empire.

But even to those who did not view things through these deceptive spectacles the opening ceremonies were in the highest degree striking and interesting. They commenced with a picturesque religious ceremony on the sands near Port Said, where were collected the fleet of steamers which were to convey the foreign representatives and the invited guests through the canal, and these formed a long and imposing procession, headed by the Empress Eugénie in the beautiful yacht *L'Aigle*; then the Emperor of Austria and the other representatives according to their respective ranks. They halted for the night at the Bitter Lakes, where a ball was given in the new Aladdin Palace, which had suddenly sprung into existence at Ismailia, and proceeded the next day to Suez, whence the company made their way to Cairo to take part in the festivities prepared for them there.

Everything had gone off without a hitch of any kind, and old Lesseps was in his glory, exulting with justifiable pride in the accomplishment of a magnificent work carried out under immense difficulties, and above all rejoicing in the blow he believed himself to have

inflicted on *la perfide Albion*. His triumph would have been embittered if he had surmised that it was *la perfide Albion* alone which was to reap the benefit of his labours, and that France would gain nothing by them; but he was disturbed by no such distressing foreboding, and he determined still further to celebrate the occasion by marrying a second wife, and the ceremony took place in the presence of his sons and of his grandchildren three days after the opening.

Poor old man—though he was no friend of ours and we have no call to feel grateful to him for a benefit he unwittingly did us, he is not to be blamed for his wish to transfer the trade of the East from us to his own country; and the indomitable determination that he showed from first to last must be admired, even though it was accompanied by a perfect disregard of human suffering. He obtained from the Khedive whole armies of Fellahs to work as forced labourers on the canal; and when the cholera broke out among them, and they were dying like flies in their hundreds and thousands, overworked and underfed, they were ruthlessly kept to their tasks, till at last, in spite of Lesseps' resistance, the protests of our Government against the continuance of this barbarous system obliged the Khedive to withdraw the privilege, for which under an award of the Emperor Napoleon, to whom the matter was referred, he had to pay a sum of no less than three millions sterling to the canal company as a compensation for the loss of the forced labour he had promised.

From Egypt we went to England on leave, and had hardly returned to Constantinople when there was the great fire that burnt the Embassy along with two-thirds of Pera. Even in that land of great fires there never had been one at once so extensive and destructive and that had completed its havoc in so short a space of time, or that had been accompanied by so great a loss of life; for, though the great fire at

Stamboul some ten or twelve years before may have extended over nearly as large an area and burnt nearly as many houses, it took three days to complete its work, while at Pera it began in the forenoon and was over long before midnight, having in that short time consumed everything that lay in its line of march, the Embassy having been one of the last houses to take fire.

We were at luncheon on June 6, 1870, when it was reported that a fire had broken out in a suburb of Pera, and on going to an upper window I saw that it was about half a mile distant; but as I observed that the wind, which nearly amounted to a gale, set straight down upon us, with nothing but wooden houses between us and the fire, I at once ordered the iron shutters with which the windows were fitted to be closed, and our three fire-engines to be got out and placed near the tanks. I knew them to be in perfect working order, as I had myself seen them tried a few days before, and in spite of being well laughed at for taking such precautions against what was thought an altogether imaginary danger, I sent down to our *stationnaire*, the *Antelope*, for a body of seamen to be ready to help in case of need; and it was not very long before it was evident that their services were likely to be required, for the fire spread and approached us with marvellous rapidity.

There was probably no one who could see as much of its course as my wife, for, while I had to be everywhere organising our resistance, she, after helping my daughter, her governess, and the maids to fill baths with water in every room on the side of the fire, stationed herself at an upper window which commanded a complete view of what was going on. After a time she saw the fire breaking out in one place after another at some distance from the main conflagration. Blazing planks from the wooden houses were carried by the wind over the roofs of the houses nearest to the fire,

and first a little puff of smoke would be seen where the planks fell, and then a blaze and a fresh fire, cutting off the retreat of the people in the intermediate houses, which explained the large number that perished.

There were about forty yards between the Embassy and the nearest row of houses, and we hoped that the distance would save us; but the draught caused by the fire made the wind blow with almost hurricane violence, and when those caught fire great tongues of flame blew right up to us across the intervening space, till we were very much as if we had been at the mouth of a blast-furnace, and inside the iron shutters the glass of the windows became so hot that I could not bear my hand on it. Some of the *Antelope's* men had been stationed on the roof where they once put out a fire that had taken under the slates, and when I went up there I found them working in a scorching heat, stifled with smoke and in a rain of burning cinders, against which they had no fireman's dress to protect them, and I was not surprised when soon after they sent to tell me they could not stand it any longer. But I knew then that if any part of the roof were again to take fire nothing could save the house, and we were not long kept in suspense; for it did catch, and then almost instantaneously it was in a blaze from one end to the other, as it was all heated to such an extent that when once lighted the fire ran like a train of gunpowder.

I fortunately happened at the moment to be on the upper floor, where our bedrooms were, for it is certain that if I had not been there neither my wife, nor my daughter, nor the governess would ever have got down, as they would not believe that there could be any immediate danger; but I had seen the frightful rapidity of the approach of the flames and knew that there was no time to be lost. I told them to make a bundle of what they could carry in their arms but not to attempt to save anything else, and I had almost

to drag them away by force, as there was much they were loth to lose. I am sure that I did not allow them more than two minutes, but we were none too soon in making our escape, for two of the three staircases were already impassable, the melted lead pouring down them like rain, and in the other, down which we went, the smoke was so thick that we could not see the steps on which we put our feet; but all got safe to the garden, where, though the heat was intense, the house was a protection against the hot cinders that were flying from the burning wooden buildings.

Nothing then remained but to try to save all that could be got out of the state apartments and living-rooms, and in this we were very successful, as before the fire reached that floor there was time to carry down most of what was at all movable—furniture, books, pictures, etc.—though much of it was of course damaged and a great deal was carried off by the thieves and pilferers who had managed to get into the garden; but there was not a change of clothes left to any one of our party.

The archives of the Embassy were in vaulted rooms on the ground floor and were saved, and not a public document was lost, but all my own private papers were burnt, and I still have to deplore the whole of my correspondence with the different Ministers under whom I had served, sometimes at very interesting moments. It would have been easy for us to save every article belonging to us if we had begun to remove them as soon as the danger became apparent, though, as the day was Sunday, we had fewer people than usual about the place.

In a letter to Hammond, the Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, I wrote: “Lady Elliot, our little girl, her governess, and the maids were on the bedroom floor, and after filling every bath, jug, and basin, kept on the look-out that the insidious enemy should not slip in unawares, and on one occasion they did detect

and suppress him. When, however, the fight was over they had not prepared an article of their own for removal, and so the whole was lost. Do not imagine that I regret it, for, though we were beaten, we had the consciousness of having done everything we could, and we should not have this feeling if any of us had been engaged upon our private property. The fact of the matter is, that when I think that if I had not myself been at that moment on the bedroom floor, and remember that neither Lady Elliot nor my daughter would ever have come down, I look upon their losses and my own with most complete indifference."

We had the satisfaction of receiving very complimentary acknowledgments from the Government and their thanks, in which my wife was included, for our efforts to save the public property; and Lord Clarendon, in one of the last letters he ever wrote, enclosed a few most flattering lines from the Queen. He was dead before it reached me.

The scene in the garden, where we had taken refuge after being driven out of the house, was a curious one; for there were piles of furniture and chattels of all sorts surrounded by crowds of people, of whom some were sympathisers and others were pilferers, whom it was difficult to prevent from exercising their calling, and who had climbed in with no praiseworthy designs.

In the old Turkish cemetery called the "Petit Champ," just below the Embassy, one could see innumerable groups of the houseless people, who, with the bundles containing all that remained of their property, had established themselves under the cypress trees for the night—Christian groups and Mahometan groups—all no doubt in deep despair, but giving no vent to noisy wailing and lamentation.

When nothing more could be done to save the house, the engines were withdrawn for the protection of the stables and laundries, which stood at some little distance,

and their success in that quarter stopped the progress of the fire in a direction where if it had once got a hold it would have had a much greater extension.

It had been a puzzle to know what to do with the horses, for the chance of saving the stables seemed very remote, and it was not easy to get them out into the glaring light of the fire; but one high-couraged and bold old English horse consented to lead the way, and the others all followed. Even when they were in the garden the difficulty was not over, for the main entrance was not passable, and in the garden they would soon have been driven wild by the glare and the rain of burning cinders; but there was fortunately a narrow foot gate opening into a street away from the fire, and through this it was possible to squeeze them, and I desired that they should be taken to Therapia, about twelve miles off. I had to borrow some bluejackets to help the grooms to take them down, but there was no difficulty in obtaining volunteers for a night ride, during which there must have been some amusing scenes, as the sailors tumbled off half a dozen times.

At last, when there was nothing more to be done, after leaving a guard over the things lying in the garden we made rather a mournful procession down to the *Antelope*, to pass the night, and there we found ourselves with nothing but the clothes we stood in.

My wife had carried off her brush and comb, which had to do duty the next morning for the sole toilet of the whole party; but everyone bore the inconveniences with astonishing cheerfulness, for we all of us felt that of all who were burnt out, none were as well off as ourselves in having another good house ready to receive us at Therapia; and, although the nuisance of being without clothes and a hundred indispensable articles was great, it was one rather to laugh at than to be unhappy about. The things that one regretted the most were not so much those of real value as trifles that one was attached to, and which we con-

tinued to miss for many a long day; but, though we could and did laugh at our own discomforts cheerily enough, the destruction of the Embassy itself left us with very sore hearts.

I had received civil messages of condolence from the Sultan, who wished to put at our disposal the palace in which he had lodged the Prince and Princess of Wales, but which was occupied by one of his sisters who was unwilling to vacate it, and the Government telegraphed to me to convey their acknowledgments to His Majesty; so I went in my dirty shooting jacket to the Palace and delivered my message to the Head Chamberlain, explaining that I was not in a fit costume to ask to deliver it in person. The Sultan, however, insisted that I should come up as I was, and asked minutely about all that had occurred, finishing by expressing his hope that "my harem" had not suffered. It sounded rather strange to English ears, but it would have been the height of indelicacy if he had said that he hoped my wife had not suffered, for a Turk may never speak to another man about his wife, and must confine himself to asking about the "harem," which only means the whole of the female part of the establishment, and not at all what is generally supposed in England. If you know that the wife of one of your friends is ill, you may say that you understand that there has been sickness in his family, and that you hope it is disappearing, but there you must stop.

The number of persons who perished in this fire was never even approximately ascertained, but it certainly greatly exceeded that on any previous occasion, and after collecting all the particulars I could I was satisfied that it was considerably above a thousand, owing to the unheard-of rapidity with which it spread, and which took everyone by surprise. When the fire was advancing towards them from the side on which it broke out the people clung to their houses, from which

they tried to remove their property, without being aware that the fire had leapt over them and had lighted others in their rear; and whole streets thus suddenly found themselves enveloped in a blazing circle from which there was no escape. Another cause of many deaths was the absurd belief that there was no danger in a brick or stone house; for wherever there were any of these in a wooden quarter numbers of people took refuge in them and shut themselves up, thinking they might remain there in safety till the wooden houses round them were burnt out, and of course all of them perished.

There was also another class of persons of whom very many were burnt without being much regretted, and these were the thieves, who as soon as a house was deserted, and even before, rushed in to secure such plunder as they could lay hands on, and were so intent upon making their harvest that they often got caught before they could effect their escape; and some notion may be formed of their numbers by the fact that on the morning after the fire some seventy caiques were found to be without caikjees, or boatmen, who were notorious as being thieves, and had undoubtedly paid the penalty of their misdeeds. They were quite open in their depredations, and some of them even went the length of trying to carry off our things as they were being taken down to the steamer by our own people.

Quite close to the wall of the Embassy garden there was a sort of private hospital for children, the whole of whom, thirteen in number, were burnt, together with the two nurses, who would not abandon their charge; and stories of that kind were numerous, as well as of some very gallant rescues, and also some with a mixture of the tragical and ludicrous. One woman with a bundle in her arms met a friend who asked her what she had done with her child, and then discovered to her horror that she was carefully nursing

a parcel of silver. The practice of the poorer people on the approach of a fire was to throw their valuables into their well, going back afterwards to fish them out, and this poor woman, rushing out of her house half distracted, with her baby in one arm and a bundle of silver in the other, had thrown the baby into the well and continued her flight without discovering her mistake.

The Government behaved very liberally in granting us all—ourselves, the gentlemen of the Embassy, and our servants—a fair compensation for our losses, though of course it did not nearly cover them, and there was much besides for which no compensation was possible. They also lost no time in beginning the restoration of the house, of which the walls had not materially suffered, and we again inhabited it before we left Constantinople.

CHAPTER IX

TURKEY—II.: THE DREI-KAISER BUND

THE troubles which came upon Turkey, beginning with the Herzegovinian insurrection in 1875, and followed by the wars with Servia and Montenegro, the rising in Bulgaria with its bloody repression, the unfortunate Conference of Constantinople, and the disastrous war with Russia—were, beyond all question, attributable to the once famous, though now almost forgotten, Drei-Kaiser Bund, or league for common action between the Governments of the three Northern Empires.

The effect of it was to secure for Russia the whole weight of Austria in pursuing her traditional policy of weakening and embarrassing Turkey, although this was far from being contemplated or intended by the man then at the head of the Austro-Hungarian Government, for Count Andrassy had certainly no leaning towards Russia, and no unfriendly feeling towards Turkey. After being condemned to death, and hanged in effigy, for his part in the great Hungarian insurrection of 1849, which was suppressed by a Russian army, it was in Turkey that Count Andrassy had found a refuge; but it was, nevertheless, he who induced his Sovereign to enter into the league that proved fatal to the country which had braved the animosity of the Northern Courts by affording shelter and protection to him and other “rebels” who were claimed by their Governments.

Austria, when she went into the alliance, no doubt hoped to be able to check the Russian intrigues in

Turkey—but Russia well knew that it would enable her to succeed in making Austria play her game.

During my subsequent residence at Vienna I became so intimate with Andrassy that we could speak with little reserve on either part, and I sometimes reproached him with the mischief he had done by the change he had inaugurated in the policy of Austria in the East. He was not a man to admit that he ever could have been mistaken, but there was something almost apologetic in the history he gave of the origin of the Imperial Bund, and in justification of the course he had adopted. When he succeeded Count Beust as Prime Minister, he had found Austria, he said, without an ally in Europe—Russia and Italy hostile, Germany cold, France only just recovering her breath after her disasters. It was indispensable to get out of this position of isolation, and his first act was to turn to England, in the hope of being able to come to an agreement which would give both countries additional strength; but this overture was rejected, and nothing remained for Austria but to enter into close connection with the two neighbouring Empires.

This account of the origin of the Drei-Kaiser Bund is, I believe, strictly correct; for, before its formation, an overture such as that spoken of by Andrassy was certainly made through Lord Lytton, then in charge of the Embassy at Vienna, and was rejected by Lord Granville, who naturally hesitated to enter into what might prove an embarrassing alliance, although Count Andrassy assured me that he did not ask for an alliance, but merely for an engagement that the two Powers should act in concert in Eastern matters. Be this as it may, the effect of our refusal to fall in with Andrassy's proposal was to make him conclude the agreement with Germany and Russia, by which the latter Power was enabled to pursue her intrigues in Turkey, not only without being checked as heretofore by Austria, but with her actual co-operation.

Andrassy had a large dose of vanity in his composition and an overweening confidence in his own power of influencing others; and he honestly believed that, under the Drei-Kaiser Bund, it would be himself who would direct the policy of the three Empires at Constantinople, and the supposition of his putting himself under the lead of General Ignatiew was the last thing of which he would contemplate the possibility, though others could plainly see that the new course he was adopting must inevitably lead to that result.

The very first political conversation I ever had with him was on this subject, and I then warned him that he would find himself led where he had no intention of going.

I was returning to Constantinople from leave of absence in May 1874, when, in the train between Vienna and Pesth, I got a telegram asking me to dine that evening at the Palace of Buda. The Emperor spoke much of Eastern affairs, and was evidently anxious that I should be convinced of his friendly feelings towards Turkey, of which I never had any doubt, for he was fully aware that Ignatiew was doing all in his power to create a distrust of him at Constantinople.

After dinner Andrassy took me to his own rooms and explained his new policy at great length. He never touched upon the Drei-Kaiser Bund, nor alluded to any understanding with the other Empires, but spoke as if he had taken his new departure solely from considerations in reference to the Austro-Hungarian Slavonic populations, and he was convinced that it would prove as advantageous to Turkey as to Austria. They both of them, he said, had semi-savage populations of the same nationality on each side of the frontier, and it could not but be to the advantage of Turkey if these people were taught to turn their eye to Austria, which was a thoroughly

friendly Power, and to look to her for sympathy and support in obtaining redress of their grievances, instead of to Russia, of whose hostility to Turkey everyone was aware. The cause of these people would henceforth be pleaded at Constantinople by the Austrian rather than by the Russian Embassy, and the influence that Austria would thus acquire over them would enable her to prevent anything contrary to the rights or real interests of the Sultan from ever being attempted.

I told him that it was not difficult to foresee the results that must follow from the course he meant to adopt; for, after entering upon this competition with Russia for the favour of the vassal and Slav populations, he would be forced to outbid her, and to go further than even she had ventured openly to go in the encouragement of sedition.

(It is to be remembered that Roumania and Servia were at that time vassal principalities, which, though perfectly independent in their internal administration, were anxious to sever their connection with Turkey, while all the Powers wished the *status quo* to be maintained undisturbed.)

We were all ready, I said, to support him in urging the redress of grievances upon the Porte, but we all knew perfectly well that it was not the redress of grievances but an entire separation from the Turkish Empire that the discontented were aiming at; and, if he was bent on taking the wind out of the sails of Russia he would find himself obliged to support them in the steps they would take with this object.

This prophecy, which was fulfilled to the very letter, stands on record in various despatches and letters written by me at the time.

The policy of Austria at Constantinople, up to the time of the Drei-Kaiser Bund, had been directed by Baron Prokesch Osten, a statesman of unrivalled knowledge of Eastern affairs, who had for years been a

thorn in the side of the Russian diplomatists, constantly seeing through and frustrating their designs, and acting almost invariably in the closest harmony with the English Embassy.

He was now removed from his position as Internuntio—equivalent in rank to Envoy—and replaced by Count Franz Zichy, a *persona gratissima* to the Russians from having acted as Imperial Commissioner with the headquarters of the Russian army that suppressed the great Hungarian insurrection, by which he had earned the aversion of his own Hungarian countrymen without securing the respect or esteem of the Austrians.

Having arrived at Constantinople with the rank of Ambassador, never before held by the Austrian representative, as an indication that his Government intended to assume a more prominent position than it had taken in the past, he at once entered upon the post assigned to him with great energy, and I very soon reported that Ignatiew was skilfully keeping unusually quiet, “satisfied with seeing Zichy play the Russian game”; and, being by far the abler man, it was not long before he directed the Austrian, as well as the German, Embassy as completely as if he had been the official representative of the two other Emperors as well as of his own.

But, while prompting every action of Zichy’s, he not only kept himself in the background, but continually warned the Turks against the hostile tendency of Austria, from which, he declared, he was with difficulty defending them; and I was told by the Sultan and his Ministers that he seldom saw them without enlarging on this theme—and, if he did not succeed in inspiring confidence in himself, or his Government, he was, at least, perfectly successful in producing a thorough distrust of Austria, which, indeed, her own proceedings were well calculated to create.

After a time Zichy became fully persuaded of the

perfidy of his colleague, but even then he could not shake off his trammels. When walking with him in his garden, I have seen him stop and look up at the Russian Embassy, which lay just above, shaking his fist at it in impotent rage, and exclaiming, "Oh ! that fiend of a man !" and the next day he would humbly follow the fiend as obediently as ever.

Baron Werther, the German Ambassador, was also a weak, good kind of man. He told me that Prince Bismarck had rather a friendly feeling than otherwise for the Turks, but that he took no interest in Turkish affairs apart from the effect they might have on European politics. His instructions were to act in concert with the two other Imperial Embassies, but he did not like being considered as a tool of Ignatiew, and he once piteously complained to me that someone in the House of Commons had spoken of Ignatiew as Mephistopheles, and of himself as his shadow: what, he asked, had he done to deserve being called a shadow ?

I gravely pointed out that a shadow had not anything *to do*, though the accusation was an absurd one, since Ignatiew, if he had been the personage pretended, would not have been entitled to any such appendage as a shadow. He did not much relish the joke, but Ignatiew, who also spoke to me about it, was evidently much more flattered than annoyed by the title that had been given him, which he took as a recognition of his consummate skill in accomplishing his ends.

The consequences of the Drei-Kaiser Bund quickly became apparent in the breaking out of the Herzegovinian insurrection in July 1875, which began immediately on the return from banishment to Montenegro of a number of turbulent Bosnians in favour of whom the Russian Embassy had strongly interceded. They first attacked and murdered a party of Turkish travellers, and then robbed and burnt the

villages whose inhabitants refused to join them, and in this way their numbers were quickly increased, though at first by very unwilling recruits.

The country had been so quiet that there was no force at hand to put down the disturbance, and the Governor asked for a couple of hundred men, which was all he thought necessary; but the Russian and Austrian Embassies at once remonstrated, urging the Porte not to give unreal importance to an insignificant disturbance, and to be satisfied with enquiring into the causes that had led to it.

Advice to do nothing is always so agreeable to the Porte that of course it was followed; and this took place again and again, while the movements acquired greater extension, and the Governor-General continued begging in vain for a force sufficient to put an end to it at once, his applications being always paralysed by the objections of the three Embassies.

The insurgents being led by the people who had been permitted to return from exile at the instance of Russia, that Power might fairly have been expected to wish that they should justify her recommendation, and to use her influence to keep them quiet. She did the very reverse, and throughout the insurrection gave it every possible encouragement and assistance short of helping it by a regular contingent of troops.

M. Yonine, the Russian Consul-General at Ragusa, did not even think it necessary to conceal his active co-operation with the insurgents. Their chiefs met at his house, where their plans were laid, and were aided by the information that General Ignatiew enabled him to give of the proceedings of the Turkish authorities; and so little mystery was made of his co-operation that, on one occasion when an insurgent chief was killed, the Russian flag at the Consulate was displayed at half-mast, and the Consul-General attended the funeral in full uniform. Arms, ammunition and supplies of all kinds went through the same safe channel.

Then the new Austrian policy began to make itself felt. The Slavs had to be taught, as Count Andrassy had said, that they had more to expect from Austria than from Russia, and it was found, as I had warned him, that when once he entered upon this competition he must outbid the Russians, or be content to lose the race.

To what extent the encouragement given to them was directly sanctioned by the Imperial Government it may be difficult to determine, but they cannot be acquitted of having at least wilfully shut their eyes to the proceedings of their military authorities in Dalmatia and Croatia, who were all Slavs by birth and in sympathy.

The Porte was assured from Vienna that any armed body passing the Austrian frontier would at once be disarmed and *interné*; but Count Rodeck, the Governor-General of Dalmatia, never made even a pretence of performing this elementary international duty, and made it impossible for the Turkish troops either to capture or destroy the insurgent bands, which, when too hotly pressed, simply passed the frontier, where they could not be pursued, and after receiving supplies and ammunition reappeared in some other quarter, where the same scene was re-enacted.

Consequently, the Turkish Government showing besides its usual incapacity, the insurrection went on for month after month, till the three Powers determined to take the matter in hand, and the Andrassy Note was issued at the end of December 1875; which, proving fruitless, was followed in the month of May by the famous and equally useless Berlin Memorandum, which our Government were afterwards blamed for having rejected, instead of amending it, by which, it was said, they had prevented a common action by the European Powers.

There was little justice in the accusation, for the Drei-Kaiser Bund itself had put an end to all general

concert. The Prime Ministers of the three Emperors, Prince Gortchakow, Prince Bismarck, and Count Andrassy, met at Berlin, and there, without consultation or communication with any other Government, drew up the famous Memorandum, simply informing the different Cabinets by telegraph of its substance, and contemptuously asking that their adherence should at once be telegraphed back to them; for the three great men did not consider it necessary to remain at Berlin long enough to allow of a written answer being received, or to permit them to discuss any observations or objections that we might wish to make. There it was—flung to us as an intimation of the decision of the three Emperors, to which, indeed, we might give our adhesion, but without a hint that any amendment would be listened to.

However, Lord Derby, in an admirable letter to Odo Russell, at once declared that it would be childish to raise objections or to make difficulties because we were not consulted in the first instance, and it was solely on the merits of the proposal itself that Her Majesty's Government must decline to give it their adhesion.

The terms of the Memorandum were such as to make it difficult to believe that its authors can ever have supposed it likely to lead to a pacification, for it was evidently far more calculated to ensure a prolongation than a termination of the struggle. The paper began by stating that the news from Turkey impelled *the three Cabinets* to draw their intimacy closer. It suggested naval co-operation for the protection of their own subjects (who were in no sort of danger) and of the Christian inhabitants of Turkey (contrary to an express stipulation in the Treaty of Paris). The three Powers were to insist *at the Porte*, with all the energy of their united voices, on an armistice of two months. It recommended among other suggestions, that the Porte should

be required to concentrate its troops at particular points; that the consuls or delegates of the Powers should keep a watch over the execution of the reforms; and it concluded with the extraordinary intimation that if the armistice were to expire without the ends of the Powers being attained, "the three Imperial Courts were of opinion that it would become necessary to supplement their diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement to promote the efficacious measures which might appear to be demanded in the interest of general peace."

Lord Derby might well say, as he did in the letter I have referred to, that this clause would leave the disposal of events wholly with the insurgents, who could not be expected to be such fools as to accept the terms offered, after being told that, if they did not take them, the Powers would intervene to get them better conditions.

With regard to the armistice, he asked who was to guarantee it: the Turks had kept the last one faithfully, and their opponents broke it—can they be better relied upon now?—and he conceived that, before any plan founded on the proposed basis is discussed, we must have it clearly understood that Servia and Montenegro will be compelled, if necessary, to keep quiet until the term is over.

The proposal to force the Turkish Government to rebuild the destroyed villages was an affair of millions, and it was of questionable justice to make them responsible for mischief which was in the main the work of the insurgents.

The arguments against the Memorandum were equally forcibly pointed out in the public despatch by which our refusal to acquiesce in it was conveyed; and it was represented that by forcing the Turks to concentrate their forces in particular places, while the insurgents were to retain their arms, the whole country would be delivered up to anarchy.

Her Majesty's Government further considered that the proposed "consular supervision" would reduce the Sultan's authority to a nullity, and they were of opinion that care should be taken that the naval forces of foreign Powers were not employed in any manner contrary to the treaty rights of the Porte or subversive of the Sultan's authority.

The refusal of our Government to have anything to do with the Berlin Memorandum was, at the time, unanimously approved by all parties in England; and it was only later, after Mr. Gladstone had gone too wild upon Turkish matters to be capable of listening to reason, that he reproached them for the course they had followed.

This famous document had at last a rather ignominious end. It was to have been presented to the Turkish Government by the representatives of the three Powers on May 30,* and on the morning of that day Sultan Abdul Aziz was deposed. There was then a little hesitation as to what was to be done about it; for, while the Russians wished it to be presented to the Ministers of the new Sultan as soon as he was recognised, Count Andrassy was in favour of delay, and he was supported by Prince Bismarck; the final result being that it stood over for a time, and was then allowed to drop without ever having been presented at all. Such was the end of this famous instrument, which, though never acted upon, contributed much to keep alive the insurrection and to encourage the Servians and Montenegrins in their preparations for war, by convincing them that there would at last be foreign pressure laid upon the Turkish Government.

During the whole of the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina the conduct of Austria was so unlike that which Turkey had a right to expect from a friendly disposed neighbour that an impression

* 1876.

gained ground that she was actuated by a deliberate design of aggrandisement and annexation; but I never myself shared in it—though it was probably true as regarded Rodeck and the other Slav Generals; and in my despatches from Constantinople, at the time when the proceedings of the Austrian authorities were most suspicious, I continually expressed the opinion that the Imperial Government was not hostile to Turkey, but was being dragged on by the necessities arising out of the principle adopted by Count Andrassy, of not allowing the Slav populations to believe the Russian Government to be more favourable to their aspirations than himself.

This view of the question was greatly strengthened when I learnt the particulars of the mission of a General Soumarikov, who, in September 1876, and before the Russo-Turkish War, had been sent by the Russian Government to Vienna to intimate that, if the Austrian Government would engage not to oppose their proceedings on the eastern side of the Balkan Peninsula, Russia would hold Austria to be free to deal with the western side of it, and to advance her own frontier as far as she thought fit. Prince Bismarek was favourable to the arrangement, and, with Austria on the one hand, and Russia on the other, acting with the moral support of Germany, the Turkish Government could scarcely have even attempted to oppose a serious resistance to its execution.

The overture was kept very secret at the time, and it was not till some years later that at Vienna I learnt the particulars of it from undoubted sources. I then asked Count Andrassy whether it had included the consent of Russia that Austria should advance as far as Salonica, which she has often been suspected of coveting. He said that he understood the Russian Government to mean that they would not object to the advance of Austria through Bosnia and the Herzegovina as far as ever she pleased, and down to

Salonica, provided Russia was left to act as she thought fit on the side of Bulgaria; but he had refused to fall in with the proposal.

It seems, indeed, probable enough that Russia might have had no insuperable objection to see Salonica annexed to Austria, and thus effectually to put an end to the expansion of Greece along the shore of the *Aegean*, which all the Greeks look forward to as a heritage that must sooner or later come to them, but to which Russia is entirely opposed. The Emperor Nicholas told Sir Hamilton Seymour that the one thing to which he could never be brought to consent would be the creation of a powerful Greece; and Russia, remaining true to her traditional policy in this respect, would have seen herself secured from a further extension of Greece as soon as Salonica became Austrian.

There was undoubtedly in Austria a party, small and uninfluential, chiefly of the military element, which was eager for pushing on to Salonica, and these blame Andrassy for having lost an easy opportunity of accomplishing it.

However, though I did not believe the policy of Austria to be guided by a spirit of aggrandisement, the result likely to follow from the support given to the insurrection by the Imperial frontier authorities was evident enough to me, and in my correspondence with the Foreign Office I recorded the conviction that, if the authority of the Sultan in Bosnia was put an end to, it was inevitable that the province must pass into Austrian hands.

The autonomy, so much talked of in England by those who were profoundly ignorant of everything connected with the province, was known by all who were acquainted with its circumstances to be a manifest impossibility. In Bosnia proper, without the Herzegovina, there were three antagonistic classes—the Orthodox Slavs, the Roman Catholic Slavs, and

the Mussulmans—the first being the most numerous, but the two others combined forming considerably more than a majority of the whole population; and neither of these sympathised with the insurrectionary movement, which in that province was chiefly of an agrarian character. The proprietors were, for the most part, Mahometan, with some Roman Catholics, while the land, under many complicated and often vexatious tenures, was farmed by Orthodox peasants, who were intent upon getting absolute possession of the soil they cultivated, which the proprietors were determined not to give up—the position being not unlike that of the landlords and tenants of Ireland. Nothing but the hand of a controlling Government could prevent a province so composed from becoming the scene of anarchy and civil war; and it was certain that Austria would never tolerate on her frontier a state of things of which the effect would be to disturb the kindred populations in her neighbouring Croatian and Dalmatian Provinces. It was no less certain that Austria would not sanction the absorption of Bosnia into Servia, which would then only be separated from the Adriatic by the narrow strip of Austrian Dalmatia, and could not be expected to be satisfied or to remain quiet till she had extended herself to the sea.

It was therefore as evident from the first, to all those who had taken the pains to study the question, as it became afterwards to the plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Berlin, that Bosnia must either remain under the rule of the Sultan or be made over to that of Austria, and that no middle course was possible.

From the commencement of the Bosnian insurrection the people of Servia and Montenegro had naturally sympathised with their countrymen, and sent many volunteers to aid the cause, though the two Governments professed entire neutrality. At last, however, when the Porte appeared incapable of re-establishing

its authority, and when the Northern Powers seemed inclined to favour the insurgents, the two principalities deemed the moment favourable for striking a blow for their own interests, and early in the summer of 1876 began to make open preparations for war.

In England most people imagined that Servia had risen for the purpose of shaking off the intolerable thraldom of the Turkish yoke, and were ignorant of the fact that the administration of the Principality was as free and independent as it could have been if relieved of the suzerainty of the Sultan, which gave him no rights of interference within its frontiers; but if the war, on the part of Servia, was purely aggressive and ambitious, it was dictated by the legitimate wish of a people anxious to achieve entire independence, and encouraged by the not unnatural hope of being able to take advantage of the state of things to annex some of the adjacent Turkish insurgent districts.

There was, however, such an entire absence of any grievance against the Porte or any avowable pretext for war, that even the Russian Government had felt bound to warn Prince Milan that, if any unprovoked attack upon Turkey on his part should be followed by defeat, the Principality must be prepared to bear all the consequences of its rashness, as no one would interpose to save it from the retribution it had provoked. This warning would, no doubt, have been attended to if, at the same time, it had not been intimated to the Servian Government that they need not attach much importance to what was in reality intended only as a blind to the other Governments, which were truly desirous of the maintenance of peace; and, while the Russian Government officially professed to discourage the warlike aspirations, they continued to assist the Servian preparations to the utmost of their power, by supplying the Servians

not only with arms but with soldiers and officers of all ranks, from generals down to corporals.

By the beginning of July the preparations were complete and hostilities broke out. Within a month the campaign had gone so much against the Servians that a suspension of hostilities was urged by the Powers upon the Porte, which was thus prevented from following up its advantages, when its army might have advanced to Belgrade with little prospect of serious opposition. The suspension of hostilities having led to no arrangement, operations were resumed, and again so much to the advantage of the Turks that nothing but active intervention on behalf of the Servians could save them from a crushing defeat; and Russia then threw off the mask, and in spite of all the declarations about leaving them to bear the consequences of their unprovoked aggression, showed a determination to enter into the contest, which might very probably lead to a European war.

To avoid this danger our Government resolved to urge the Porte to agree to an armistice, to be followed by a Conference, at which the conditions of peace with Servia and Montenegro and for the pacification of the insurgent provinces could be arranged. This time it was not to be a mere temporary suspension of hostilities, but a regular armistice for a period of "not less than a month," so as to give time for the negotiations that were to follow.

October 5.—I was ordered to insist upon its being immediately granted, and to intimate that if it was refused I was to leave Constantinople with the whole Embassy.

It was, in my opinion, a mistake to mix up the question of peace with Servia and Montenegro with that of the pacification of Bosnia, and I at once telegraphed home to ask if it was too late to separate them, but I received no answer to the enquiry. Servia had been hopelessly beaten in the campaign,

and would at once have accepted a peace on the terms of the *status quo ante*, which the Porte was ready to grant, and a few days would have sufficed to arrange the outlines of the conditions; but the pacification of Bosnia and the Herzegovina involved so many complicated considerations that a month's armistice, during which the hostile armies would be kept facing each other, with constant risk of collisions, would clearly be insufficient for the purpose.

Receiving no answer to my appeal, I energetically urged the armistice upon the Porte, which, remembering how injurious to its interests had been the former suspension of hostilities agreed to at the instance of the Powers, was very unwilling to consent; but English influence at that time was great, and at last I succeeded in extorting the promise of an armistice of five months, which would cover the whole winter, during which a settlement of all the questions might be effected.

Our Government were so thoroughly satisfied that they telegraphed the warmest congratulations to me for a success which they said was "entirely owing to my exertions," and I believed, myself, that I had done good work. They had asked for an armistice of "not less" than a month, desiring that it should, if possible, be longer, and I had obtained one of five months, which would make the resumption of hostilities much less probable than at the end of the shorter term; but, as this did not at all suit the views of the Russian Government, which had no wish to see a final pacification brought about, they insisted on a shorter period being fixed, so as to facilitate a renewal of hostilities; and, under a threat of immediate declaration of war if the demand was not complied with, the Porte was obliged to give way and to grant an armistice of six weeks, which of course proved, as everyone knew it must, so insufficient that it had afterwards to be renewed.

The proceedings of the Russian Government are often very questionable, though it is seldom that even they do anything so monstrous as they did on this occasion, by threatening a declaration of war unless Turkey consented to *shorten* a suspension of hostilities which had been asked for in the interests of its beaten enemy; but they were enabled to carry out their point because Austria, although thoroughly desirous of seeing the end of a state of things likely to cause her the most serious embarrassment, was precluded from offering the slightest opposition to the Russian designs by the entanglement in which she was involved by the fatal Drei-Kaiser Bund.

CHAPTER X

TURKEY—III.: THE SALONICA MURDERS

IN the course of the summer of 1876 two events occurred that naturally aroused throughout Europe a feeling of indignation, which, however justifiable in itself, was carried to an excess far beyond what was warranted by a true knowledge of the facts. The first of these was the "Salonica Massacre," in which the French and German Consuls were murdered, and the second was the "Bulgarian Atrocities."

In both these cases, as in almost all of those where the Mahometans have given way to an outburst of fanatical violence against the Christians, it was these last who had themselves provoked it. Even at times when the most perfect goodwill prevails between Christians and the Mussulmans, anything like a slight upon their religion, or of the nature of an insult to their women, will, in a moment, rouse a quiet Mahometan population to a state of frenzy, rendering them capable of every excess; and in the case of Salonica both these causes of provocation had been given in the most offensive form. The Turks saw a woman professing herself a Mahometan, wearing the Turkish yashmak and feridgee, torn, before their faces, by a Christian mob, from the police who were escorting her, her veil pulled off—of all insults the greatest—herself put into a Consul's carriage, driven off to his house and kept there, in spite of the repeated demands of the authorities to have her restored to them.

Much less than this would have been sufficient to exasperate a Turkish mob, and there is far less reason for surprise that it should have led to the loss of two lives than that it should not have cost more; for, even in this country—say at Glasgow, Dublin, or Belfast—if a girl about to take the veil was violently carried off by a Protestant mob, it would be well if the riot that would ensue did not lead to worse consequences.

The Helen who was the cause of this disturbance was a most uninteresting heroine, being a Bulgarian girl, between twelve and eighteen years old, of indifferent character, belonging to a not over-respectable family, in a village at a short distance from Salonica. She had a Turkish lover, and one day, declaring that she had become Mahometan, she went to her lover's home, where his family refused to keep her till her conversion to Islamism had been legally registered by the authorities. In order that this formality might be gone through, she was sent next day to Salonica by rail, accompanied by the Hodja of the village and an Arab woman, and her mother went by the same train. On their arrival at Salonica some Greeks who were waiting for her at the station tried to prevent her from going to the Government House to make the official declaration of her change of religion, and three zaptiehs came to protect her from them; but the Christian mob became greater, and after a scuffle with the police they seized the girl, pulled off her yashmak, tore her feridgee, and took her to the American Vice-Consulate in the Vice-Consul's carriage.

Up to this point the faults had been entirely on the side of the Greeks; if they had allowed the girl to be taken to the Konak or Government House, she would have been examined by the Governor in the presence of her mother, when she would have been called upon to declare publicly whether she was

adopting Islamism of her own free will, or whether coercion or compulsion had been used towards her. Instead of this, they had taken her by force from the hands of the police, and had placed her in a Consulate, where the authorities had no right to enter. It does not appear that the American Vice-Consul was himself a party to the proceeding, for he had been absent for some days; but the case is much less clear as regards his brother—a Russian subject—who was acting for him in his absence, and who, if not a party to the act itself, at least associated himself with the perpetrators by refusing to divulge where the girl was taken after being removed from the Consulate.

The Turks, however, were now thoroughly roused: they armed during the night, and it was evident that unless the girl was restored to the authorities serious consequences must ensue; but neither the Governor nor the police took any measures of precaution to prevent the conflict, which would have had far worse consequences than those which actually followed if it had not been for the energy and courage shown by Mr. Blunt, our Consul.

On the forenoon of the day following the capture of the girl, a large body of Mussulmans went to the Konak to insist that she should be brought back, warning the Governor that, if he could not deliver her from the Christians, they would attack the American Vice-Consulate and rescue her themselves. The Pasha thereupon sent a message to the Vice-Consulate demanding the immediate presence of the girl at the Council Chamber, but the Vice-Consul's brother answered that she had left the house, and he professed not to know where she was. The people then got impatient and angry, and leaving the Konak, went to a neighbouring mosque where great numbers of Mussulmans were collected and preparing to attack the American Consulate.

About the same time M. Moulin, the French Consul, and Mr. Henry Abbott, the German Consul, were seen going into the Turkish quarter, with what object has never been ascertained, and, while passing by the mosque they were surrounded by the Mahometans and hustled into it. The mob became furious and menacing, and notice was sent to the Governor, who immediately went to the spot, accompanied by some of the principal Turks, and entered a room off the mosque, in which the two Consuls had taken refuge. The Consuls promised to have the girl taken to the Konak, and Consul Abbott wrote to his brother Alfred desiring him to do so, and the Pasha and the police summoned the mob to disperse, but they refused.

In the Christian quarter of the town no one had been aware of what was going on, and it was not till half-past three that Alfred Abbott showed the note he had received from his brother to Mr. Blunt, who urged him not to lose a moment in getting the girl sent to the Konak. He then set off himself towards the mosque to see what he could do for his colleagues, but on approaching it he was met by the French Chancelier, a French Consular cavass, and some respectable Mussulmans, who surrounded and held him back, saying that the crowd was so furious that no European could go near them with safety. He then ran to the Konak, which was close at hand, and wrote a note to the American Consulate, which he sent by his cavass, insisting upon the girl being at once given up to the authorities. She was not there; but Mr. Alfred Abbott had found her and handed her over to Mr. Blunt's cavass, by whom she was conducted to the Konak, though too late to save the two Consuls, who had already been murdered. The mob outside had torn down the iron bars of the window of the room in which they were, and, getting in through it, slaughtered them

in the presence of the Governor and his zaptiehs, who, though remonstrating and trying to protect them by persuasion, never made use of their arms in their defence, but behaved with disgraceful cowardice in standing trembling by, while they were murdered before their eyes.

If Blunt did not succeed in saving the lives of his two colleagues his prompt action at least averted a further disaster, for the mob, after wreaking their vengeance on the two Consuls, set out with the intention of attacking the American Consulate where they believed the girl to be concealed; but, by the greatest good fortune, on their way they met Blunt's cavass, who was conducting her to the Konak, and thereupon, after raising a shout of triumph and firing a kind of *feu de joie*, they dispersed, and tranquillity was at once restored. ■■■

It was a disgraceful business from first to last and discreditable to everyone who had anything to do with it, excepting Mr. Blunt, whose conduct had been admirable—to the Christians first for their violent and illegal capture of the girl; then to the Mussulman mob, composed chiefly of the lowest classes; next, to the Governor and police, who took no steps to prevent an imminent riot, and had not the courage to risk their lives to protect the threatened Consuls; and lastly, to the naval and military commanders, who showed no alacrity in obeying a tardy summons to send men to quell the disturbance. ■■■

The Porte at once promised that a prompt and severe example should be made, and within ten days six of the actual perpetrators of the murders were publicly executed, meeting their fate with the calm stoicism always exhibited by fanatical Mussulmans on such occasions, in the evident conviction that they were dying for the zeal they had shown in defence of their Faith, and that they had thus ensured their road to Paradise. Altogether there

were twelve persons condemned to death, and about twenty others sentenced to penal servitude, and no complaint could be made of a lack of severity towards those who had taken an active part; but the sentences passed by the Court at Salonica upon the officials who had so grossly neglected their duty were disgraceful, insufficient.

On receiving the first news of the murders the Minister for Foreign Affairs had asked all the Ambassadors to meet him, and gave assurances that every satisfaction should be offered. An Imperial Commission would be despatched at once to Salonica, and delegates from the French and German Embassies would accompany it.

As the murdered German Consul was a British subject, I insisted upon an English delegate being associated with them, and named Mr. Blunt in that capacity. I desired him to act as closely as he could with his two colleagues, to see that substantial justice was done, and no favour shown to any guilty person, whatever his rank might be; but he had a difficult task to perform in making them reasonable, as I had also with my ambassadorial colleagues at Constantinople.

The German was tolerably calm, but the Frenchman, Baron Bourgoing, was outrageously vindictive. He did not care, he said, for the execution of a dozen of the *canaille*, "mais il nous faut un gros bonnet." I asked whether his delegate had intimated that any "gros bonnet" had been a party to or had connived at the murder, or was suspected of more than a neglect of duty in repressing the riot. He admitted that none was accused of complicity in the crime, but "l'honneur de la France" required that the penalty of it should be visited upon some important personage. I replied that I did not clearly see how "l'honneur de la France" would be advanced by his insisting on the punishment of any man for a

crime of which he was not guilty; that I was ready to go as far as he pleased in insisting that no rank or position should save any one of the accused from the penalty due to any crime that could be brought home to him; but I must tell him plainly that I would not go one inch further, or be a party to requiring a vindictive sentence as a mere satisfaction to his *amour-propre*. He was exceedingly wroth, and, when he proceeded to hint that, as the murdered men were the French and German Consuls, I ought not to have a delegate at the trials at all, I was obliged to stop him short and to remind him that, as the latter was a British subject, I would not for a single moment allow him to dispute or question my right to be represented in the inquiry into his death on a footing of perfect equality with him and our German colleague.

My ground was too strong for it to be possible for him to maintain his objection, but the conversation was a stormy one, and we had others of a similar character, in one of which he imprudently betrayed the animus under which he was acting; for, after launching into violent denunciations of “ces misérables Turcs” for their slighting attitude towards France during the German War, he exclaimed, “And they expect that we should spare them now that we have an opportunity of paying them off!” To this I could only reply that he must not expect me to join him in pressing for the execution of any man whom I did not believe to deserve it out of revenge for some imaginary previous slight upon France; but the incident affords a good example of the lengths to which the foreign representatives at Constantinople sometimes go.

However, in the end I carried my point: at a second trial, held at Constantinople, the Governor received a sentence of degradation and imprisonment, which he fairly deserved, while the chief of

the police and some other officers, for their gross neglect of duty, were condemned to penal servitude. The French and German Governments then declared themselves satisfied, and the matter ended—300,000 francs being paid as compensation to the family of the German Consul, and 600,000 to that of the French Consul, their Ambassador upon learning the amount demanded for the former, having at once required the double, in order to show the superior importance of a Frenchman over all others.

In the treatment of the whole affair there was an entire absence of any semblance of justice on the part of the French Ambassador, and if it had not been for the fortunate accident of our being able to have a delegate on the Commission a serious complication would certainly have arisen, for the two Ambassadors had orders to break off relations if their demands were not complied with, while the exact extent of the satisfaction to be exacted was left very much to them to decide. Baron Werther, in spite of his own inclination to be reasonable, did not venture to lag behind his French colleague in his demands; and the latter, unless he had our word to say in the matter, would, I firmly believe, have insisted upon the execution of the Governor or some other "*gros bonnet*," which the Porte could not possibly have submitted to.

All this occurred while the Government were in the midst of the difficulties connected with the deposition of Abdul Aziz, the murder of the Ministers, and the incapacity of the new Sultan, and it caused a serious aggravation of them; while, at the same time, they had to deal with the much more serious embarrassments resulting from the Bosnian insurrection, the war with Servia and Montenegro, the attempted insurrection in Bulgaria, and its barbarous suppression.

CHAPTER XI

TURKEY—IV.: THE TURKISH REFORM MOVEMENT, 1875–1876

DURING 1875 and 1876 we had a series of exciting occurrences, and among them the deposition and death of Sultan Abdul Aziz. Till within the last four years a marked and steady—if slow—improvement had been going on in every branch of the Turkish administration under two exceptionally able Grand Viziers, who had established over the Sultan an authority that enabled them in a great degree to control his extravagances and to put a check upon the Palace favourites, who are at all times the curse of Turkey; but from the moment of their deaths, which occurred at short intervals, everything at once began to go from bad to worse at a rate that soon gave rise to universal discontent. From this there sprang into existence a party consisting of the most enlightened men, of which Midhat Pasha*

* Born in 1822. Charged with the pacification of the Balkan provinces in 1854. Was appointed Governor of Nish, and in 1865 of the combined Vilayets of Silistria, Widdin and Nish, and instituted many reforms. Was recalled in 1868 through Russian influence and appointed Vali of Bagdad in 1869. Became Grand Vizier in 1875; was dismissed and sent into honourable exile for a short time; recalled to Constantinople and held the posts of Minister of Justice and President of the Council of State, but resigned on finding himself unable to carry out a reforming policy. Took office again under the Grand Vizier Mehemet Rushdi Pasha; succeeded him as Grand Vizier, and promulgated the ill-fated “Constitution” in December of that year. Was disgraced and deported by Sultan Abdul Hamid in January 1877, and after years of ill-treatment was murdered in prison at Taif on April 26, 1883. (See *Life of Midhat Pasha* by his son, Ali Haydar Midhat.)

was the leading spirit, with the object of effecting the reforms that were necessary to save their country from the ruin that was approaching. Midhat himself was a very remarkable man, as unlike as possible to the ordinary Turkish Pasha, who in every province of which he had been Governor had distinguished himself by his activity in developing its resources, in putting down corruption, in smoothing religious animosities, and advancing education. He soon set to work with characteristic energy for the reforms that he had at heart, and for which he staked and lost his life.

I was well aware of the general principles that had been adopted by the reformers, but at the beginning of 1875 one of Midhat's partisans, a Pasha who had filled some of the highest positions in the State, informed me that their object was to obtain a "Constitution," which was the first time that I heard the word pronounced. A few days later Midhat himself called upon me and explained his views at great length. The Empire, he said, was being rapidly brought to destruction; corruption had reached a pitch it had never before attained. The service of the State was starved, while untold millions were poured into the Palace; the provinces were being ruined by the uncontrolled exactions of Governors who purchased their appointments at the Palace, and nothing could save the country but a complete change of system. The only remedy he could perceive lay—first, in securing a control over the Sovereign by making the Ministers, especially as regarded the finances, responsible to a national popular Assembly; secondly, in making this Assembly truly national by doing away with all distinctions of classes and religions, and by placing the Christians upon a footing of entire equality with the Mussulmans; thirdly, by decentralisation and by the establishment of provincial control over the Governors.

It must certainly be admitted that these were enlightened and statesmanlike views, deserving of every encouragement.

Midhat was not blind to the difficulties of the task he had undertaken, or to the risk to himself that it involved, for he well knew the resistance the Sultan would be certain to offer to measures for the restriction of his own power, and that he would not readily forgive those who proposed them; but he did not despair of success if, as he hoped, he could rely upon the hearty sympathy of the British nation for an attempt to obtain something like an imitation of its own institutions. He dwelt repeatedly on the value of which this sympathy would be, and on the manner in which his countrymen were now looking to England as the example they hoped to follow.

I told him in reply that I could not doubt that measures framed on the lines he had laid down must command the approval and ensure the good wishes of every Englishman who, like myself, had faith in the advantages of a popular check upon arbitrary power. And certainly the very last thing I anticipated was that those who in this country make the greatest parade of their Liberalism would be the first to cast contumely on men who, at the risk of their lives, were trying to introduce it into theirs, and to ridicule their proposals.

About a week after this conversation with Midhat Pasha I happened to have an audience of the Sultan, when, being anxious to give the reformers every support, as well as being convinced that matters were becoming serious, I took the opportunity of urging him to carry out effective reforms, and at the risk of giving him mortal offence, I added that among His Majesty's subjects "a spirit had arisen of which every other European country had had experience, that the institutions of the past were no longer suited to the present age, and that everywhere

the people were beginning to expect to have a certain control over those who conducted their administration." The Sultan listened to me without any outward mark of displeasure, but I could not boast of any effect produced by my words.

During the next three months, the discontent and agitation continued to increase, and a crisis was clearly impending. The Softas, or law students, of whom there were a good many thousands in Constantinople, were known to be arming; and the foreign communities imagining that a massacre of the Christians was imminent, a complete panic took possession of the colonies, although the native Christians remained without apprehension. The information I had obtained respecting the movement made me feel certain that it was directed solely against the Government, and the only risk to which the Christians might be exposed would be the occurrence of a great popular tumult and conflict between the progressive and reactionary parties, for I knew that the Softas had fully accepted the principles of their leaders, and counted on the co-operation of their Christian fellow-subjects in their efforts for the common good, and that there was more community and goodwill between the two classes than had ever before existed. I could not therefore, in the slightest degree, share in the extreme alarm shown at that time, and on subsequent occasions, by some of my colleagues and many of the foreign residents; and while most of the Embassies kept the iron gates of their gardens carefully closed, ours stood wide open as usual, much to the satisfaction of the Turks, who were gratified by what they took as a proof of confidence in their orderly behaviour.

The first of the many incidents which followed each other closely in the summer and autumn of 1876 took place on May 10, when an assemblage of

several thousand Softas stopped Prince Yussuf Izzeddin, the Sultan's eldest son, on his way to the Ministry of War, desiring him to return to the Palace and inform the Sultan that they demanded the dismissal of Mahmoud Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and of the Sheikh ul Islam, the officially recognised expounder of the Koran. The Sultan did not venture to resist the demand, and the Grand Vizier and the Sheikh were dismissed, the latter being replaced by a mollah belonging to the popular party. Instead, however, of Midhat, as had been hoped by the Softas, the Sultan named as his Grand Vizier Mehemet Rushdi Pasha, an old man who, although universally respected, was not possessed of the resolution of character requisite for a great crisis; but, as he insisted on having Midhat in his Cabinet as President of the Council, it was believed that the latter would be the guiding spirit, and general satisfaction was felt.

This, however, did not last long. The Sultan quickly showed his determination to resist all reform by appointing to high posts several of the worst of the old school of Pashas, and it then became so evident to me that an attempt to depose him would certainly very shortly be made, that on May 25 I put my conviction upon record in a despatch to the Foreign Office, in which I wrote that "the word 'Constitution' was in every mouth; that the Softas, representing the intelligent public opinion of the capital, knowing themselves to be supported by the nation—Christian as well as Mahometan—would not, I believed, relax their efforts till they obtained it, and that, should the Sultan refuse to grant it, an attempt to depose him appeared almost inevitable; that texts from the Koran were circulated proving to the faithful that the form of government sanctioned by it was properly democratic, and that the absolute authority now wielded by the Sultan was a usurpa-

tion of the rights of the people, and not sanctioned by the Holy Law, and both texts and precedents were appealed to, to show that obedience was not due to a Sovereign who neglected the interests of the State. "The disaffection" (I said) "now ran through every class, from the Pashas down to the porters in the streets and the boatmen on the Bosphorus—no one thought any longer of concealing his opinions." The same day I reported that, notwithstanding the strict seclusion in which the Sultan kept his nephews confined, the leaders of the movement had contrived to communicate with Prince Murad, the heir-apparent, who had promised to proclaim a "Constitution" immediately on his accession.

When the signs of what was impending were so evident to me, it is inconceivable that no alarm should have been felt at the Palace and no precautions taken, and that not one of my colleagues, including General Ignatiew with his innumerable spies and secret agents, should have had even a remote suspicion of what was going on; but within a week after my reports were written the deposition had been effected.

The only persons who took an active part in it were Midhat Pasha and Hussein Avni Pasha, the Seraskier or Minister of War, and the risk they had to run was very great, for their heads were at stake; but they concerted their project with skill and executed it with courage and resolution. They passed the early part of the night of May 29 at Hussein Avni's country house at Begler Bey, on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus; and from there, an hour or two after midnight, when it was very dark and raining hard, they passed over to Constantinople in a small caique, attended by a single servant, to a spot where they expected to find carriages waiting for them, but found to their consternation that these

had not arrived. They were thus left standing for a considerable time in a drenching rain, exposed every moment to a discovery that would have been fatal to themselves as well as to their enterprise, till at last their servant found and brought the missing carriages, which had gone to a wrong place.

Then, as had been arranged, while Midhat Pasha proceeded to the Seraskeriat,* Hussein Avni went to the barracks near the Sultan's Palace of Dolma Baghtche, where, as Minister of War, he had no difficulty in bringing a regiment quartered in them to the Palace, which was surrounded without any alarm being taken. He then knocked at the gates, and desired the Kislar Agha, the chief official of the household, to inform the Sultan that he was a prisoner, and to urge him to put himself into the hands of the Seraskier who answered for his safety. The Sultan's first and natural impulse was to resist, and it was not till Hussein Avni, who could not permit any delay, went in person before him and convinced him that resistance was impossible, that he could be persuaded to submit to his kismet. A guard was placed over him without a blow being struck, and, as had been agreed upon, a gun was fired to announce to Midhat Pasha at the Seraskeriat that the arrest of the Sultan had been successfully carried out.

In the meantime Midhat Pasha's position had been intensely critical. He had no authority over the troops, no right to give them orders, and he had to rely solely on the personal influence he might be able to exercise. He had arrived at the Ministry of War under the most suspicious appearances—in the dark, unattended and drenched to the skin; and it was with the utmost difficulty that, by representing himself as authorised by the Seraskier, he at last succeeded in inducing the commanding officer to

* Ministry of War.

call out his men and draw them up in the square. He had a long and anxious time to pass, during which at any moment, if sinister rumours arrived from the Palace, the troops might assume a hostile attitude; for it was not till close upon daybreak that the signal gun put an end to the suspense and announced the successful accomplishment of the enterprise. Midhat then came out into the square to harangue the troops, and not a murmur of discontent was heard when he informed them of the step that had been taken, and explained the necessity for it. He was cheerfully obeyed when he ordered a guard of honour and an escort to proceed to the palace of Prince Murad, to announce to him his accession to the throne, and to conduct him to the Seraskeriat, where he was at once proclaimed and saluted as Sultan by the troops drawn up there and by the people, who by that time had begun to assemble.

Abdul Aziz was first taken to the palace near the Seraglio Point, but was soon removed to his new palace at Tcheregan, where he had lavished millions of money diverted from the service of the State, and where, by pulling down and confiscating the houses of the inhabitants of the neighbourhood, he had largely added to the discontent that led to his overthrow.

Notification of the change of Sovereign was at once telegraphed to every quarter of the Empire, and everywhere the news was received with unbounded satisfaction and rejoicing; but, till late in the afternoon, no messages were allowed to pass either from the Embassies or from private persons, and our Government, having heard nothing from me and knowing nothing of what had occurred, telegraphed in some perplexity to ask me the meaning of a telegram from the Consul at Salonica reporting that "the proclamation of Sultan Murad had given the greatest satisfaction there!" By that time the telegraph

offices were again open, and I was able to give the information.

One newspaper correspondent alone had contrived to send the news to his employers. He was at the head of the Turkish Post Office, and, with a view to some possible emergency, he had arranged a private code by which he could communicate political intelligence, while appearing to deal with purely private concerns, and he obtained permission to forward a message "of an urgent private nature," which ran as follows: "The doctors have found it necessary to bleed (depose) poor Jane (Abdul Aziz). Grandmamma (the Validé) is with her; Cousin John (Murad) has taken charge of the business." This ingenious telegram conveyed, I believe, the first intelligence of what had occurred that reached any European capital.

Although the deposition of the Sultan had been effected quietly and without resistance, it remained to be seen how the news of it would be received by the population of the capital, and whether perhaps a strong party might not be found ready to stand up for the deposed monarch, and to dispute the right of his successor. But all anxiety upon that head was quickly set at rest by the universal exhibition of rejoicing, which showed that the misgovernment of the last few years had left Sultan Abdul Aziz almost literally without friends among his subjects. None regretted his fall, except the immediate dependents of the Palace, the satellites of Mahmoud Pasha, and the Russian party; but these were too few in number to venture to make a show against the overwhelming mass of public opinion arrayed on the other side.

In order to satisfy the scruples of the stricter Mahometans, questions had been laid before the Sheikh ul Islam, the highest authority on the Sacred Law. They ran as follows: "If the First of the true

believers gives signs of madness and of an ignorance of political matters—if he spends the public money on himself in excess of what the nation can grant him, will he not thus become the cause of trouble and of the public ruin? Ought he not to be dethroned?" To this the Sheikh ul Islam answered by a simple "Yes," signed with his name, Hassan Khairullah, and the question and answer became a Fetwa, of which every true Mussulman is bound to admit the authority.

But if the Mussulman population were in general well satisfied with what had been done, the Christians were still more exultant, because they knew that the leaders of the movement had adopted the absolute equality of all Turkish subjects as the fundamental principle of their reforms.

So far, everything had gone without a drawback of any kind, but this was not fated to last long, and there came a succession of unfortunate occurrences, the first of them being the tragical death of the ex-Sultan. In England it seems to be almost universally believed that he was murdered, and the suspicion is certainly not unnatural; for when, on the morning of June 4, five days after his deposition, it was announced that Abdul Aziz had committed suicide by opening the veins of his arms with a pair of scissors, there was probably not a person who doubted, any more than I did myself, that he had in reality been the victim of an assassination; and my suspicion of foul play was only removed in the course of the forenoon by the report of Dr. Dickson, the Embassy physician, who made me acquainted with particulars and details which convinced me that it was unfounded. Dr. Dickson was a man of great intelligence, of long experience in the East, where he had seen much of the secret and dark doings of the harems. He was of a suspicious rather than of a confiding nature, little likely to shut his eyes to

any evidence of a crime, and he certainly would not have concealed it from me, his Ambassador, if he had entertained even the remotest doubt upon the case. He came to me at Therapia straight from an examination of the body, and declared in the most positive manner that there was not a doubt in his mind that it was a case of suicide, and that all suspicion of assassination must be discarded. He told me that early in the morning he had received a summons from the Government inviting him to go to the Palace to examine the body of the ex-Sultan, and to ascertain the cause of his death. All the principal medical men of Constantinople had received a similar invitation, which eighteen or nineteen, including those of several of the Embassies, had accepted, together with Turkish, Greek, and Armenian physicians.

Besides these there was another English doctor, an old Dr. Millingen, the same who was with Lord Byron when he died at Missolonghi, and who had ever since remained in the East and was a medical attendant of the ladies of the imperial harem. He and Dickson went together to the Palace, but found on their arrival that the other doctors had finished their examination, and Dickson told me that he and Millingen, being thus left alone, had made as complete an examination of the body as it was possible to make. He said that they had turned it over and looked minutely at every part of it, to see what traces of violence could be found upon it, but there were absolutely none, with the exception of cuts in both arms, partly severing the arteries, from which the ex-Sultan had bled to death.

The skin, he said, was more wonderfully delicate than he had ever seen in a full-grown man, and was more like the skin of a child, but there was not a scratch, mark, or bruise on any part of it, and he declared that it was perfectly impossible that the

force that would have been required to hold so powerful a man could have been employed without leaving visible marks. The artery of one arm was almost entirely and that of the other partially severed; the wounds being, in Dickson's opinion, such as would be made, not by a knife, but by sharp-pointed scissors, with little cuts or snips running in the direction that would be expected in the case of a man inflicting them on himself.

He had, therefore, no hesitation in accepting as correct the account that had been given of the manner of the ex-Sultan's death. The wounds, moreover, if not made by himself, must have been made from behind by someone leaning over his chair, where no one could have taken up his position without a struggle, of which traces must have remained, or without a noise that certainly would have been heard in the adjoining room, in which the ladies were collected; and it further appeared that when the ex-Sultan was seated in the chair, in which the pools of blood proved him to have bled to death, the back of his head could be seen by the women who were watching at a projecting flanking window in the next room, and to whom anyone getting behind the chair would be fully visible.

From all this Dr. Dickson and Dr. Millingen concluded, as I have said, without hesitation that the ex-Sultan had destroyed himself; and when they went out and joined the other physicians, who had examined the body before their arrival at the Palace, they found that they also had been unanimous in arriving at the same opinion. Among them were foreigners whose independence of character was beyond dispute, and who would without hesitation have given a contrary verdict if there had been reason for it; but they one and all came to the same conclusion, and several years later Dr. Marouin, the eminent physician of the French Embassy, as well

as Dr. Dickson, published a statement to the effect that nothing had in the slightest degree shaken the conviction originally arrived at by them. Even if the medical evidence stood alone it would seem to be conclusive; but it is very far from standing alone, and, taken in conjunction with the statement of the women of the harem, it appears quite irresistible.

Dr. Millingen, as medical attendant of these ladies, went into the harem and questioned them immediately after examining the body. They told him that, in consequence of the state of mind into which the ex-Sultan had fallen since his deposition, every weapon or instrument by which he could do himself or others an injury had been removed from his reach; that in the morning he had asked for a pair of scissors to trim his beard, which were at first refused, but were afterwards, in spite of the urgent remonstrances of the women, sent to him by the Sultana Validé, his mother, who did not like to refuse him, and that as soon as he got them he made the women leave the room and locked the door. The women then took their station at the projecting side window of the adjoining room, of which I have spoken, from which they could look into the part of the room in which the ex-Sultan's chair stood, and could just see the back of his head as he sat in it. While they were watching, they after a time saw his head suddenly fall forward, and, alarm being taken, the Validé ordered the door to be broken open, when the ex-Sultan was found dead, with pools of blood on the floor and with the veins of both arms opened. When Dr. Millingen, hearing that the Validé was in a state of distraction, asked if she would see him, she exclaimed that it was not the doctor but the executioner who should have been sent to her, as she had caused the death of her son by giving him the scissors.

All these details were given me by Dr. Dickson on

coming straight from the Palace, and nothing can be more certain than that the persons who would have been the very first to believe in foul play—*i.e.*, his mother, the Sultanas, and ladies of the harem—did not entertain a suspicion of the ex-Sultan having died otherwise than by his own hand.

Abdul Aziz had an undoubted predisposition to insanity in his blood; the mind of his brother, Abdul Medjid, whom he succeeded, had broken down while still a young man, and his nephew Murad, who succeeded him, became hopelessly insane immediately after his accession. He had, to my own knowledge, been out of his mind on several different occasions; the first time as far back as 1863, when I find it mentioned in letters that I wrote from Athens,* where I was on a special mission, and on two later occasions, within eighteen months of his deposition, I had spoken of his insanity in my letters to Lord Derby, reporting that I had been told of it as an undoubted fact by one of the Ministers, with whom I was intimate. At one time he would not look at anything written in black ink, and everything had to be copied in red before it could be submitted to him. Ministers appointed to foreign Courts could not proceed to their posts, and were kept waiting for months because their credentials could not well be written in red ink, and he would not sign those written in black. At another time a dread of fire had got hold of him to such a pitch that, except in his own apartment, he would not allow a candle or a lamp to be lighted in the whole of his vast Palace, its innumerable inmates being forced to grope about in the dark from sunset to sunrise; and in many other respects his conduct passed the bounds of mere eccentricity.

That such a mind as his should have entirely given way under the blow that had fallen upon him need

* p. 148.

hardly excite surprise, and under the circumstances there was nothing even improbable in the fact of his taking his own life, especially as he was known to hold that suicide was the proper resource of a deposed monarch; for when the news of the abdication of the Emperor Napoleon was brought to him, his exclamation had been, "And that man consents to live!" The person who assured me that these words had been used to him by the Sultan was Musurus Pasha, the late Ambassador in London.

If at the time there was no ground for a suspicion of assassination, there was certainly no evidence deserving the slightest attention brought forward at the iniquitous mock trial three years later, when the ruin of certain important persons had been resolved upon. To secure this object two men—a wrestler and a gardener—were found willing to depose that they had been hired by Midhat and his colleagues to assassinate the ex-Sultan, whom they had murdered with their own hands; and the trial was conducted so as to ensure a conviction in a way that scandalised even the opponents of the accused Pashas, and in defiance both of the law and practice of the country. The story told by the two ruffians was of itself an impossible one, and could easily have been shown to be so if the accused had not been denied by the packed court their legal right of cross-examining the witnesses; and they were found guilty upon the unsupported testimony of two miscreants who gave their evidence without exhibiting the slightest anxiety about the position in which they were placing themselves by avowing that they had murdered their Sovereign with their own hands; and the assumption is irresistible that they were promised not only immunity but reward if they obtained the conviction of the eminent persons who were esteemed dangerous, and likely to stand in the way of the resumption by the Sultan of the absolute

authority taken from him by the Constitution, of which he was contemplating the revocation that was soon carried out. There is no other way of explaining how after the lapse of three years, when they were in no danger, two men should voluntarily come forward and make a confession, which if true must have cost them their lives, but as it was they ran no risk. Their employers kept to their bargain, for they were not hanged, and are understood to have enjoyed comfortable pensions ever since.

The Pashas were condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted, and Midhat was sent to Jeddah, on the Red Sea, whence accounts of him were now and then brought, showing that he was sinking under the rigours of his confinement and from the insufficiency of the pittance of food allowed to him; but, although the general belief is that he ultimately died of starvation, a person who had exceptionally good means of obtaining accurate information has assured me that he ascertained beyond all doubt that the impatience of his gaolers or their employers did not let them wait, and that more energetic means were resorted to for finally getting rid of him. However this may be, there can be no doubt that he was done to death for his efforts to regenerate his country.

The tragical death of ex-Sultan Aziz was destined to prove fatal to the hopes of the reformers. Murad was known at one time to have indulged in habits of intemperance, though he was supposed latterly to have overcome them; but he was of a weak character, devoid of personal courage, and, when Abdul Aziz, about a month before his deposition, caused him to be closely confined to his apartment, he was seized by a constant fear of assassination, under which he again reverted to the abuse of stimulants more immoderately than ever, drinking largely of champagne "cut" with brandy. While the con-

spiracy that was to place him on the throne was in progress he was in a state of terror, for he knew that its failure would cost him his life; and the news of the death of his uncle, ex-Sultan Abdul Aziz, gave him a shock that left him in a state of imbecility, which necessarily put a stop to all the measures it had been intended immediately to carry out.

Sensational events had been succeeding each other with startling rapidity, but we were not yet at the end of them. Within ten days from the death of Abdul Aziz the calm which had followed was again suddenly disturbed by the news that the Ministers had been attacked while sitting in council, and that some of them had been killed and others wounded. It being naturally believed that a counter-revolution was being attempted, a complete panic took possession of many people, and one of my colleagues, with a face as white as a sheet, came into my room while I was dressing in the morning, and, with his teeth literally chattering in his head, asked me what I proposed to do, and whether I intended at once to go on board the despatch boat. Of course I said I was going to remain quietly where I was till I knew more of what was taking place, and that in all events I would do nothing calculated to cause a panic or to make one spread.

It soon appeared that there was no cause for alarm, and that the outrage had been the act of a single man, who without confederates or assistants had carried it out with an audacity and resolution for which it would be difficult to find a parallel. He was a young Circassian officer known as Tcherkess, or Circassian, Hassan, and there is reason to believe that he entertained no particular animosity against any of the Ministers except Hussein Avni, the Minister of War; but that he had maddened himself with "bang," or Indian hemp, and, like an Indian running amuck, attacked everyone within his reach. He was

said to be a near relative of one of Abdul Aziz's Khadines, and probably for that reason had been ordered to a distant post, which excited his wrath; and that he had originally no design against any but the Minister of War seemed proved by the fact that he had first looked for him at his own house, and learning that he had gone to attend the Council followed him thither.

Nothing can show more conclusively the perfect tranquillity and confidence prevailing in a town where a revolution had just been carried out than the fact of the Ministers being found at night sitting quietly in Council without a sentry or armed guards of any kind.

Tcherkess Hassan, who was a noted pistol shot, using his right or left hand indifferently, saying to the doorkeepers that he was charged with a message to one of the Ministers, walked without hindrance into the Council-room and fired two shots in rapid succession, the first killing Hussein Avni Pasha, the Seraskier, and the second Reshid Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, neither of whom even moved afterwards. The other Ministers rushed to the doors to escape, except the Minister of Marine, a gallant old seaman who had given proofs of his courage on many previous occasions, and, amongst others, when he was blown up with his ship at Sinope at the beginning of the Crimean War. He got behind the assassin and tried to pinion him by holding his arms till he was wounded by a yataghan, and, being obliged to let go, slipped through a door into a room where the Grand Vizier had already taken refuge, and the two old men managed between them to push a heavy divan across the door, which fortunately opened inwards. Hassan, failing in all his efforts to force the door, addressed Mehemet Rushdi, the Grand Vizier, in the most respectful terms, saying, "My father, I assure you I have no wish to hurt you,

but open the door and let me finish the Minister of Marine." To which appeal Mehemet Rushdi answered, "My son, you are far too much excited for me to let you in while you are in your present state, and I cannot open the door."

While this strange colloquy was going on the unarmed attendants made an attempt to seize Hassan, but they were shot down one after the other, and it was not till a soldier came and ran him through the body that he was effectually secured. He had brought four revolvers—two in his boots, besides those in his belt—and with these he had succeeded in killing seven persons, including two Ministers, and had wounded eight others, of whom one was the Minister of Marine. He was hanged the next day, maintaining an undaunted bearing to the end, walking, in spite of his wound, to the gallows, where he helped to adjust the rope round his own neck, and died showing to the end the reckless courage with which he had carried out the vengeance he had resolved to take. It did not appear that political considerations, in addition to the grudge he certainly bore against the Minister of War, had in any way actuated him; and if the attack was made with the view of setting on foot a hostile movement against the Government it signally failed of its effect, for the first excitement caused by it almost immediately subsided. But if, instead of the Seraskier, it had been Midhat who had been killed, it would have been very different; for it was in him that the whole hopes of the Constitutionalists were centred, and although Hussein Avni had played such an important part in the deposition of Abdul Aziz, he was never supposed to be in his heart devoted to the cause of freedom.

Impatience, however, began to be shown when day after day passed without any sign of the promulgation of the Constitution so eagerly expected.

The delay was indeed explained by the new Sultan's illness, which was generally known, but the nature and gravity of his malady were so carefully concealed as not to be suspected; and, notwithstanding all the means of information I possessed, it was a considerable time before I ascertained that it was his mind and not his body that was affected, and it was in fact only on July 22, more than six weeks after his accession, that the Grand Vizier, perceiving that I was aware of the truth, ceased to attempt to conceal the state of the case, and spoke openly of the difficulties of the situation.

There was a difference of opinion between him and Midhat as to the course the Government ought to follow; for Mehemet Rushdi recoiled from the adoption of any decisive step till he was satisfied that the condition of the Sultan was hopeless, which the doctors had not yet pronounced it to be. Midhat, on the contrary, thought that the Government were assuming too great a responsibility in continuing to conceal the Sovereign's condition from the nation, and that the state of the case should be laid before a Grand Council, which would determine the course to be followed.

Midhat's language to me at that time led me to conclude that he was even prepared to take a still more decisive step; for he spoke with despondency of the time that was passing without anything being done, and of the necessity of proving to the nation and to Europe that a new era was being inaugurated.

As a Grand Council had already pronounced that an organic reform was necessary, he seemed ready to promulgate the measure on the authority of that national decision; and he was probably influenced in his desire to take this course by his ignorance whether Hamid, if called to the throne, would consent to the constitution on which he had set his heart.

Murad had been pledged to grant it immediately

on his accession, but Hamid, with whom Midhat was not even acquainted, would ascend the throne untrammelled by any such engagement. The objections urged by the Grand Vizier against the course advocated by Midhat were certainly forcible. The object of the proposed Constitution was, he said, to limit or abolish some of the existing prerogatives of the crown, and could, he asked, such a measure be promulgated by the Ministers while the Sovereign was not in a condition to understand the nature of the concessions he was making ? Would not the validity of the new law be contested by those who were opposed to it, and possibly by the next Sovereign ? The hesitation of Mehemet Rushdi was very natural; but the bolder course, instead of temporising, would probably have been better and safer.

But the Grand Vizier had not the strength of character necessary for so great an emergency, and another month was allowed to pass. Even then his dread of assuming the responsibility for a step he knew to be inevitable was so great that he attempted to throw a portion of it upon me; and it shows the estimation in which England was then held at Constantinople when a Grand Vizier, to strengthen his own position among his countrymen, who are peculiarly sensitive to foreign interference in their domestic affairs, wished to support his action in such a matter by obtaining the previous approval of the British Ambassador. Mehemet Rushdi came to me at Therapia on August 25 for the purpose, as I reported to my Government the same day, of obtaining my opinion upon the course that should be followed with regard to the Sultan; and an Ambassador could hardly be placed in a more delicate position than by being asked by the Prime Minister whether he would recommend the reigning Sovereign being set aside. He said he had lost all hope of His Majesty's recovery, and that the head of the lunatic

asylum—whom I knew to be a very eminent authority—was of the same opinion; that Dr. Leidersdorff, the well-known specialist in mental disorders, who had been summoned from Vienna, declared that it would only be after several months—during which he must be kept perfectly quiet—that it could be pronounced whether an ultimate cure might still be possible. This treatment, however, could not possibly be followed, for we were drawing near the time of the Ramazan and the festival of the Bairam, during which it was indispensable for the Sultan to appear in public. At the same time the Grand Vizier could not get over the feeling that Murad might perhaps recover, and it would be cruel for him to find that he had been put aside during a temporary incapacity, and he wished to have my opinion on the matter.

I answered that “he must not expect me, as the Queen’s Ambassador, to express a direct opinion upon a question of such extreme delicacy; that he had two duties to bear in mind, the one to his Sovereign and the other to his country, and he must endeavour to reconcile the two as long as possible; but when he became convinced that the safety and welfare of the Empire were seriously endangered by the continued inability of the Sultan to take charge of its interests, that consideration must overcome all others. Whether that moment had come was a question for him and not for me to answer.” This was sufficient for Mehemet Rushdi, but in reporting the conversation to Lord Derby I added that, “although I was bound to speak with reserve and caution to the Grand Vizier, I must not conceal from your Lordship my opinion that the change should be made with the least possible delay, and that the Empire should not be allowed to continue longer without a Sovereign.”

The next day Prince Hamid sent to me a person

in his service, an Englishman who possessed his entire confidence, to bespeak the support of Her Majesty's Embassy, and to inform me of his views and opinions. The Prince declared that his first wish was to be guided by the advice of Her Majesty's Government. He had had translations made of our Blue-books, and he fully understood that the friendly feeling of England towards Turkey must necessarily be estranged by what had taken place in Bulgaria, and the hard words that had been used in Parliament were not stronger than was warranted if applied to those who were responsible for what had occurred. The credit of the State must be restored by a rigid economy, so that justice could be done to the public creditors; and a control must be established over the finances, to put a stop to the corruption reigning in that department.

The professions of the Prince seemed fair enough, but I was anxious to learn something of his character that would enable me to judge of the course he was likely to follow better than from the mere words he might think it desirable to employ; and upon this point the information I got from his envoy was not so satisfactory. It is true that, as was to be expected, he spoke in the highest terms of the Prince's capacity and disposition; but when he added that he was determined not to put himself into the hands of any Minister, and as soon as possible to get rid of those then in office, it was evident that he bore no good will to the reformers; and, since he appeared to intend to continue the system of personal government, which it was their object to limit, it seemed probable that they would have difficulty in obtaining his consent to the measures by which the power of the Sovereign was to be restricted by a proper control, and which, if Murad had been able to reign, would have been at once secured.

So it proved. Abdul Hamid was proclaimed

Sultan on August 31, and six weeks later the increasing impatience of the people was quieted by the issue of a proclamation announcing a general scheme of reform for the whole Ottoman Empire, but the formal Constitution that was to give effect to it was still withheld. The proclamation, however, promised the establishment of a senate and of a representative assembly to vote the Budget and taxes; a revision of the oppressive system of taxation; the reorganisation of the provincial administration; the full execution of the law of the vilayets, with a large extension of the right of election; and other liberal measures, including most of those which the Porte had been urged to introduce into Bosnia and the Herzegovina. It was issued on October 12, but, owing to the difficulties to be overcome at the Palace, it was not till January 25 following that the long-expected instrument which was to be the charter of the freedom of the Turkish nation was officially proclaimed. Even then it was greatly modified in some essential particulars from Midhat's original project, and disfigured by the omission of a clause for which he had struggled in vain, under which no Ottoman subject could be sent into exile otherwise than by the sentence of a competent court. The Sultan positively refused to be deprived of the power of exiling any of his subjects by his own will, and it turned out in the end that Midhat Pasha himself was the first person upon whom he used it.

When the Constitution was proclaimed Midhat Pasha proposed to communicate it formally and officially to the Conference then sitting at Constantinople, and if the offer had been accepted the Powers would have obtained an engagement little less binding than a formal treaty, and would have secured the right of authoritatively insisting that its provisions should be respected; and, though the Sultan might, perhaps, endeavour to evade it, he could not have

ventured, as he afterwards did, openly to repudiate it; for he would have known not only that the Powers would sternly remind him of the engagement he had taken towards them, but that they would be supported in their protest by the immense majority of his own subjects.

If the members of the Conference had been at all aware of the serious nature of the reform movement that was in progress, and of the earnestness of the men who were striving to carry it through, they would, no doubt, gladly have seized the opportunity of forwarding it; but most of them, being profoundly ignorant of all that had been going on in the country before their own arrival, imagined the Constitution to have been invented merely as a means of providing the Porte with a *prétext* for refusing to accept some of the proposals on which they were insisting. But there was something painfully ungenerous towards a people striving for their freedom, in the comments that were made upon it, when all that was valuable in it was carefully passed over, while all its shortcomings were no less carefully dwelt upon, and in the insinuations that were allowed to reach the Palace that the Sultan would do well to be on his guard against Midhat Pasha, who had taken an active part in dethroning his two predecessors, and who was now aiming at making himself a dictator. The Liberal party in England, little to its credit, adopting much the same tone, thus did its best to defeat the efforts of a people struggling to escape from an odious despotism; and the day Lord Salisbury and I arrived at Dover on our return from the unfortunate Conference we were greeted with the news of the dismissal and disgrace of Midhat Pasha, as the first result of the triumphant success with which General Ignatiew had conducted it.

Incomplete as the new Constitution undoubtedly was, and falling short of what had been hoped for

by its authors, who had been forced to be satisfied with what they found it possible to extort from a Sovereign reluctant to permit any limitation of his authority, it is certain that the much-derided Charter contained much that must have proved of inestimable value in reforming to Turkish administration in the only way in which it ever can be reformed—that is to say, by recognising in the people the right of control over the finances, by rendering the Ministers and officials responsible to the representatives of the nation, by establishing the absolute equality of all Ottoman subjects of whatever race or creed, and by guaranteeing their persons and property against arrest or spoliation. During the time it was in existence the two Sessions of the National Assembly which were actually held were eminently encouraging, and, although Midhat Pasha and other leaders of the reforming party had already been summarily banished, the representatives showed that they were not to be cowed by the presence of officials or Palace favourites, and that they were determined that the control they had been granted over the Government should be a real one. There was no jealousy between the different classes of which the Assembly was composed; turbanned Mollahs and dignitaries or representatives of the Christian Churches being equally bent upon making the new institution work for the regeneration of their common country, criticising the acts of the Government with perfect freedom, making known the abuses going on in the provinces, and refusing to vote the money asked for when they deemed the amount excessive or the objects undesirable. Nothing in fact could be more promising; and many of those who in their ignorance of the Turkish character had laughed at the notion of an Ottoman Parliament, prophesying that it would be entirely subservient to the Government, and confine itself to registering all the proposals submitted to it,

now honestly expressed their surprise and admiration at the fearless spirit that was exhibited.

I had then left Constantinople, and cannot speak of the proceedings from my own observation; but the correspondent of *The Times*, as well as those of other papers, bore testimony to the courage with which, at almost every sitting, the Chamber criticised the acts of the Government and called upon the different Ministers to give explanations respecting their conducts of their departments, and he added that the present contest "was one between the people and the Pashas." No doubt this was so. For two years the struggle of the people with the Palace and Pashas had been carried on, and the weight of England, unfortunately led by those who ought to have been the first to welcome the dawn of freedom in another country, had been thrown into the scale of the Pashas, and against those who were labouring for the people.

Absolute rulers and their dependents do not reconcile themselves readily to the loss of any of their power, and it is not, therefore, surprising that the aberration by which England was then possessed should have encouraged the Sultan to set about the recovery of his authority, and he at once perceived that his first step should be to deprive the reformers of their leader. A blow might be safely struck at Midhat Pasha without the risk of a word of disapproval from either party in England, for by the Liberals he had been mercilessly reviled, and he had incurred the aversion of the representatives of the Government at the Conference of Constantinople by his refusal to accept *en bloc* the whole of the proposals which, under the inspiration of the Russian Ambassador, had been pressed upon him. Consequently the Sultan eagerly seized the opportunity of getting rid of the one man whose presence would make it difficult for him to recall the reforms he had been

constrained to grant. Midhat Pasha was sent to perish in exile, Abdul Hamid recovered his despotic power, unchecked by parliamentary or other control, and Turkey relapsed into a state as bad as that in which it had ever been.

CHAPTER XII

TURKEY—V.: THE BULGARIAN ATROCITIES, 1876

NOTHING occurring in a foreign country within my recollection ever caused in England a sensation at all to be compared with that produced by the Turkish excesses in Bulgaria in the spring of 1876; but, horrible as they were, the excitement about them, as about anything not directly affecting our own country, would soon have passed away if the leaders of the Opposition had not found in them an opportunity to make political capital against Lord Beaconsfield's Government, and, by a reckless distortion of facts, to rouse all the generous instincts of the nation not only against Turkey but against our own Government, which was represented as scarcely less guilty. There had been, they declared, an unprovoked attack by the fanatical Mussulmans of Bulgaria on their unoffending and peaceable Christian fellow-subjects, upon whom they had exhausted every form of barbarous brutality, while our Government had stood calmly looking on without either expressing abhorrence for these deeds or doing anything to procure the punishment of those guilty of them.

All this was entirely untrue, excepting as regards the fact that horrible atrocities had been committed by bands of Mahometans, for it was the Christians who had been the first aggressors, treacherously massacring unsuspecting Turkish zaptiehs and burning many Mahometan villages; and, as soon as it was known that the Turks on recovering from their panic were retaliating with indiscriminate brutality, we were incessant in urging the Porte to take measures

to protect the populations from these iniquities, and to bring to justice those who had been engaged in them.

Over anything that took place in a Turkish province our Government had, of course, absolutely no control, nor had they more power to procure the punishment of offenders than every Government which kept a representative at Constantinople; but, although no one knew this better than Mr. Gladstone, he did not hesitate to speak of the outrages much as if they had taken place in British territory and as though we alone were responsible for the impunity of the perpetrators of them.

There was, however, one Government directly responsible for all that occurred by encouraging the attempted insurrection which brought upon the Christians the bloody reprisals that horrified the world; but it was that Government which was selected for boundless eulogy by Mr. Gladstone when he passionately urged that "we should emulate the good deeds of Russia and show ourselves her equal in the pity for suffering humanity for which she is so conspicuous." From first to last he never once alluded to the fact that it was the Christians who began the work of murder and the burning of villages, and that it was only after finding themselves threatened with destruction that the Mussulmans retaliated, as all Eastern populations will do, with the savage ferocity of demons—it was the unspeakable Turk indulging his innate love of slaughter and his hatred of all unbelievers.

The almost official assistance given by Russia to the insurgents in Bosnia and the Herzegovina through its Consul-General and other Agents, together with the scarcely less open encouragement of the Austrian Slav Generals in Dalmatia, had effectually prevented the suppression of the insurrection in those provinces, and encouraged an attempt to get up similar move-

ments in other quarters; and during the winter of 1875-6 Russian Agents, directed by the Slav committees of Moscow and Odessa, which were in close alliance with General Ignatiew, were busy in organising a rising in Bulgaria, where the Mahometans formed a small minority of the population. The province was so quiet and the two races were living in such entire harmony that there were scarcely any Turkish troops in it; but the movement broke out before the time fixed by the leaders, who had not completed their arrangements, and, after some zaptiehs had been slaughtered and a number of villages burnt, it was ferociously stamped out by the Mussulman population formed into irregular bands.

Such, in a few words, is the broad outline of the history of the famous "Bulgarian Atrocities," of which I will give some further details, and will show how absolutely groundless were the accusations against Her Majesty's Government and Embassy of the callous indifference of which they were accused.

It was on May 4 that at Constantinople we first heard that an insurrection had broken out at Otlakeui, a village not very far from Philippopolis, but, as we had no Consular Agent nearer than Adrianople, all the information I could get had to be obtained through my colleagues or from indirect sources, and for some time we heard of nothing except of the excesses that were being committed by armed bands of Christian Bulgarians. The Austrian Ambassador told me that he had heard from his Consular Agent of five villages being burnt by the insurgents, and he looked upon the affair as very serious; while General Ignatiew, who was with us at the time, and who, if he had chosen could have told us a good deal more about it, as his own Consular Agent was a prime instigator of the movement, declared that it was a mere disturbance among the workmen on the railway, many of whom were Italians, and that we should endeavour

to persuade the Porte not to raise it into undue importance by the despatch of troops or the adoption of any extraordinary measures.

I reminded him that this was the very same advice he had given at the beginning of the Herzegovinian insurrection, which had unfortunately been followed by the Porte, with the result, as we all knew, that it was still unrepented, and that the authorities had been obliged to resort to Bashi-Bazouks and irregulars, whose mode of proceeding was notorious, and the employment of whom was precisely what we ought to endeavour to prevent. For my part, therefore, I should urge the Porte not to lose a day in despatching to the scene of the disorders such regular troops as they could lay their hands upon, instead of leaving them to be dealt with by irregulars; and in this I was warmly supported by Count Zichy, the Austrian Ambassador, notwithstanding his usual deference to his Russian colleague, whose advice, however, contrary to ours, prevailed with a Grand Vizier notoriously under his influence.

Two or three days later I received a despatch* from our Vice-Consul at Adrianople giving the report of a Polish gentleman of the occurrence at Otlakeui, of which he had been eye-witness. He said that a post of Turkish zaptiehs had been fallen upon and murdered by a party of Bulgarians led by Servians, who set on fire the villages of the peaceful Bulgarians, and that in this way twenty small villages had been burnt and the inhabitants driven away; and that at another place called Sarambey four or five more zaptiehs had been murdered by the insurgents and more acts of incendiaryism committed. The authorities then collected and armed the Mussulmans and pursued the murderers.

In forwarding this despatch to Lord Derby I said

* Not to be confounded with the despatch improperly withheld.

that there was, I believed, "no doubt of the correctness of what Mr. Dupuis states of the leaders in the affair at Otlakeui, where the disturbances commenced, being Servians or other emissaries of the revolutionary committees, and that the organisers of the movement pursued the same atrocious policy as was followed in the Herzegovina by burning and ravaging all villages, whether Mussulman or Christian, if the inhabitants refused to join them." I added that the last accounts received by the Porte were satisfactory, and it was hoped that the movement would not spread, but that there was one danger "*greatly to be apprehended*. Outrages committed upon the peaceful Mussulmans, and especially upon the women and children, may provoke among the Mahometans a spirit of fanaticism and revenge likely to lead to similar acts of retaliation, which it may be very difficult to restrain, although the Government declare their determination to do all in their power to prevent it."

A few days later the Vice-Consul reported that the burning of a place called Bellova by the insurgents had been attended with horrible cruelties to the small Turkish Guard, who had been hacked to pieces by the Bulgarians; that a party of well-equipped insurgents then entered the village, "led by priests, declaring, with crucifixes in hand, that that was the way to exterminate Islam"; that the authorities were showing great activity in the enrolment and arming of Bash-Bazouks and other volunteers, who were reported to be committing the excesses that were to be expected from them.

The Consul at Rustchuk also reported that a Circassian village near Avratelan had been burnt by the insurgents, and that, if this was so, the lawless Circassians would be sure to take their revenge, which it would severely tax the Government to prevent; and, on receiving these accounts, I again and again

protested at the Porte against the employment of irregulars, whose excesses I had foreseen and attempted to guard against even before the rumour of any having been already committed had reached me or any of my colleagues at Constantinople.

It was not, in fact, till the middle of June, six weeks after we first heard of the outbreak, that any particulars of the occurrences arrived there, when a despatch from the Vice-Consul at Adrianople, which in the ordinary routine of the service ought at once to have been communicated to me, was improperly withheld from me, and given to the correspondent of the *Daily News*, and the public thus got from a newspaper much that the Government would have learnt from me if it had not been for this unjustifiable proceeding, of which I remained in ignorance for two years, when the officer who had so misconducted himself was already dead. But, although this was made the pretext for accusing me of being either indifferent to, or of endeavouring to conceal, the Turkish misdeeds, those who made the charge knew perfectly well that it was groundless, for the correspondent had expressly stated in his letter that "the Ambassador has been bringing his influence to bear on the Turkish Government to put a stop to these proceedings"; but, with this statement before his eyes, Mr. Gladstone did not scruple to declare that, without the letter in the *Daily News*, "we might have been left in the dark up to the present moment." His object being to raise a popular clamour against the Government, he had no hesitation in concealing from the public or in misrepresenting their real action at Constantinople. Every scrap of information that reached me was at once sent home, and my published despatches of May 28, June 8 and 19, reported the repeated protests I had been making against the employment of Bashi-Bazouks, who, I said, had been acting "with cruelty and brutality," and it was not

till June 23 that the *Daily News* published the famous letter from which it was pretended the first knowledge of the excesses was derived.

It was true, however, that that letter, embodying the concealed report of the Adrianople Vice-Consul, first brought to light the fact that the slaughter of men, women, and children, and other outrages of all kinds, had taken place upon a scale of which not an Embassy at Constantinople had previously the slightest conception; but, although the real horrors might have been supposed sufficient to satisfy the most greedy appetite for them, there was besides a systematic manufacture of imaginary ones; and every word published anonymously in a newspaper was accepted without question in England and made the text of declamatory speeches, in which the Government and the Embassy were attacked with a violence that could not have been exceeded if they had themselves been the guilty parties. Story upon story, without even a foundation of truth, circulated throughout the length and breadth of the country—sixty young women burnt in a barn, a hundred children massacred in a school, cartloads of heads of women and children triumphantly paraded, young women and children publicly sold, were among the inventions greedily accepted and believed, and those who ventured to say that they were untrue or that the reports were exaggerated were denounced to public execration as sympathising with the ill-doers.

At Constantinople, in the majority of cases, it was next to impossible to ascertain what was true and what was false; for, while on the one side the Turkish denials were not to be trusted, the assertions made on the other were quite as little veracious; and on one occasion I had an opportunity of seeing how persons of perfectly good faith were entrapped into endorsing the imaginary sensational stories of the ingenious manufacturers of horrors. A young Greek arrived

one morning in a fearful state of excitement and misery at the house of some respectable English residents at Scutari, saying he had just escaped from a village, which he named, where his brothers and sister had been brutally maltreated and murdered by some Turks, from whom he had with much difficulty contrived to escape. The Englishmen had questioned and examined him closely, and sent him up to me at Therapia, saying they were convinced of the truth of his story, which he repeated so circumstantially that I, like them, believed it, in spite of the declaration of the Minister of Police, who happened to call while the man was with me, that no such occurrence could have taken place without his being informed of it, at a village within a day's journey of Constantinople, and in a part of the country where there had been no disturbance. He promised to have the matter at once investigated; but I, not choosing to trust to the Turkish enquiry, desired one of our own Dragomans to go to the scene of the outrage and to let me know the whole truth about it. At the end of two days he came back, having found the village perfectly quiet, no disturbance of any kind having taken place. The young Greek had disappeared when he found his story was to be tested: it was a lie from beginning to end, and but for the accident of the scene of it having been laid at a place within my reach, it would have gone down, like so many other stories not less false, as a monstrous and well-established case of outrage, in which I myself fully believed.

The most curious example of British credulity was that afforded by Canon Liddon and Mr. Malcolm McColl, of whose perfect good faith there cannot be a question; while, at the same time, it is at least equally certain that they never really did see that which they affirmed themselves to have seen. Their statement was that from the deck of an Austrian steamer on the

River Save, which separates Servia from the Herzegovina, they distinctly saw the body of a man, still alive, writhing on a stake close to a Turkish guard-house; while similar stakes were observed to be prepared for the same purpose near other guard-houses.

Many hideous and revolting murders were committed during the insurrection, both by the Mussulmans and the Christians, and I knew of one case, that took place on the frontiers of Montenegro, in which the latter showed a barbarity that could not have been exceeded by the most ferocious of their adversaries, when a young doctor was flayed alive, while his companion had his limbs chopped off one by one. The victims in this case were Christians, and they were thus treated by the "Christian" insurgents because they refused to join them; but it would be as unjust to suppose that such deeds were countenanced by the Prince of Montenegro as it is to insinuate that, when committed by the Mussulman bands, they were countenanced by the Turkish authorities. The two races have precisely the same savage propensities, which they equally give way to in the time of war; and if the reverend gentlemen had stated that they had seen a man on the stake at some unfrequented place at a distance from any Turkish post, it would have been impossible to feel sure that they had not come upon one of the victims of the bands of ruffians then in arms. But their statement admits of no such explanation, for they declared that the scene lay *close* to a Turkish guard-house, while at the other guard-houses stakes had been *prepared for similar purposes*. The impalement must therefore have been, not a murder committed by unknown miscreants, but a brutal execution carried out by Turkish officials.

What it was that they took for an unfortunate wretch writhing on the stake will probably never be known and can only be guessed at. In those countries

poles with notches on them are erected, up which the keepers of cattle climb, and are constantly seen leaning over the top of them while watching the herds, and the same thing is done by the fishermen when watching to see a shoal of fish enter their nets, and the men on the top look very much as if they were transfixed by the pole, as is well known to all who have lived long on the Bosphorus; and the most plausible conjecture is that it was one of these men who was pointed out as an impaled Christian by some practical joker on board the Austrian steamer, who must have thoroughly enjoyed the success of his hoax.

The officers of those steamers, which run weekly on the Save, are Austrian, and almost all Slavs, sympathising with the Christian insurgents and hostile to the Turks, and they were under strict orders to report anything unusual they observed on their voyages; but when questioned upon this matter, they declared that neither on the occasion in question nor on any other had they seen a man on the stake, and that, moreover, they had never even heard of such a case. The sight, which must have filled with horror everyone on board the steamer, had only been visible to Canon Liddon and Mr. McColl ! All endeavours to find a single other witness among those who were present with them proved fruitless, and it is not surprising that, when their account reached Constantinople, even the most vehement of the adversaries of the Turks joined in the shout of derision with which it was received; for they well knew that for very many years there had been no such thing as an execution by impalement.

The occurrence was said to have taken place in the diocese of the well-known and energetic Slavophil, Bishop Strossmeyer, and he was written to by one of the Consuls in Bosnia, who asked if he had heard of this or any other case of impalement. His answer

was truly jesuitical, and he fenced with the question without answering it: his conscience would not allow him to go the length of affirming that he had ever heard of such a case, but he could not bring himself to give the Turks the satisfaction of saying that he never had, so he contented himself with declaring that there was no barbarity of which they were not capable.

But Mr. Gladstone's conscience was not so tender, and his language on the subject was altogether unscrupulous. He declared that the question whether Mr. Liddon and Mr. McColl were mistaken or not was a matter of perfect indifference, and that the incredulity that had been expressed about what had been treated as Canon Liddon's hobgoblin story "only showed the gross ignorance of those who ought to know better." Having thus asserted his own superior knowledge, he proceeded to point out to his more ignorant hearers that the matter was immaterial, since it was only a question "as to one more or less, because impalement *is* a thing familiarly practised in Turkey. It *is* one of the venerated institutions of the country, and every sound Turk would feel that you were depriving him of a part of his patrimony if the practice of impalement were to be given up. There is no doubt about it any more than there is any doubt about any other fact familiar to history." His words no doubt answered their turn by stimulating the popular indignation against the Turks which he was labouring to arouse, since few of Mr. Gladstone's hearers would think of questioning anything that he laid down as being, to his own knowledge, an indisputable matter of fact; but there never was anything more absolutely untrue than the statement that impalement is familiarly practised in the Turkey of our day, or that it is an institution to which all true Mussulmans would cling.

Admitting that Mr. Gladstone, even under the

storm of passionate excitement that then possessed him, would not deliberately make a statement which he knew to be false, and that he must in charity be assumed to have spoken in ignorance, the excuse is, at the best, a very lame one; for if he had not at the time been utterly reckless, before making such a sweeping charge and sneering at what was said by "those who ought to know," he would have felt that in common decency he should try to ascertain the truth for himself; and he would have had no difficulty in doing so. If he had applied to anyone who had resided in Turkey of late—merchants, Consuls, Christian missionaries and Bible *colporteurs*, of all men the least likely to conceal Mahometan misdeeds—they would have told him, without one exception, that impalement had for many years past been as obsolete a punishment in Turkey as the pillory and branding are in England, or hanging for the theft of a sheep or of five shillings. I have questioned many and never got but one answer.

In England, where anything that takes place is known everywhere in a few days, it is not easy for people to realise how such things as had happened in Bulgaria could remain for weeks unknown, not only at Constantinople but at places like Adrianople and Philippopolis, where there was equal ignorance about some of the worst atrocities which had occurred within short distances from them. Such, however, was the case, and under instruction from Lord Derby I sent Mr. Baring, a Second Secretary of the Embassy, to investigate the facts on the spot. He did his work thoroughly and conscientiously, and reduced to about a tenth the number of the victims given by the English newspapers; but although even Baring's estimate was afterwards found to have at least doubled the reality, when hundreds of those he had counted among the slain returned to their villages, he fully established the fact that in many places there had

been awful and wholesale massacres and brutality on a scale of which no one at Constantinople had previously had a conception, and which were more than sufficient to justify a feeling of universal execration. His report was consequently cited at every indignation meeting held in England; but there was one portion of it which was never by any chance quoted or alluded to, for it too effectually disposed of all that had been said of the peaceful Christians having been wantonly fallen upon by the Mussulmans, and it showed too clearly what had been the part played by Russia, who had been so loudly extolled by our humanitarians.

He stated that he had ascertained that a conspiracy for an insurrection on a very large scale had been hatching for many months; that Mahmoud Pasha, the Grand Vizier, commonly known as Mahmoudoff from his notorious subserviency to the Russian Ambassador, had been warned of it, and took no steps to avert it by sending a few regular troops into the province, and that the insurrection broke out prematurely, before the general organisation was complete, and began by the sudden and unprovoked massacre of Turks at several different places. Then followed the arming of the Mussulman populations, and the bloody stamping out of the insurrection by them and the Bashi-Bazouks with the savage retaliation that the attack upon them was pretty sure to provoke. Baring showed that the insurrection had been planned and fomented by Russian agents, who went about persuading the deluded peasants that, as soon as they rose, they would be supported by a Russian army, which would enable them to exterminate the Turks; and it was through the influence of the Russian Ambassador that the Porte delayed the despatch of the troops which, if they had reached the disturbed districts in time, would have prevented the excesses.

The Russian Vice-Consul at Philippopolis was one of the principal organisers of the movement and proposed to carry it out, as had been done in Herzegovina, by surprising and massacring isolated parties of unsuspecting Turks, and by burning all the villages of which the inhabitants refused to take part in it; but, although nothing could be more clearly proved from Baring's report than that Russia, and Russia alone, had been responsible for all that had taken place, the speeches at the indignation meetings may be searched in vain for any allusion to this fact.

There can be no doubt that the Mussulmans had ample ground for the belief that their own destruction was intended, and it was under the combined influence of panic and of a thirst for vengeance upon those who had attacked them that they gave way to the excesses, of which, as I have already said, all these populations, whether Mussulman or Christian, are capable in times of excitement.

The Bulgarians themselves, who since their liberation have earned well-deserved admiration, and are naturally a quiet, industrious people, showed on the advance of the Russian army that they could surpass the Turks in the treatment of their enemies; and the atrocities of which they had been the victims sank into insignificance when compared with those of which they themselves were guilty. The helpless Turks, the women and children who perished with every form of outrage, were as a thousand for every hundred of the Bulgarians who had been similarly treated; and these horrors, which went on for very many months, were only stopped by the strong hand of Prince Alexander, while the excesses of the Turks had only lasted a fortnight, or at the utmost three weeks, while their passions were at the highest.

Little was heard in this country of the excesses of the Bulgarians; for when the victims were Turks and the misdoers Christians, our so-called humani-

tarians had not a word to spare of pity for the first or of blame for the latter. The truth is that in those countries the populations, of whatever creed, exhibit in time of war savage propensities of which those who have only seen them in times of tranquillity would not believe them capable. In ordinary life the Turks are humane and considerate of women and children, but when thoroughly aroused there is nothing they will not do.

Then, again, the Christian Montenegrins, of whose good qualities everyone who has visited their country speaks with admiration, act in time of war like perfect savages; and the pictures that used to be drawn of them during the Turkish crusade had about as much likeness to the originals as Fenimore Cooper's descriptions had to the real American Red Indian. During the war such few Turkish prisoners as were brought to the Montenegrin capital of Cettinje were treated as well and with as much humanity as they could have been by any civilised people; but, on the other hand, the Montenegrins are not apt to give quarter to their enemies, those who fall into their hands being generally put to death with every kind of barbarity, of which I heard many well-authenticated examples. The Prince did all in his power, but without success, to get his people to abandon their custom of cutting off the noses of their killed or wounded enemies, which they kept as trophies exactly as the Indians kept scalps.

On one occasion a wounded young Montenegrin was brought into the hospital at Cettinje, and, on being put into a ward under a sympathising Austrian lady, asked that the bag containing his valuables should be put under his pillow for safety. In a day or two the ward was found not to be as sweet as usual, and this getting worse, a search was made, when the mischief was found to proceed from the bag of the young patient, who had put his much prized noses with his other treasures under his pillow !

A nose had an additional value if it had a portion of the upper lip attached to it, to show by the moustache that it had belonged to a man and not to a woman. About a hundred and forty Turkish soldiers thus mutilated—a very small proportion, of course, of the poor wretches operated upon, of whom by far the greater number died—were at one time in the hospital at Constantinople, where the sight of them greatly changed the feelings of persons who had come from England with warm sympathies for the mild Christians who were defending themselves from the savage Turks, and who now, for the first time, became aware of what the former were capable. If those who bore the marks of this barbarous treatment had been Bulgarians or Montenegrins the pictures of the victims of the abominable Turk would, no doubt, have been exhibited at every indignation meeting, and made the theme of denunciation against the Mussulman monsters; but, as the mutilated wretches were only Turks, not a word was said about it.

The destruction of villages in Bulgaria, and the death of so many of the men belonging to them, having left many women and children houseless and destitute, committees for their relief were organised at Constantinople, and we, still believing at that time that most of those who were descanting so loudly on the sufferings undergone by the Christians at the hands of the Turks were actuated by a genuine feeling of humanity, expected liberal subscriptions from them to the relief funds; but they quickly undeceived us, for, to our surprise and disappointment, the donations were deplorably meagre, and by far the greater proportion of them came from those who did not join in the outcry against Turkey and our Government. There was no doubt of the prevalence of destitution and suffering among the Bulgarian population, though much of it was caused by the destruction of

the villages, burnt by the insurgents; but the humanitarians had exhausted their stock of charity in words, in scathing denunciations of the unspeakable Turk, in harrowing descriptions of the destitution and sufferings of the unfortunate Bulgarians, and they had nothing to spare for the relief of those sufferings —of wordy philanthropy a vast deal, of practical philanthropy scarcely any.

After this it would be difficult indeed to believe that those who spoke the loudest were inspired by any higher feeling than a wish to damage the Government, as whose agent I had to bear the brunt of much vehement vituperation; and the game of the party was shown by Mr. Freeman when he wrote (*Daily News*, September 5): "No doubt Sir Henry Elliot is not the greatest culprit, but he is the greatest whom any possible form of proceeding allows us to touch. We cannot ask Lord Derby to dismiss himself: we can ask him to dismiss his subordinate." This was plain speaking, and others followed suit, among them Canon Liddon, who, irritated perhaps by the ridicule attaching to his impalement story, declared, in a spirit not over-seemly in a clergyman, that it would be "necessary to replace Sir H. Elliot by a diplomat of human rather than of Turkish sympathies." Canon Liddon had formed his opinions, as I was afterwards told and fully believe, entirely from the speeches and newspaper articles, without himself reading any of the official correspondence; for had he done so, he would have found it difficult to find in my despatches a single word showing sympathy for Turkish misdeeds or of indifference to the maltreatment of the Christians, but much that would have satisfied him that I had done all in my power for the latter. The only mistake that I am conscious of was that at first, in common with all my colleagues, I disbelieved the excesses to be on such a frightful scale as was afterwards proved to be the case, though this had in no way

relaxed my endeavours to get them put an end to and the perpetrators punished.

A misinterpreted speech of Lord Beaconsfield, alluding to "bazaar gossip" about outrages, had offended public feeling, and created a disposition to listen to the accusations brought against the Government of a callous indifference to them, and of a desire to conceal the misdeeds of the Turks, for which there was no real foundation. That our Government and the Embassy did everything that could be done, both for the protection of the Bulgarians and to obtain the punishment of those who had maltreated them, was to be seen plainly enough in the published official correspondence; but few among the public took the trouble to look at the Blue books; they were contented to accept the statements, unsupported except by anonymous newspaper writers, which were put forward by those whose sole object was to damage the Government, and who did not scruple to suppress anything that would weaken their attack.

Party spirit often leads to unreasonable attacks upon a Government, but it seldom goes the length to which it was carried on this occasion. The attempt to make the Government responsible for what happened in a foreign country was in itself sufficiently absurd, but there was something outrageous in the way in which Lord Derby, and myself especially, were held up to public execration as monsters destitute of every human feeling, only influenced by a blind love of the Turks and by the desire to conceal or excuse their misdeeds.

I am not, of course, an impartial judge with regard to my own actions, but, looking calmly at them after a lapse of seventeen years, I am still at a loss to see what I omitted to do that was possible for a person in my position; and I have at least the satisfaction of knowing that I did very much more than was done

by all my colleagues combined, though they were precisely similarly placed. Before any outrages occurred I urged the Porte to take measures to prevent them; when they occurred I insisted that they must be stopped; and I was incessant in pressing for the punishment of the guilty. It would be difficult for those who most virulently attacked me to say what more I could have done.

CHAPTER XIII

TURKEY—VI.: THE CONFERENCE OF CONSTANTINOPLE

THIS ill-starred Conference, which directly paved the way for the Russo-Turkish War and for the unrest which has ever since prevailed in European Turkey, is not a subject upon which I have any disposition to dwell; but I have at least the satisfaction of knowing that I never was supposed to approve what was done, and that I was ultimately recognised as having been right in my objections to the course followed.

Before the end of the summer of 1876 complete tranquillity was restored in Bulgaria: the Mussulmans had recovered from the panic under which they had committed their excesses, any renewal of which was made impossible by the presence of a large body of regular troops; the devastated villages were being rapidly rebuilt—partly by the Government and partly by public subscriptions—and the dispersed inhabitants, including many hundreds who had been counted among the slain, were quietly returning to their houses.

But, on the other hand, no progress was made towards repressing the insurrection in Bosnia; Servia and Montenegro were still at war with Turkey, and, although Montenegro had obtained some advantages, Servia, in spite of all the underhand Russian assistance in money, arms and officers, was so hopelessly beaten that the Russian Government, which had originally declared that if the Servians chose to make an unprovoked attack they would leave them to their fate,

now felt it necessary to come forward in their defence. They proposed therefore that a Conference of the Great Powers should be held at Constantinople, at which, without the presence or participation of a Turkish representative, conditions should be laid down and enforced upon the Sultan; but none of the other Governments were willing to fall in with a proposal which was regarded, especially by England and Austria, as an outrageous attack upon the independence of Turkey.

While rejecting the Russian proposal, however, Her Majesty's Government declared their readiness to take the initiative of inviting a general Conference of the Powers, including Turkey, at which it was hoped that it might be possible to come to some arrangement; and in the invitations sent to the other Governments the object of this Conference was stated to be: first, the conclusion of peace between Turkey, Servia, and Montenegro, and, secondly, the pacification of Bosnia and the Herzegovina by means of a system of local or administrative autonomy, which, as far as was applicable, should be extended to Bulgaria, so as to ensure the populations there from further maladministration.

The Porte was very unwilling to agree to the holding of a Conference, and only gave way after I had been instructed to give the most solemn assurance that the independence of Turkey should be fully respected, that the programme should be strictly adhered to, no departure from it being permitted; and had this engagement been observed, we should not have been open to the just reproach of the Turks of having gone back from our pledged word, and the result would have been very different.

When the question of a Conference was first mooted I had written to Lord Derby that, if there was to be any change in the policy I had hitherto been instructed to carry out, I was so completely identified

with it, and my views were so well known at Constantinople, that I was the last person who ought to be employed in the negotiation.* I was, moreover, so unwell from overwork as to be almost unfit for business, and was most anxious at once to avail myself of the leave of absence I had already asked for. But the Government had no thought of changing their policy, and Lord Derby so strongly urged me to remain for the Conference, on account of the "importance they attached to my judgment and experience," that I unwillingly consented to do so, which I certainly would not have done if I had suspected the line that was to be followed.

The announcement that Lord Salisbury was to be our First Plenipotentiary gave me unmixed pleasure, for, never doubting for a moment that we should act in harmony in our common task, I rejoiced at the weight that would be given to the British representatives by the presence of a Cabinet Minister of his eminence, and certainly the last thing that I could anticipate was that he would almost at once become a docile instrument in the hands of the Russian Ambassador.

It is hardly possible to recognise in the Minister who has for so many years directed the Foreign Affairs of the country with such admitted ability the same person as he who so conspicuously failed in his first diplomatic campaign; but Lord Salisbury, when appointed First Plenipotentiary to the Conference, was, although a Cabinet Minister, under the disadvantage of being profoundly ignorant of the ground on which he had to work, and of knowing nothing of

* In vol. vi., p. 13, of *The Life of Lord Beaconsfield* he complains on September 10, 1875, "Not one of Her Majesty's Ambassadors is at his post." This was incorrect; Sir Henry Elliot was at Constantinople, and it was three years of incessant and anxious work which had temporarily injured his usually fine health.

Turkish affairs or of the people with whom he had to deal; and he may have believed that there was more of exaggeration than of truth in what was said of the intrigues of Russia and the falseness of her Ambassador. The moment was exceptionally favourable for an English Cabinet Minister to acquire influence over the Turkish Government; a reforming Grand Vizier was trying to establish a popular control over the Palace, and the sympathy and good wishes of the British nation were counted upon, while, at the same time, Russia was more than usually the object of the hatred and distrust of the Turks, who knew that it was through her machinations that their troubles in Bosnia and Bulgaria, and their war with Servia and Montenegro had been brought about, and that she had mobilised her army and was only waiting for some favourable pretext for attacking them.

It was obviously our policy to exert all our influence to induce the Porte to make all the concessions that could reasonably be required, so as to deprive Russia of the pretext she was seeking; while it was no less obviously the policy of Russia to obtain our concurrence in putting forward such extreme demands as, if consented to by Turkey, would have the effect of permanently weakening her, or, if rejected, would afford the wished-for excuse for declaring war. It had seemed to me so clear that this would be the Russian game that when the Conference was decided upon I expressed my conviction to the Government that it would be the one played, and played it was with complete success.

On the day of Lord Salisbury's arrival at Constantinople I had a long conversation with him, in which I laid before him that he would find the Turks well disposed to listen to any advice given them by a Cabinet Minister belonging to a Government which

had shown themselves friendly to them. I said that I knew some people believed that nothing more was required than that England and Russia should agree as to the demands to be made upon the Sultan, but that my knowledge of the Turks made me certain that this was a dangerous delusion, which, if acted upon, would assuredly wreck the Conference. I further told him that General Ignatiew was still bent upon having a preliminary exclusive Conference on the Russian plan, to draw up proposals to be imposed upon the Sultan, and this, Lord Salisbury emphatically said, "must be resisted"; but the resistance did not last long, for, in spite of the recorded disapproval of our Government, the General almost immediately carried his point, and put an end to the hope of the Conference leading to any good result. After my conversation with Lord Salisbury on the day of his arrival he never once, of his own accord, entered upon the subject upon which we were associated, hinted at the course he proposed to follow, or informed me of the arrangements he was making with General Ignatiew, till I learnt them at the meetings when they were communicated to our foreign colleagues.

I accompanied Lord Salisbury to the audience given him by the Sultan a few days after his arrival, when he was received with a cordiality and confidence that nothing could exceed. Abdul Hamid, who had been but a few months on the throne, spoke of his own inexperience and of the difficulties by which he was surrounded; he was convinced of the friendly disposition of Her Majesty's Government, and was anxious to recover the sympathy of England, which he knew had been forfeited by recent events in Bulgaria previous to his accession; he expressed an earnest and evidently sincere wish to be greatly guided by Lord Salisbury's advice, and if Lord Salisbury would let him know the concessions

which Her Majesty's Government thought he should make and the reforms to be carried out, he would find him prepared to go as far as a regard for his independence and the interests of his Empire should make it possible.

Lord Salisbury very naturally answered that he could not at that moment tell His Majesty what measures might be necessary, as he must first have some further communication with his colleagues, but he hoped *in a very few days* to be in a position to speak more plainly; and it was then arranged that as soon as Lord Salisbury had had the communications with his colleagues he had spoken of, he should send to the Palace, and His Majesty would expect him and me to dine with him the same day, when the state of affairs would be fully discussed.

It was supposed that this would be in two days, or three at furthest, but day after day passed and no sign was made; message after message came from the Palace asking when we were coming to dine with the Sultan according to the invitation given and accepted, and the messengers were sent away without an answer, excuse, or explanation. At that time there was a general belief—doomed to be fatally disappointed—that the reign of Abdul Hamid was to be the dawn of a new era of prosperity, and when the contemptuous slight that had been passed upon him became known it gave rise among all classes of his subjects to a feeling of resentful indignation that was fatal to our influence, and led to our being regarded as in league with the enemy who was aiming at the ruin of the Empire; and, indeed, it was not difficult to detect the hand of the Russian Ambassador in what had occurred.

At a second interview with the Sultan it was very possible that Lord Salisbury might obtain the promise of all that he was empowered by his Government to ask, which would be fatal to the schemes of General Ignatiew, who successfully prevented it from taking

place, and who soon showed that he had no intention that the attention of the Conference was to be directed to the subjects for which it had been summoned.

At the first meeting of the foreign representatives in the preliminary exclusive Conference, General Ignatiew made a speech announcing that he was going to lay before us resolutions that had been drawn up by Lord Salisbury and himself on the principle of endeavouring to "faire semblant de maintenir la fiction de l'indépendance du Gouvernement Turc." The independence which our Government had pledged itself to respect was to be treated as a fiction, and the principle thus avowed by the General was inexorably followed to the end. The resolutions proposed to us did not even touch upon the means of putting an end to the Bosnian insurrection or upon making peace with Servia and Montenegro, which were to have been our first and principal duty, but were confined to an elaborate scheme for the administration of Bulgaria. It had been prepared by General Ignatiew for some time, and I had sent it home before the arrival of Lord Salisbury, who of course had had nothing to do with its preparation and whose ignorance of the complicated Turkish provincial administration made him little competent to judge of its merits or demerits; and the new boundaries to be fixed to Vilayets, Sandjaks, Muderliks, or Nahiés, and the attributions to be assigned to Caimakams and Mutessarifs, were to be decided by a set of diplomatists of whom hardly one had even heard these names a week before, and who were profoundly ignorant of the distribution of the various races and creeds in the province with which they were dealing.

I could not, of course, offer any opposition to a scheme which we were told had been approved by my leader, but I thought it right distinctly to record my conviction that if we pushed our demands upon

the Porte too far we should meet with an insuperable refusal to entertain them; and I afterwards represented this still more strongly to Lord Salisbury, and, finding that I failed to move him, I at last determined fully to express my views in a despatch to Lord Derby; but before forwarding it I sent the draft to Lord Salisbury, who, representing how embarrassing it would be to the Government to receive contradictory reports from their two Plenipotentiaries, urged me not to send it; and in consequence of this appeal I reluctantly, and perhaps weakly, consented to keep it back. Thus, the despatch never became an official document, but I give it here, as showing both that I had correctly judged the situation, and that I had done all that I possibly could to open Lord Salisbury's eyes to it.

CONSTANTINOPLE,
December 17, 1876.

"**MY LORD,**

" One of two advantages was to be hoped for from the Conference.

" War between Turkey and Russia might be averted by an agreement being come to between the Powers and the Porte respecting the arrangements to be made for the security of the provincial populations. Should the Conference fail in this great primary object, and a rupture between the two countries become inevitable, good would still be done if a resort to force by Russia could be shown not to be justified by any act of Turkey.

" The proceedings of the preliminary meetings of the Plenipotentiaries give little expectation of either of these advantages being realised.

" The proposals upon which they seem about to agree appear to me to be in excess of the bases communicated to the Porte, and in excess of what the Porte is at all likely to consent to.

"The basis of the reforms to be required for the provinces was stated to the Porte to be the adoption of a system of local or administrative autonomy which should give the population 'some control' over their local affairs, and guarantees against the exercise of arbitrary authority, while at the same time the independence of the Imperial Government was to be respected.

"Nothing could be more reasonable than this proposal, and by a strict adherence to it there would be a fair prospect of obtaining the acquiescence of the Porte; but the projects which are being elaborated by the Plenipotentiaries go so much further that they are likely to be rejected as contrary to the basis agreed upon.

"We may calculate on the Porte objecting that it is not a partial but a nearly unlimited control which is given to the populations, or more properly to the Christian portion of it, which will, moreover, be placed under the direct protection of the Powers.

"There are other provisions in the proposal to be submitted to the Porte about Bulgaria, to which I should anticipate determined resistance by the Turkish Government, and which I myself consider open to the most serious objection.

"I allude especially to the creation of a Christian Militia. In a country recently in insurrection, for which, although promptly repressed, the seeds of a formidable and general movement had been laid, and where the revolutionary committees of Bucharest and Moscow exert immense influence, I can hardly imagine a measure more fraught with danger than the establishment of a militia drawn exclusively from that class of the population in which the disaffection exists, and among whom the late excesses of the Turks have roused a feeling of bitter hatred.

"The exertions of the Marquis of Salisbury have been successful in obtaining the omission of the clause

by which General Ignatiew proposed that the Turkish troops should be confined to the fortresses, or, in other words, be excluded from the whole of the country south of the Balkans where no fortresses exist; but, highly important as this concession is, we must doubt whether the Porte will consider it sufficient to justify them in venturing to create an exclusively Christian Militia.

"The introduction of Christians into the gendarmerie or police, and measures for their gradual incorporation into the army, are points to be insisted upon, which would appear to meet your Lordship's instructions without the probability of encountering any insuperable objections on the part of the Porte.

"The guarantee contemplated by Her Majesty's Government for the execution of the reforms appeared to be a diplomatic veto—as a temporary arrangement—upon the nomination of the Valis, judges and higher officials, unless the appointment of proper administrators could be ensured in some preferable manner, such, for instance, as by means of an international commission such as that which was employed in the affair of the Lebanon. The Plenipotentiaries, however, adopt the suggestion of an international commission, not as an alternative guarantee in the place of a diplomatic veto, but as one in addition to it; and there would besides be the further condition of the presence of a foreign force, although one which could certainly not be regarded as an occupying army likely to cause political danger.

"I have already informed your Lordship of the apparent determination of the Porte not to grant special autonomic institutions to the Slav Provinces alone, but I have thought it my duty now to point out to Her Majesty's Government such of the proposed arrangements as are, in my opinion, most likely to confirm the Porte in its resolution of resistance.

" Much of what is most valuable in the proposals would be easily engrafted into the Law of the Vilayets without any violent disturbance of existing arrangements, and without the undoubted drawback of granting special institutions to a particular race protected by a great and encroaching Power.

" There would necessarily have to be special temporary guarantees for the execution of the reforms in those provinces with which alone we have at present to deal; but, although there will be great difficulty made by the Porte, the more moderate we make them the better will be our chance of overcoming the resistance.

" The formal character of the preliminary meetings of the Plenipotentiaries, and their prolonged duration, have produced the effect that was foreseen on public opinion, and have increased the distrust with which the Conference has been regarded from the first, and the determination to resist proposals which it is believed we are about to submit authoritatively for the acceptance of the Porte.

" I believe that I have already stated to your Lordship how far I am from sharing General Ignatiew's opinion that the Porte will accept anything unanimously insisted upon by the Powers. I may be mistaken; but when, as I have very often done of late, I have said to any of the Turks that if they rejected the proposals which we supported in their own interests they would be left alone in the face of Russia, their calm answer that they must meet the danger as they can, and make the best resistance in their power, appears to indicate a resolution not likely to be shaken.

" If, when the Conference meets, a disposition is shown by the Plenipotentiaries to take fairly into consideration the proposals which the Porte may bring forward for securing to the populations the reforms required for them, we may meet with a spirit of

concession leading to a satisfactory result; but if, on the contrary, we insist too strongly upon the adoption of the plans we have ourselves elaborated, there is more than a probability of our efforts to effect an arrangement proving vain.

“The result must therefore depend upon whether the Russian Ambassador will give way sufficiently to confine the demands within what the Turks consider a fair interpretation of the bases of the Conference.”

Nine formal meetings of the foreign representatives, a Conference in all but the name, were held at the Russian Embassy, without the participation of the Turks, who were incensed at finding that in their own capital an elaborate scheme for the administration of their provinces was being prepared by their arch-enemy General Ignatiew, who, with the co-operation of Lord Salisbury, took the whole task upon himself, as it seemed to be understood that the other Plenipotentiaries would assent to all that was settled by those two.

At the last meeting the General announced the result of his labours and produced what he designated as the irreducible minimum (*minimum irréductible*) “of the demands, the acceptance of which,” he said, “his Government felt sure all the Christian representatives would consider themselves bound in honour to *impose* upon the Turks.” There was to be no question of negotiation; the scheme thus framed was to be flung before the Porte to be swallowed by it in full, or rejected at its peril; and when the full Conference met under the presidency of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, this mode of proceeding was pitilessly adhered to. The objections raised by the Turks to various parts of the proposals were barely listened to, and they were browbeaten to such a degree as to scandalise some of our colleagues, who came

round to me and whispered that they now saw that we had gone too far, and that they would have done better to listen to me.

A meeting was held at the Russian Embassy the next day to consider the answer to be returned to the objections to the "irreducible minimum" put forward by the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, and I determined to make another attempt to obtain the adoption of a more conciliatory course of action, which I recorded in a despatch written the same day. "Believing," I said, "that I possessed a greater knowledge of the character of the Turks and their present disposition than most of my colleagues, I thought it right very freely to express my opinion that if we were still to hope to bring the labours of the Conference to a satisfactory issue, we should not confine ourselves to an endeavour to refute the objections of the Porte; but that we must show a willingness so far to modify our proposals as to bring them back more strictly within what the Turkish Government will consider a fair interpretation of the bases on which the Conference had been proposed to them. I was not criticising the merits of the proposals themselves; but we must remember that the success of the Conference, of which we need not despair, depended upon their acceptance by the Turks, which I believed could only be obtained by sufficient modifications to bring them within what the Porte would regard as the limits of the programme." This speech was little to the taste of General Ignatiew, who looked very glum while I spoke, but on this occasion so many of our colleagues rallied to my views that he saw the necessity of giving way, and the result of the meeting was that he drew up for presentation to the Turkish Plenipotentiaries another document, termed by him the "Quintessence," which in appearance was very different from the irreducible minimum they had been called upon to accept without modification. It

omitted all mention of several of the demands to which the Turks had most strongly objected. The proposed new territorial divisions affecting five of the existing Vilayets, the admission of a body of foreign troops under the orders of an international Commission, and the confinement of the imperial forces to the fortresses and principal towns, which were among the most important features of the original project, were all passed over in silence, and the functions of the proposed international Commission were reduced to insignificance compared to those assigned to them in the "irreducible minimum," by which, supported by a force of 8,000 foreign troops, they were to have a complete control over the country.

Thinking that I might have more influence at the Porte than other members of the Conference, Lord Salisbury sent the paper to me, begging me to urge its acceptance on the Grand Vizier, which, seeing in it the basis for an understanding, I willingly consented to do, and had an interview with Midhat Pasha that was far from discouraging. He practically accepted the schemes of reorganisation as stated in the paper, and I was able to report that the only really important points upon which difficulty seemed likely to be encountered were those relating to the nomination of the Governors-General and the international Commission; and there was no reason why, with a little patient negotiation, either of these should prove insuperable, for Midhat had shown himself not indisposed to consent to temporary Commissions such as had been suggested by our Government, though he would not agree to the permanent establishment of a foreign Commission in a Turkish province. But patience was not one of the virtues of the Conference, nor was negotiation its mode of proceeding, and Midhat Pasha's answer was considered as an absolute rejection of its demands; and,

after one or two more sittings, the Conference, unable to extort the unconditional acceptance it insisted on, announced its approaching dissolution, still confiding in General Ignatiew's assurance that this threat would speedily bring the Turks to their knees; and great was the consternation of the Plenipotentiaries when nothing of the kind occurred, and no attempt was made to detain them; while some, and especially the very able French representative, Count Chaudordy, loudly declared that it was shameful to refuse a hopeful negotiation which might avert the war that could now be foreseen.

The ninth meeting of the Conference took place on January 20, when Safvet Pasha, its President and Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a speech enumerating all the demands that the Porte were ready to accede to, which left only the two respecting the nomination of Governors-General and the international Commissions, upon which any difficulty remained, and with regard to the last the Porte was willing to adopt the proposal of Count Andrassy of two Commissions composed of equal numbers of Christians and Mussulmans, freely elected by the inhabitants of the provinces; but, hopeful as this offer was, the leading members of the Conference were too deeply committed to the principle of coercion that had been followed to be able to bring themselves to adopt a more conciliatory course.

The first object for which the Conference had been called was stated, as I have said, to be the conclusion of peace with Servia and Montenegro, which might easily have been settled in half an hour; for Servia would gladly have accepted peace on the basis of the *status quo ante*, which Turkey was prepared to agree to, and Montenegro would have been well satisfied with the cessions of territory that Midhat was ready to make to it, but no attempt whatever was made to secure this result. The fact of the matter was that

the Conference had so exclusively devoted itself to a scheme of administration for Bulgaria that it had lost sight of everything else, and when it announced its dissolution it was found that the question of peace, the first object for which the Conference was convoked, had been *forgotten*. The omission was so striking that, to my own knowledge, there was one Government, the Italian, and there may have been others, which thought it right to record an expression of their regret that the Conference should have separated without accomplishing this great object, which was so manifestly within its reach; but General Ignatiew went his way rejoicing, for the continuance of a state of war between Turkey and the Principalities was eminently favourable to Russia in the hostilities upon which she was herself resolved.

Two days before the last Conference the Porte, according to custom on very serious occasions, convoked a Grand Council of the most important personages of the Empire, to the number of above two hundred; comprising, besides the Mahometans, representatives of all the different Christian communities, the Patriarchs being represented by their delegates, in order that they might be informed of, and consulted upon, the proposals submitted by the Conference. It was afterwards pretended by the Russian party that the Grand Vizier had laid the question before the Council in such a way as to ensure its rejection; but this assertion, like most of those emanating from the same source, was as nearly as possible the reverse of the truth. I was intimately acquainted with many of the members, both Christian and Mussulman, and as they one and all gave me substantially the same account there could not be a doubt of its accuracy. They said that Midhat Pasha had opened the proceedings in a speech of such pacific tendency, and had pointed out in such strong language the dangers to which the Empire would be exposed by

a war with Russia, that murmurs of disapprobation were raised against him, and without a single dissentient voice the Council pronounced an unequivocal rejection of the proposals concerning the nomination of Governors and the international Commissions, which, it was declared, must be rejected at all hazards, however great these might be.

The Council unquestionably represented the universal feeling of the populations, Mussulman and Christian, between whom there was exhibited a cordiality and good fellowship such as there had probably never been an example of in the history of the Turkish Empire. In the course of the discussion a striking appeal to the Grand Vizier was made by the representative of one of the Christian churches, with the warm approval of all the others. He said that as the decision to be come to might lead to war it was essential to know the character to be given to that war. If it was to be a religious war the Christian populations could not be expected to sympathise with it; but if, on the contrary, it was to be a war for the honour and independence of the Empire, in which they all felt an equal interest, then the Christians would join with their Mussulman fellow-subjects. The scene was described to me as very impressive; the speech was enthusiastically applauded by the members of the Ulema, who called out: "You go to the Church and we go to the Mosque, but we all worship the same God; we are subjects of the same Empire, and mean to live together as brothers."

I may mention as a further proof of the harmony then prevailing that, after the breaking up of the Conference, when it was universally known that I had been strongly opposed to the demands of the Russian Ambassador, who professed to have been acting solely in the interest of the Christian populations, the heads of all the Christian Churches in the Empire, the Greek Patriarch, the Armenian Orthodox

Patriarch, the Armenian Catholicos Patriarch, and the Vekil of the native Protestant Church, as well as the leading Mussulmans, sent me addresses conveying the expression of their regret at my departure and of their warm recognition of my services. It was a sufficient refutation of the accusation so often made against me by English Turcophobes that my sympathy for the Mahometans was so strong as to make me indifferent to the grievances of the Christians, whose attitude on this occasion Mr. Gladstone told me he considered "disgraceful."

That Lord Salisbury should have come to the belief that the Turks would not venture to refuse anything pressed upon them by both England and Russia, although a fatal, was far from an unnatural mistake, in one ignorant of their character and of the temper prevailing among them; but it is not so easy to understand how he can have brought himself to put himself so entirely into General Ignatiew's hands and to accept all his proposals without any independent inquiry as to their being suitable to the situation. Knowing my views upon the subject when he decided to reverse the policy hitherto followed by our Government, he no doubt found himself in a position that was not free from embarrassment; for I was the Queen's Ambassador, associated with him as second Plenipotentiary to the Conference, the instructions of our Government being addressed to me as well as to him, and of my right to be consulted on every step to be taken there could be no possible doubt. He was, however, clearly bound to tell me frankly and openly the course he had resolved upon, and, although I should have tried to dissuade him, I should not have questioned his right, as first Plenipotentiary, to take the line that seemed to him the most desirable, and, with my knowledge of the circumstances, I should have been able to furnish him with arguments to resist the most

objectionable of General Ignatiew's proposals. But this he did not do; and when I found myself without one word of explanation, simply ignored as if I did not exist, while projects were being elaborated of which I knew nothing, but to which I was nominally to be a party, it was not altogether easy to bear it with equanimity, and if I had merely consulted my own inclination I would at once have escaped from the false position in which I was placed by taking the leave of absence for which I was pining; but as this would have been taken as a public declaration of disagreement with Lord Salisbury, which would encourage the Turks to resist his demands, I considered it my most distasteful duty to remain on to the bitter end.

The success of the Russian Ambassador was complete. He had succeeded in getting the impossible demands he had made on the Turkish Government sanctioned by the Plenipotentiaries of all the Great Powers, and, upon their rejection by the Porte, Russia was left free to make the war for which she had been anxious to find a pretext without the danger of protest from any quarter.

Disastrous as that war was to Turkey, it may be confidently asserted that the conditions to which she had to submit under the Treaty of Berlin were far less fatal to her than would have been the acceptance of the Conference proposals, by which the whole of the Sultan's European dominions would have been placed under international Commissions in which Russia must necessarily have been supreme.

As soon as the Conference was over I went home, where I found the Cabinet divided into two parties, of which the one adhered to Lord Salisbury while the other strongly disapproved of the course he had followed; and neither Lord Beaconsfield nor Lord Derby concealed from me how thoroughly they had shared my views.

About three months later it was thought that the Embassy ought no longer to be left under a Chargé d'Affaires, and Lord Derby asked if I felt well enough to resume my duties at Constantinople, which he wished, though it was objected to by a section of the Cabinet. He so fully recognised my right to go back if I wished it that he pledged himself to resign if he could not carry the point, even if it might break up the Government. Nothing could possibly be handsomer than the support he was ready to give me, for no one was more fond of office than Lord Derby; but I told him that, however keenly I should feel the slight of being superseded, I would not, out of personal considerations, insist on a right that might have such serious public consequences, and it was ultimately arranged that Sir H. Layard should be sent on a special and temporary Embassy to Constantinople, while I continued to hold the post of permanent Ambassador to the Porte, the duties of which my health really made me hardly fit to resume. In this way the appearance of my having been set aside was to some extent saved, but the sacrifice that I had made was nevertheless a great one.

I had, however, the satisfaction of knowing that the British residents in Turkey would have welcomed my return; for, far from joining in the attacks that had been lavished upon me in England, they went out of their way to convey to me their dissent from them, and, before I left Constantinople in January 1877, a representative deputation presented me with an address in which they alluded to the reflections that had been cast upon me, which they declared "my life and character, as they had known them for ten years, refuted and belied." This address was signed by all the respectable British residents, without an exception that I am aware of; and some of the principal men of the native Christians, Greek and Armenian, to whose welfare I had been represented as so in-

different, asked to be permitted to join my fellow-countrymen in the testimonial.

Towards the end of the year the Embassy at Vienna became vacant and I was appointed to it by Lord Derby, who, however, resigned a few months later, and was succeeded at the Foreign Office by Lord Salisbury, so that I found myself called upon to serve under a Minister who had shown me at Constantinople such a marked want of confidence and consideration as to make it a question whether I could do so with credit to myself or advantage to the public. But he at once put my mind at rest on that subject. In the interval that had elapsed since the fatal Conference his eyes had been opened to the true situation, and he was now intent on thwarting the designs of Russia, which at Constantinople he had done so much to further: our views were in perfect agreement and, no symptom of distrust remaining, our relations were as cordial and confidential as possible during the time he continued in office.

When I was appointed to Vienna the great anxiety of Lord Beaconsfield was for the re-establishment of the agreement on Eastern politics that used to prevail between the two Governments till it was put an end to by the Drei-Kaiser Bund, to which object all my efforts were to be directed, and I was ultimately entirely successful. But our improving relations received a severe check when, in 1880, Lord Beaconsfield had to make way for Mr. Gladstone, who, in his Midlothian campaign, had been denouncing the Emperor and Austrian Empire in such violent and offensive language as would have made it impossible for the two Governments to be on tolerable terms if Count Karolyi had not extorted from him an apology, very gratifying to Austrian *amour propre*, but very humiliating for a British Prime Minister.

He would probably have been glad to recall me at once, for he had been loud in his blame of my pro-

ceedings at Constantinople, and Turkish affairs were those that had chiefly to be treated at Vienna; but, as I represented the policy of an intimate understanding between England and Austria, he could not, at that moment, venture to take a step which would be understood as being aimed against it, and so I remained on for a couple of years when, at the end of 1883, a diplomatic career of more than usual interest was brought to a close.

APPENDIX

REMARKS ON LORD SALISBURY'S BIOGRAPHY

THESE Recollections were already in the press when the *Life of Lord Salisbury* appeared, and his letters and despatches on the Constantinople Conference call for some comment on the part of the Editor of this book.

Lord Salisbury was evidently much perturbed at the prospect of failure before him and, unwilling to admit that he had misjudged the Turkish mentality and determination, persuaded himself and endeavoured to persuade others that the blame of the failure rested on Sir Henry Elliot's shoulders. In this he was mistaken. Though immeasurably General Ignatiew's superior in intellect as well as in principle, he was in no way armed to meet a totally unscrupulous adversary whose whole life had been passed in the East, and whose energies for years had been solely concentrated on the advancement of Russian interests in Turkey, and on frustrating any progress or tendency towards liberty in that unhappy country. On page 110, vol. ii., of the *Life*, an amusing account is given of the General's attempt to alter on the map a frontier line already determined on, and of Lord Salisbury's "irritated discomfort" until the General beamed on him, and exclaimed: "Monsieur le Marquis est si fin—on ne peut rien lui cacher!" The Englishman threw himself back in an uncontrollable burst of laughter, in which both embarrassment and annoyance vanished." The writer does not perceive that it was the Russian who scored in this encounter of wits. His trick had been detected; for that he cared little, though he would have been glad if it had succeeded; but, what was far more important, he had, by a dexterous compliment, confirmed Lord Salisbury in the belief that he was his equal in diplomatic craft.

Writing of Ignatiew and Midhat (p. 117), Lord Salisbury says: "They are the biggest pair of liars to be found in Europe, but I am inclined (though with much diffidence) to think that Midhat is the falser of the two." Lord Salisbury would have had some difficulty in adducing proofs of Midhat's

falsity, but he utterly disbelieved in the possibility of reforming the Turkish Empire, while Midhat implicitly believed in it. His life had been spent in a struggle to introduce reforms in the Provinces of which he had been Governor, and his endeavours had been repeatedly frustrated by Ignatiew's intrigues, which caused his removal whenever the contented condition of his Vilayet threatened the success of the Muscovite's plans. Unfortunately, Ignatiew's genial manner and amusing companionship were attractive to Lord Salisbury, whose biographer says: "He found his (Ignatiew's) society indeed a refreshing contrast to the monotonous correctitude of his more orthodox diplomatic associates." No one, however great admirer he might be of the patriot Midhat, could by any stretch of imagination find him "refreshing"; he lacked all charm of manner.

As Sir Henry points out in the Recollections, the holding of the preliminary Conference meetings from which the Turks were excluded (a distinct violation of the promise made to them when they reluctantly consented to a Conference being held), almost ensured failure from the first, and the ostentatious friendliness shown by the members of the Special Mission towards the Russian Embassy, coupled with their aloofness and cold demeanour towards their own Embassy, which was known to be friendly to Turkey, did not dispose Turkish patriots to feel any confidence in the Envoy.

Sir Henry had written to Lord Derby before Lord Salisbury's arrival, suggesting that he should be granted leave of absence, as he was the last person who ought to be employed in the negotiation if there was to be any departure from the policy hitherto followed (p. 276), and Lord Derby had begged him to remain. Lord Salisbury can hardly have been ignorant of this, yet we find him (*Life*, p. 117) writing on December 26th, 1876, to Lord Derby complaining of Sir Henry's attitude, and three days later (p. 118) pressing for his recall, and supporting his demand by urging that Count Corti, Count Zichy, Baron Werther, and Count Chaudordy thought it desirable! Counts Corti and Zichy, the Italian and Austrian Ambassadors, were notoriously the tools of General Ignatiew; Baron Werther, the German, was a cypher; and Count Chaudordy, the able French Envoy, quite unacquainted with the East.

On December 17th Sir Henry drafted the despatch to Lord Derby (p. 281) warning him of the consequences likely to follow the course which was being pursued, and, not thinking it fair that Lord Salisbury should remain in ignorance of its

contents, submitted it to him, and allowed himself to be persuaded to abstain from sending it, so that his view of the situation remained unrecorded. Lord Salisbury never informed him that he had demanded his recall. Though stating always that "Sir Henry of course behaves quite loyally" and he is "a thorough gentleman," he complains that the same is not the case with his entourage, and in a letter to Lord Carnarvon (p. 120, vol. ii.), alleges that "all the rascally Levantines who stir up the Porte to hold out cluster round the Embassy. My power of negotiation is almost *nil* so long as he (Sir Henry) stays." This charge against the Embassy was unfounded, and one can only suppose that Lord Salisbury allowed himself to be misled by men whose aim was to make mischief between the two Missions.

On January 11th, 1877, Lord Salisbury wrote (p. 121, vol. ii.): "Our influence here is at a very low ebb." This was perfectly true, but it was not true that "the character of our Ambassador has no doubt done something to ruin our influence, but the character of our policy has done more." Our influence in Turkey never stood higher than it did in the spring and early summer of 1876; the untoward agitation over the Bulgarian Atrocities was the first blow which it received, and the ostentatious preference shown from the day of their arrival by the Special Embassy for the Russian Embassy over their own contributed largely to the distrust with which the Turks regarded Lord Salisbury.

On page 95, vol. ii., of the *Life* we read: "With his gift for rapidly assimilating information, this journey must be regarded as a notable step in Lord Salisbury's progress from an amateur's interest in foreign affairs to an expert's knowledge of them." Just so, but could it be expected that a few weeks' training should enable any man, however gifted, to meet so astute a diplomatist as General Ignatiew on equal terms. And would it not have been better to consult Sir Henry? Would it not have been better to go to this "loyal gentleman" for information, rather than always to seek it from the man who had been for years his chief opponent, and whose standard of morality had been shown by the incident of the map?


Sir Henry Elliot and Lord Salisbury worked together in perfect amity in after years: they were both men who put their country's interest first, but in those very interests it is much to be regretted that the affairs of the Constantinople Conference were not differently managed.

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